# LETTERS,

ON THE

Spirit of PATRIOTISM:

ON THE

Idea of a PATRIOT KING:

AND

On the STATE of PARTIES,

At the Accession of

KING *GEORGE* the First.

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*DUBLIN:*

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

# Advertiſement.

THE following papers were written ſeveral years ago, at the requeſt, and for the ſake of ſome particular friends, without any deſign of ever making them public. How they came to be made ſo at this time, it may be proper to give an account.—— The original draughts were entruſted to a man, on whom the author thought he might intirely depend, after he had exacted from him, and taken his promiſe, that they ſhould never go into any hands, except thoſe of five or ſix perſons, who were then named to him. In this confidence the author reſted ſecurely for ſome years; and tho' he was not without ſuſpicion, that they had been communicated to more perſons than he intended they ſhould be, yet he was kept, by repeated aſſurances, even from ſuſpecting

*that any copies had gone into hands unknown to him. But this man was no ſooner dead, than he received information that an entire edition of* 1500 *copies of theſe papers had been printed; that this very man had corrected the preſs, and that he had left them in the hands of the printer, to be kept with great ſecrecy, till further order. The honeſt printer kept his word with him better than he kept his with his friend; ſo that the whole edition came at laſt into the hands of the author, except ſome few copies which this perſon had taken out of the heap, and carried away. Theſe are, doubtleſs, the copies which have been handed about, not very privately, ſince his death. The reſt were all deſtroyed in one common fire as ſoon as they were given up, except a copy or two, which have never been ſince out of the author's own hands. By theſe copies it appeared, that the man who had been guilty of this breach of truſt, had taken upon him further to divide the ſubject, and to alter and to omit paſſages, according*

*cording to the ſuggeſtions of his own fancy.*

*What aggravates this proceeding extremely is, that the author had told him on ſeveral occaſions, among other reaſons why he would not conſent to the publication of theſe papers, that they had been writ in too much heat and hurry for the public eye, tho' they might be truſted to a few particular friends. He added, more than once, that ſome things required to be ſoftened, others to be ſtrengthened, and the whole moſt certainly to be corrected; even if they were to remain, as he then imagined they would, in the hands of a few friends only. This has been done ſince, that there might be one copy at leaſt more conformable to the author's intentions than thoſe which had gone abroad, or even than his original manuſcripts.*

*There is ſcarce a man in the world more detached from it, at this hour, than the author of theſe papers, or more indifferent to the cenſure of moſt people in*

*it, having nothing to expect, nor any thing to fear from them. He might, therefore, in his way of life, and in his diſpoſition of mind, either not have known that ſcraps and fragments of theſe papers had been employed to ſwell a* monthly magazine, *and that the ſame honourable employment of them was to be continued; or, knowing it, he might have deſpiſed and neglected it. But ſome of his friends thought that it was too much to ſuffer this breach of truſt, and the licentious advantage taken of it, to make him appear the author of writings, which were become more properly the writings of others than his, conſidering how they had been garbled, and in what manner they were publiſhed. The editor therefore, who has in his hands the genuine copy which the author reſerved to himſelf, after reviſing and correcting the originals, reſolved to publiſh it; ſince it was become impoſſible to hinder ſuch as were not genuine from being retailed monthly or weekly to the world. Neither the author nor he would give*

*offence*

*offence wantonly to the living: but the author neither can, nor ought, on any account, to neglect what truth, honour, and the juſtice due to his own character require. Neither the author nor he affect to accuſe miniſters after their death, as the* Egyptians *formerly accuſed even their kings. There is the leſs reaſon to do ſo, ſince the former may be, and are accuſed, without ſcruple, tho' without ſucceſs for the moſt part, during their lives. The anecdotes here related were true, and the reflections made upon them were juſt, many years ago. The former would not have been related, if he who related them had not known them to be true; nor the latter have been made, if he who made them had not thought them juſt: and if they were true and juſt then, they muſt be true and juſt now and always. The author therefore ſcorns to diſown them: and the editor thinks that he has no excuſe to make for publiſhing them.*

# LETTER I.

## *On the* SPIRIT *of* PATRIOTISM.

*My* LORD, 1736.

YOU have engaged me on a ſubject which interrupts the ſeries of thoſe letters I was writing to you; but it is one, which, I confeſs, I have very much at heart. I ſhall therefore explain myſelf fully, nor bluſh to reaſon on principles that are out of faſhion among men, who intend nothing by ſerving the public, but to feed their avarice, their vanity, and their luxury, without the ſenſe of any duty they owe to God or man.

It ſeems to me, that in order to maintain the moral ſyſtem of the world at a certain point, far below that of ideal perfection, (for we are made capable of conceiving

ceiving what we are incapable of attaining,) but however ſufficient upon the whole to conſtitute a ſtate eaſy and happy, or at the worſt tolerable: I ſay, it ſeems to me, that the Author of nature has thought fit to mingle from time to time, among the ſocieties of men, a few, and but a few of thoſe, on whom he is graciouſly pleaſed to beſtow a larger proportion of the ethereal ſpirit that is given in the ordinary courſe of his providence to the ſons of men. Theſe are they who engroſs almoſt the whole reaſon of the ſpecies, who are born to inſtruct, to guide, and to preſerve; who are deſigned to be the tutors and the guardians of human kind. When they prove ſuch, they exhibit to us examples of the higheſt virtue, and the trueſt piety: and they deſerve to have their feſtivals kept, inſtead of that pack of *Anachorites* and *Enthuſiaſts*, with whoſe names the calendar is crowded and diſgraced. When theſe men apply their talents to other purpoſes, when they ſtrive to be great and deſpiſe being good, they commit a moſt ſacrilegious breach of truſt; they pervert the means, they defeat as far as lies in them, the deſigns of providence, and diſturb in ſome ſort the ſyſtem of infinite wiſdom. To miſapply theſe talents is the moſt diffuſed, and therefore

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the greateſt of crimes in it's nature and conſequences; but to keep them unexerted, and unemployed, is a crime too. Look about you, my Lord, from the palace to the cottage; you will find that the bulk of mankind is made to breathe the air of this atmoſphere, to roam about this globe, and to conſume, like the courtiers of *Alcinous*, the fruits of the earth. *Nos numerus ſumus & fruges conſumere nati.* When they have trod this inſipid round a certain number of years, and begot others to do the ſame after them, they have lived: and if they have performed in ſome tolerable degree, the ordinary moral duties of life, they have done all they were born to do. Look about you again, my Lord, nay look into your own breaſt, and you will find that there are ſuperior ſpirits, men who ſhew even from their infancy, tho' it be not always perceived by others, perhaps not always felt by themſelves, that they were born for ſomething more, and better. Theſe are the men to whom the part I mentioned is aſſigned. Their talents denote their *general deſignation*, and the opportunities of conforming themſelves to it, that ariſe in the courſe of things, or that are preſented to them by any circumſtances of rank and ſituation in the ſociety to which they belong, denote the *particular*

*vocation* which it is not lawful for them to reſiſt, nor even to neglect. The duration of the lives of ſuch men as theſe is to be determined, I think, by the length and importance of the parts they act, not by the number of years that paſs between their coming into the world, and their going out of it. Whether the piece be of three, or five acts, the part may be long: and he who ſuſtains it thro the whole may be ſaid to die in the fulneſs of years; whilſt he, who declines it ſooner, may be ſaid not to live out half his days.

I have ſometimes repreſented to myſelf the *Vulgar*, who are accidentally diſtinguiſhed by the titles of king and ſubject, of lord and vaſſal, of nobleman and peaſant; and the *few* who are diſtinguiſhed by nature ſo eſſentially from the herd of mankind, that (figure apart) they ſeem to be of another ſpecies, in this manner. The former come into the world and continue in it like *Dutch travellers* in a foreign country. Every thing they meet has the grace of novelty: and they are fond alike of every thing that is new. They wander about from one object to another, of vain curioſity, or inelegant pleaſure. If they are induſtrious, they ſhew their induſtry in copying ſigns, and collecting mottos and

and epitaphs. They loiter, or they trifle away their whole time: and their preſence or their abſence would be equally unperceived, if caprice or accident did not raiſe them often to ſtations, wherein their ſtupidity, their vices, or their follies, make them a public misfortune. The latter come into the world, or at leaſt continue in it after the effects of ſurprize and inexperience are over, like men who are ſent on more important errants. They obſerve with diſtinction, they admire with knowledge. They may indulge themſelves in pleaſure; but as their induſtry is not employed about trifles, ſo their amuſements are not made the buſineſs of their lives. Such men cannot paſs unperceived thro' a country. If they retire from the world, their ſplendor accompanies them, and enlightens even the obſcurity of their retreat. If they take a part in public life, the effect is never indifferent. They either appear like miniſters of divine vengeance, and their courſe thro' the world is marked by deſolation and oppreſſion, by poverty and ſervitude: or they are the guardian angels of the country they inhabit, buſy to avert even the moſt diſtant evil, and to maintain or to procure peace, plenty, and the greateſt of human bleſſings, liberty.

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From the obſervation, that ſuperiority of parts is often employed to do ſuperior miſchief, no conſequence can be drawn againſt the truth I endeavour to eſtabliſh. Reaſon collects the will of God from the conſtitution of things, in this as in other caſes; but in no caſe does the Divine power impel us neceſſarily to conform ourſelves to this will: and therefore from the miſapplication of ſuperior parts to the hurt, no argument can be drawn againſt this poſition, that they were given for the good of mankind. Reaſon deceives us not: we deceive ourſelves, and ſuffer our wills to be determined by other motives. MONTAIGNE or CHARRON would ſay, *l'homme ſe pipe*, 'man is at once his own 'ſharper and his own bubble.' Human nature is her own bawd, ſays TULLY, *Blanda conciliatrix & quaſi lena ſui*. He who conſiders the univerſal wants, imperfections and vices of his kind, muſt agree that men were intented not only for ſociety, but to unite in commonwealths, and ſubmit to laws. *Legum idcirco omnes ſervi ſumus, ut liberi eſſe poſſimus.* And yet this very man will be ſeduced by his own paſſions, or the paſſions and examples of others, to think, or to act as if he thought, the very contrary. So he who is conſcious of

of ſuperior endowments, ſuch as render him more capable than the generality of men to ſecure and improve the advantages of ſocial life, by preſerving the commonwealth in ſtrength and ſplendor, even he may be ſeduced to think, or to act as if he thought, that theſe endowments were given him for the gratification of his ambition, and his other paſſions; and that there is no difference between vice and virtue, between a knave and an honeſt man, but one which a prince who died not many years ago, aſſerted, 'that men of great 'ſenſe were therefore knaves, and men 'of little ſenſe were therefore honeſt.' But in neither of theſe caſes will the truth and reaſon of things be altered, by ſuch examples of human frailty. It will be ſtill true, and reaſon will ſtill demonſtrate, that all men are directed by the general conſtitution of human nature, to ſubmit to government; and that ſome men are in a particular manner deſigned to take care of that government on which the common happineſs depends. The uſe that reaſon will make of ſuch examples will be only this, that ſince men are ſo apt, in every form of life and every degree of underſtanding, to act againſt their intereſt and their duty too, without benevolence to mankind, or regard to the divine will; it is the more incumbent on

thoſe,

thoſe, who have this benevolence and this regard at heart, to employ all the means that the nature of the government allows, and that rank, circumſtances of ſituations, or ſuperiority of talents, give them, to oppoſe evil, and promote good government; and contribute thus to preſerve the moral ſyſtem of the world, at that point of imperfection at leaſt, which ſeems to have been preſcribed to it by the great Creator of every ſyſtem of beings.

Give me leave now, my Lord, to caſt my eyes for a moment homeward, and to apply what I have been ſaying to the preſent ſtate of *Britain*. That there is no profuſion of the ethereal ſpirit to be obſerved among us, and that we do not abound with men of ſuperior genius, I am ready to confeſs; but I think there is no ground for the complaints I have heard made, as if nature had not done her part in our age, as well as in former ages, by producing men capable of ſerving the commonwealth. The manners of our fore-fathers were, I believe, in many reſpects better: they had more probity perhaps, they had certainly more ſhow of honour, and greater induſtry. But ſtill nature ſows alike, tho' we do not reap alike. There are, and as there always have

have been, there always will be ſuch creatures in government as I have deſcribed above. Fortune maintains a kind of rivalſhip with wiſdom, and piques herſelf often in favour of fools as well as knaves. SOCRATES uſed to ſay, that altho' no man undertakes a trade he has not learned, even the meaneſt; yet every one thinks himſelf ſufficiently qualified for the hardeſt of all trades, that of government. He ſaid this upon the experience he had in *Greece*. He would not change his opinion if he lived now in *Britain*. But however, ſuch characters as theſe would do little hurt, generally ſpeaking, or would not do it long, if they ſtood alone. To do great hurt, ſome genius, ſome knowledge, ſome talents in ſhort, natural or acquired, are neceſſary: leſs indeed, far leſs than are required, to do good, but always ſome. Yet I imagine, not the worſt miniſter could do all the miſchief he does by the miſapplication of his talents alone, if it were not for the miſapplication of much better talents than his by ſome who join with him, and the non-application, or the faint and unſteady exerciſe of their talents by ſome who oppoſe him; as well as the general remiſſneſs of mankind in acquiring knowledge, and in improving the parts which God has given

given them for the ſervice of the public. Theſe are the great ſprings of national misfortunes. There have been monſters in other ages, and other countries, as well as ours; but they have never continued their devaſtations long, when there were heroes to oppoſe them. We will ſuppoſe a man impudent, raſh, preſumptuous, ungracious, inſolent and profligate, in ſpeculation as well as practice. He can bribe, but he cannot ſeduce: he can buy, but he cannot deceive. From whence then has ſuch a man his ſtrength? From the general corruption, of the people, nurſed up to a full maturity under his adminiſtration; from the venality of all orders and all ranks of men, ſome of whom are ſo proſtitute, that they ſet themſelves to ſale, and even prevent application. This would be the anſwer, and it would be a true one as far as it goes; but it does not account for the whole. Corruption could not ſpread with ſo much ſucceſs, tho' reduced into ſyſtem; and tho' ſome miniſters, with equal impudence and folly, avowed it by themſelves and their advocates, to be the principal expedient by which they governed, if a long and almoſt unobſerved progreſſion of cauſes and effects, did not prepare the conjucture. Let me explain

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it and apply it, as I conceive it. One party had given their whole attention, during ſeveral years, to the project of enriching themſelves, and impoveriſhing the reſt of the nation; and, by theſe and other means, of eſtabliſhing their dominion under the government and with the favour of a family, who were foreigners, and therefore might believe, that they were eſtabliſhed on the throne by the good will and ſtrength of this party alone. This party in general were ſo intent on theſe views, and many of them, I fear, are ſo ſtill, that they did not advert in time to the neceſſary conſequences of the meaſures they abetted: nor did they conſider, that the power they raiſed, and by which they hoped to govern their country, would govern them with the very rod of iron they forged, and would be the power of a prince or miniſter, not that of a party long. Another party continued ſour, ſullen, and inactive, with judgments ſo weak, and paſſions ſo ſtrong, that even experience, and a ſevere one ſurely, was loſt upon them. They waited, like the *Jews*, for a *Meſſiah*, that may never come; and under whom, if he did come, they would be ſtrangely diſappointed in their expectations of glory and triumph, and univerſal dominion.

Whilſt

Whilſt they waited, they were marked out like the *Jews*, a diſtinct race, hewers of wood and drawers of water, ſcarce members of the community, tho' born in the country. All indifferent men ſtood as it were at a gaze: and the few, who were jealous of the court, were ſtill more jealous of one another; ſo that a ſtrength ſufficient to oppoſe bad miniſters was not eaſy to be formed. When this ſtrength was formed, and the inſufficiency or iniquity of the adminiſtration was daily expoſed to public view, many adhered at firſt to the miniſter, and others were ſince gained to his cauſe, becauſe they knew nothing of the conſtitution of their own, nor of the hiſtory of other countries; but imagined wildly, that things always went as they ſaw them go, and that liberty has been, and therefore may be preſerved under the influence of the ſame corruption. Others perhaps were weak enough to be frighted at firſt, as ſome are hypocritical enough to pretend to be ſtill, with the appellations of Tory and Jacobite, which are always ridiculouſly given to every man who does not bow to the brazen image that the king has ſet up. Others again might be perſuaded, that no fatal uſe at leaſt would be made of the power acquired by corruption; and men of ſuperior

perior parts might and may ſtill flatter themſelves, that if this power ſhould be ſo employed, they ſhall have time and means to ſtop the effects of it. The firſt of theſe are ſeduced by their ignorance and futility; the ſecond, if they are not hypocrites, by their prejudices; the third, by their partiality and blind confidence; the laſt, by their preſumption; and all of them by the mammon of unrighteouſneſs, their private intereſt, which they endeavour to palliate and to reconcile as well as they can to that of the public: *& cæca cupiditate corrupti, non intelligunt ſe, dum vendunt, & vænire.*

According to this repreſentation, which I take to be true, your Lordſhip will agree that our unfortunate country affords an example in proof of what is aſſerted above. The *Dutch* travellers I ſpoke of, men of the ordinary, or below the ordinary ſize of underſtanding, tho' they are called by caprice, or lifted any other way into power, cannot do great and long miſchief, in a country of liberty; unleſs men of genius, knowledge, and experience, miſapply theſe talents, and become their leaders. A miniſterial faction would have as little ability to hurt, as they have inclination to do good, if they were not formed and conducted by one of better parts than

than they: nor would ſuch a miniſter be able to ſupport, at the head of this truſty phalanx, the ignominious tyranny impoſed on his country, if other men, of better parts and much more conſequence than himſelf, were not drawn in to miſapply theſe parts to the vileſt drudgery imaginable; the daily drudgery of explaining folly, concealing and even juſtifying fraud and corruption; inſtead of employing their knowledge, their elocution, their ſkill, experience and authority, to correct the adminiſtration and to guard the conſtitution. But this is not all: the example ſhews a great deal more. Your Lordſhip's experience as well as mine will juſtify what I am going to ſay. It ſhews further, that ſuch a conjuncture could not be rendered effectual to preſerve power in ſome of the weakeſt and ſome of the worſt hands in the kingdom, if there was not a non-application, or a faint and unſteady exerciſe of parts on one ſide, as well as an iniquitous miſapplication of them on the other: and I cannot help ſaying, let it fall where it will, what I have ſaid perhaps already, that the former is a crime but one degree inferior to the latter. The more genius, induſtry, and ſpirit are employed to deſtroy, the harder the taſk

of

of ſaving our country becomes; but the duty increaſes with the difficulty, if the principles on which I reaſon are true. In ſuch exigences it is not enough that *genius* be oppoſed to *genius*, *ſpirit* muſt be matched by *ſpirit*. They who go about to deſtroy, are animated from the firſt by ambition and avarice, the love of power and of money: fear makes them often deſperate at laſt. They muſt be oppoſed therefore, or they will be oppoſed in vain, by a ſpirit able to cope with ambition, avarice, and deſpair itſelf: by a ſpirit able to cope with theſe paſſions, when they are favoured and fortified by the weakneſs of a nation, and the ſtrength of a government. In ſuch exigences there is little difference, as to the merit or the effect, between oppoſing faintly and unſteadily, and not oppoſing at all: nay the former may be of worſe conſequence in certain circumſtances than the latter. And this is a truth I wiſh with all my heart you may not ſee verified in our country, where many, I fear, undertake oppoſition not as a *duty*, but as an *adventure*: and looking on themſelves like volunteers, not like men liſted in the ſervice, they deem themſelves at liberty to take as much or as little of this trouble, and to continue in it as long, or end it as ſoon as they pleaſe. It is but a few years ago,

ago, that not the merchants alone, but the whole nation, took fire at the project of new exciſes. The project was oppoſed, not on mercantile conſiderations and intereſts alone, but on the true principles of liberty. In parliament, the oppoſition was ſtrenuouſly enough ſupported for a time; but there was ſo little diſpoſition to guide and improve the ſpirit, that the chief concern of thoſe who took the lead ſeemed applied to keep it down; and yet your Lordſhip remembers how high it continued againſt the projector; till it was calmed juſt before the elections of the preſent parliament, by the remarkable indolence and inactivity of the laſt ſeſſion of the laſt. But theſe friends of ours, my Lord, are as much miſtaken in their ethics, as the event will ſhew they have been in their politics.

The ſervice of our country is no chimerical, but a real duty. He who admits the proofs of any other moral duty, drawn from the conſtitution of human nature, or from the moral fitneſs and unfitneſs of things, muſt admit them in favour of this duty, or be reduced to the moſt abſurd inconſiſtency. When he has once admitted the duty on theſe proofs, it will be no difficult matter to demonſtrate to him,

him, that his obligation to the performance of it is in proportion to the means and the opportunities he has of performing it; and that nothing can discharge him from this obligation as long as he has these means and these opportunities in his power, and as long as his country continues in the same want of his services. These obligations then to the public service may become obligations for life on certain persons. No doubt they may: and shall this consideration become a reason for denying or evading them? On the contrary, sure it should become a reason for acknowledging and fulfilling them, with the greatest gratitude to the Supreme Being, who has made us capable of acting so excellent a part, and of the utmost benevolence to mankind. Superior talents, and superior rank amongst our fellow-creatures, whether acquired by birth, or by the course of accidents, and the success of our own industry, are noble prerogatives. Shall he who possesses them repine at the obligation they lay him under, of passing his whole life in the noblest occupation of which human nature is capable? To what higher station, to what greater glory can any mortal aspire, than to be, during the whole

courſe of his life, the ſupport of good, the controul of bad government, and the guardian of public liberty? To be driven from hence by ſucceſsful tyranny, by loſs of health or of parts, or by the force of accidents, is to be degraded in ſuch a manner as to deſerve pity, and not to incur blame: but to degrade ourſelves, to deſcend voluntarily, and by choice, from the higheſt to a lower, perhaps to the loweſt rank among the ſons of ADAM; to abandon the government of men for that of hounds and horſes, the care of a kingdom for that of a pariſh, and a ſcene of great and generous efforts in public life, for one of trifling amuſements and low cares, of ſloth and of idleneſs, what is it, my Lord? I had rather your Lordſhip ſhould name it than I. Will it be ſaid that it is hard to exact from ſome men, in favour of others, that they ſhould renounce all the pleaſures of life, and drudge all their days in buſineſs, that others may indulge themſelves in eaſe? It will be ſaid without grounds. A life dedicated to the ſervice of our country admits the full uſe, and no life ſhould admit the abuſe, of pleaſures: the leaſt are conſiſtent with a conſtant diſcharge of our public duty, the greateſt

ariſe

ariſe from it. The common, the ſenſual pleaſures to which nature prompts us, and which reaſon therefore does not forbid, tho' ſhe ſhould always direct, are ſo far from being excluded out of a life of buſineſs, that they are ſometimes neceſſary in it, and are always heightened by it: thoſe of the table, for inſtance, may be ordered ſo as to promote that which the elder CATO calls *vitæ conjunctionem*. In the midſt of public duties, private ſtudies, and an extreme old age, he found time to frequent the *ſodalitates*, or clubs of friends at *Rome*, and to ſit up all night with his neighbours in the country of the *Sabines*. CATO's virtue often glowed with wine: and the love of women did not hinder CÆSAR from forming and executing the greateſt projects that ambition ever ſuggeſted. But if CÆSAR, whilſt he laboured to deſtroy the liberties of his country, enjoyed theſe inferior pleaſures of life, which a man who labours to ſave thoſe liberties may enjoy as well as he; there are ſuperior pleaſures in a buſy life that CÆSAR never knew, thoſe, I mean, that ariſe from a faithful diſcharge of our duty to the commonwealth. Neither MONTAIGNE in writing his eſſays, nor DES CARTES in building new worlds, nor BURNET in

framing an antedeluvian earth, no nor NEWTON in diſcovering and eſtabliſhing the true laws of nature on experiment and a ſublimer geometry, felt more intellectual joys, than he feels who is a *real patriot*, who bends all the force of his underſtanding, and directs all his thoughts and actions, to the good of his country. When ſuch a man forms a political ſcheme, and adjuſts various and ſeemingly independent parts in it to one great and good deſign, he is tranſported by imagination, or abſorbed in meditation, as much and as agreeably as they: and the ſatisfaction that ariſes from the different importance of theſe objects, in every ſtep of the work, is vaſtly in his favour. It is here that the ſpeculative philoſopher's labour and pleaſure end. But he who ſpeculates in order to *act*, goes on, and carries his ſcheme into execution. His labour continues, it varies, it increaſes; but ſo does his pleaſure too. The execution indeed is often traverſed, by unforeſeen and untoward circumſtances, by the perverſeneſs or treachery of friends, and by the power and malice of enemies: but the firſt and the laſt of theſe animate, and the docility and fidelity of ſome men make amends for the perverſeneſs and treachery of others.

Whilſt

Whilſt a great event is in ſuſpenſe, the action warms, and the very ſuſpenſe, made up of hope and fear, maintains no unpleaſing agitation in the mind. If the event is decided ſucceſsfully, ſuch a man enjoys pleaſure proportionable to the good he has done; a pleaſure like to that which is attributed to the Supreme Being, on a ſurvey of his works. If the event is decided otherwiſe, and uſurping courts, or overbearing parties prevail; ſuch a man has ſtill the teſtimony of his conſcience, and a ſenſe of the honour he has acquired, to ſoothe his mind, and ſupport his courage. For altho' the courſe of ſtate-affairs be to thoſe who meddle in them like a lottery, yet it is a lottery wherein no good man can be a loſer: he may be reviled, it is true, inſtead of being applauded, and may ſuffer violence of many kinds. I will not ſay, like SENECA, that the nobleſt ſpectacle which God can behold, is a virtuous man ſuffering, and ſtruggling with afflictions: but this I will ſay, that the ſecond CATO driven out of the forum, and dragged to priſon, enjoyed more inward pleaſure, and maintained more outward dignity, than they who inſulted him, and who triumphed in the ruin of their country. But the very example of CATO

may be urged perhaps againſt what I have inſiſted upon: it may be aſked, what good he did to *Rome*, by dedicating his whole life to her ſervice, what honour to himſelf by dying at *Utica?* It may be ſaid, that governments have their periods like all things human; that they may be brought back to their primitive principles during a certain time, but that when theſe principles are worn out, in the minds of men, it is a vain enterprize to endeavour to renew them: that this is the caſe of all governments, when the corruption of the people comes to a great pitch, and is grown univerſal: that when a houſe which is old, and quite decayed, tho' often repaired, not only cracks, but totters even from the foundations, every man in his ſenſes runs out of it, and takes ſhelter where he can, and that none but madmen continue obſtinate to repair what is irreparable, till they are cruſhed in the ruin. Juſt ſo, that we muſt content ourſelves to live under the government we like the leaſt, when that form which we like the moſt is deſtroyed, or worn out; according to the counſel of DOLABELLA in one of his letters to CICERO. But, my Lord, if CATO could not ſave, he prolonged the life of liberty: the liberties of *Rome* would have

have been loſt when CATILINE attacked them, abetted probably by CÆSAR and CRASSUS, and the worſt Citizens of *Rome*; and when CICERO defended them, abetted by CATO and the beſt. That CATO erred in his conduct, by giving way too much to the natural roughneſs of his temper, and by allowing too little for that of the *Romans*, among whom luxury had long prevailed, and corruption was openly practiſed, is moſt true. He was incapable of employing thoſe ſeeming compliances that are reconcileable to the greateſt ſteadineſs, and treated unſkilfully a crazy conſtitution. The ſafety of the commonwealth depended, in that critical conjuncture, on a *coalition of parties*, the *ſenatorian* and the *equeſtrian*: TULLY had formed it, CATO broke it. But if this good, for I think he was not an able man, erred in the particular reſpects I have ventured to mention, he deſerved moſt certainly the glory he acquired by the general tenor of his conduct, and by dedicating the whole labour of his life to the ſervice of his country. He would have deſerved more if he had perſiſted in maintaining the ſame cauſe to the end, and would have died I think with a better grace at *Munda* than at *Utica*. If this be ſo, if CATO may be cenſured,

ſured, ſeverely indeed, but juſtly, for abandoning the cauſe of liberty, which he would not however ſurvive; what ſhall we ſay of thoſe, who embrace it faintly, purſue it irreſolutely, grow tired of it when they have much to hope, and give it up when they have nothing to fear?

My Lord, I have inſiſted the more on this duty which men owe to their country, becauſe I came out of *England*, and continue ſtill, ſtrongly affected with what I ſaw when I was there. Our government has approached, nearer than ever before, to the true principles of it, ſince the revolution of one thouſand ſix hundred and eighty eight: and the acceſſion of the preſent family to the throne, has given the faireſt opportunities, as well as the juſteſt reaſons, for compleating the ſcheme of liberty, and improving it to perfection. But it ſeems to me, that, in our ſeparate world, as the means of aſſerting and ſupporting liberty are increaſed, all concern for it is diminiſhed. I beheld, when I was among you, more abject ſervility, in the manners and behaviour of particular men, than I ever ſaw in *France*, or than has been ſeen there, I believe, ſince the days of that *Gaſcon*, who, being turned out

out of the miniſter's door, leaped in again at his window. As to bodies of men, I dare challenge your Lordſhip, and I am ſorry for it, to produce any inſtances of reſiſtance to the unjuſt demands, or wanton will of a court, that *Britiſh* parliaments have given, comparable to ſuch as I am able to cite to the honour of the *parliament of Paris*, and the whole body of the law in that country, within the ſame compaſs of time. This abject ſervility may appear juſtly the more wonderful in *Britain*, becauſe the government of *Britain* has, in ſome ſort, the appearance of an oligarchy: and monarchy is rather hid behind it than ſhewn, rather weakened than ſtrengthened, rather impoſed upon than obeyed. The wonder therefore is to obſerve, how imagination and cuſtom, (a giddy fool and a formal Pedant) have rendered theſe cabals, or oligarchies, more reſpected than majeſty itſelf. That this ſhould happen in countries where princes, who have abſolute power, may be tyrants themſelves, or ſubſtitute ſubordinate tyrants, is not wonderful. It has happened often: but that it ſhould happen in *Britain*, may be juſtly an object of wonder. In theſe countries, the people had loſt the armour of their conſtitution: they were naked and

defenceleſs. Ours is more compleat than ever. But tho' we have preſerved the *armour*, we have loſt the *ſpirit* of our conſtitution: and therefore we bear, from little engroſſers of delegated power, what our fathers would not have ſuffered from true proprietors of the royal authority. Parliaments are not only what they always were, eſſential parts of our conſtitution, but eſſential Parts of our adminiſtration too. They do not claim the executive power. No. But the executive power cannot be exerciſed without their annual concurrence. How few months, inſtead of years, have princes, and miniſters now, to paſs without inſpection and controul? How *eaſy* therefore is it become to check every growing evil in the bud, to change every bad adminiſtration, to keep ſuch farmers of government in awe, to maintain and revenge, if need be, the conſtitution? It is become ſo eaſy by the preſent form of our government, that corruption *alone* could not deſtroy us. We muſt want *ſpirit*, as well as *virtue*, to periſh. Even able knaves would preſerve liberty in ſuch circumſtances as ours, and highwaymen would ſcorn to receive the wages and do the drudgery of pickpockets. But all is little, and low, and mean among

among us! Far from having the *virtues*, we have not even the *vices* of great men. He who had pride inſtead of vanity, and ambition but equal to his deſire of wealth, could never bear, I do not ſay to be the underſtrapper to any farmer of royal authority, but to ſee patiently one of them (at beſt his fellow, perhaps his inferior in every reſpect) lord it over him, and the reſt of mankind, diſſipating wealth, and trampling on the liberties of his country, with impunity. This could not happen, if there was the leaſt ſpirit among us. But there is none. What paſſes among us for ambition, is an odd mixture of avarice and vanity: the moderation we have ſeen practiſed is puſillanimity, and the philoſophy that ſome men affect is ſloth. Hence it comes that corruption has ſpread, and prevails.

I expect little from the principal actors that tread the ſtage at preſent. They are divided, not ſo much as it has ſeemed, and as they would have it believed, about *meaſures:* the true diviſion is about their different *ends*. Whilſt the miniſter was not hard puſhed, nor the proſpect of ſucceeding to him near, they appeared to have but one end, the reformation of the

government. The deſtruction of the miniſter was purſued only as a preliminary, but of eſſential and indiſpenſable neceſſity to that end. But when his deſtruction ſeemed to approach, the *object* of his *ſucceſſion* interpoſed to the ſight of many, and the *reformation* of the *government* was no longer their point of view. They divided the ſkin, at leaſt in their thoughts, before they had taken the beaſt, and the common fear of hunting him down for others made them all faint in the chace. It was *this*, and this alone, that *has* ſaved him, or *has* put off his evil day. Corruption, ſo much, and ſo juſtly complained of, could not have done it *alone*.

When I ſay that I expect little from the principal actors that tread the ſtage at preſent, I am far from applying to all of them what I take to be true of the far greateſt part. There are men among them who certainly intend the good of their country, and whom I love and honour for that reaſon. But theſe men have been clogged, or miſled, or overborne by others; and, ſeduced by natural temper to inactivity, have taken any excuſe, or yielded to any pretence that favoured it. That they ſhould rouſe therefore

fore in themſelves, or in any one elſe, the ſpirit they have ſuffered, nay helped to dye away, I do not expect. I turn my eyes from the generation that is going off, to the generation that is coming on the ſtage. I expect good from them, and from none of them more than from you, my Lord. Remember that the oppoſition in which you have engaged, at your firſt entrance into buſineſs, is not an oppoſition only to a bad adminiſtration of public affairs, but to an adminiſtration that ſupports itſelf by means, eſtabliſhes principles, introduces cuſtoms repugnant to the conſtitution of our government, and deſtructive of all liberty; that you do not only combat preſent evils, but attempts to entail theſe evils upon you and your poſterity; that if you ceaſe the combat, you give up the cauſe: and that he, who does not renew on every occaſion his claim, may forfeit his right.

Our diſputes were formerly, to ſay the truth, much more about perſons than things; or at moſt about particular points of political conduct, in which we ſhould have ſoon agreed, if perſons, and perſonal intereſts had been leſs concerned, and the blind prejudice of party leſs prevalent.

Whether

Whether the *Big-endians* or the *Little-endians* got the better, I believe no man of ſenſe and knowledge thought the conſtitution concerned; notwithſtanding all the clamour raiſed at one time about the *danger* of the *church*, and at another about the *danger* of the *proteſtant ſucceſſion*. But the caſe is at this time vaſtly altered. The means of invading liberty more effectually by the conſtitution of the *revenue*, than it ever had been invaded by *prerogative*, were not then grown up into ſtrength. They are ſo now; and a bold and inſolent uſe is made of them. To reform the *ſtate* therefore is, and ought to be, the object of your oppoſition, as well as to reform the *adminiſtration*. Why do I ſay as well? It is ſo, and it ought to be ſo, much more. Wreſt the power of the government, if you can, out of hands that have employed it weakly and wickedly, ever ſince it was thrown into them, by a ſilly bargain made in one reign, and a corrupt bargain made in another. But do not imagine this to be your ſole, or your principal buſineſs. You owe to your country, to your honour, to your ſecurity, to the preſent, and to future ages, that no endeavours of your's be wanting to repair the breach that is made, and is increaſing

increaſing daily in the conſtitution, and to ſhut up with all the bars and bolts of law, the principal entries thro' which theſe torrents of corruption have been let in upon us. I ſay the *principal* entries; becauſe, however it may appear in pure ſpeculation, I think it would not be found in practice poſſible, no nor eligible neither, to ſhut them up *all*. As entries of corruption none of them deſerve to be excepted: but there is a juſt diſtinction to be made, becauſe there is a real difference. *Some* of theſe entries are opened by the abuſe of powers, neceſſary to maintain ſubordination, and to carry on even good government, and therefore neceſſary to be preſerved in the crown, notwithſtanding the abuſe that is ſometimes made of them; for no human inſtitution can arrive at perfection, and the moſt that human wiſdom can do, is to procure the ſame or greater good, at the expence of leſs evil. There will be always ſome evil either immediate, or remote, either in cauſe or conſequence. But there are *other* entries of corruption, and theſe are by much the greateſt, for ſuffering of which to continue open no reaſon can be aſſigned, or has been pretended to be aſſigned, but that which is to every honeſt and wiſe man a reaſon for ſhutting them up; the

the increaſe of the means of corruption, which are oftener employed for the ſervice of the oligarchy, than for the ſervice of the monarchy. Shut up *theſe*, and you will have nothing to fear from the *others*. By theſe, a more real and a more dangerous power has been gained to miniſters, than was loſt to the crown by the reſtraints on prerogative.

There have been periods when our government continued free, with ſtrong appearances of becoming abſolute. Let it be your glory, my Lord, and that of the new generation ſpringing up with you, that this government do not become abſolute at any future period, with the appearances of being free. However you may be employed; in all your councils, in all your actions, keep this regard to the conſtitution always in ſight. The ſcene that opens before you is great, and the part that you will have to act difficult. It is difficult indeed to bring men, from ſtrong habits of corruption, to prefer honour to profit, and liberty to luxury; as it is hard to teach princes the great art of governing all by all, or to prevail on them to practiſe it. But if it be a difficult, it is a glorious attempt; an attempt worthy to exert the greateſt talents, and

to

to fill the moſt extended life. Purſue it with courage. my Lord, nor deſpair of ſucceſs.

———*Deus hæc fortaſſe benigna*
*Reducet in ſedem Vice.*

A parliament, nay one houſe of parliament, is able at any time, and at once, to deſtroy any corrupt plan of power. Time produces every day new conjunctures: Be prepared to improve them. We read in the old teſtament of a city that might have eſcaped divine vengeance, if five righteous men had been found in it. Let not our city periſh for want of ſo ſmall a number: and if the generation that is going off could not furniſh it, let the generation that is coming on furniſh a greater.

We may reaſonably hope that it will, from the firſt eſſays which your Lordſhip, and ſome others of our young ſenators, have made in public life. You have raiſed the hopes of your country by the proofs you have given of ſuperior parts. Confirm theſe hopes by proofs of uncommon induſtry and application, and perſeverance. Superior parts, nay even ſuperior

virtue, without theſe qualities, will be inſufficient to ſupport your character and your cauſe. How many men have appeared in my time who have made theſe eſſays with ſucceſs, and have made no progreſs afterwards? Some have dropped, from their firſt flights, down into the vulgar crowd, have been diſtinguiſhed, nay, heard of no more! Others with better parts, perhaps with more preſumption, but certainly with greater ridicule, have perſiſted in making theſe eſſays towards buſineſs all their lives, and have never been able to advance farther, in their political courſe, than a premeditated harangue on ſome choice ſubject. I never ſaw one of theſe important perſons ſit down after his oration, with repeated hear-hims ringing in his ears, and inward rapture glowing in his eyes, that he did not recal to my memory the ſtory of a conceited member of ſome parliament in *France*, who was overheard, after his tedious harangue, muttering moſt devoutly to himſelf, *Non nobis, Domine, non nobis, ſed nomini tuo da gloriam!*

Eloquence, that leads mankind by the ears, gives a nobler ſuperiority than power that every dunce may uſe, or fraud that every

every knave may employ, to lead them by the noſe. But eloquence muſt flow like a ſtream that is fed by an abundant ſpring, and not ſpout forth a little frothy water on ſome gaudy day, and remain dry the reſt of the year. The famous orators of *Greece* and *Rome* were the ſtateſmen and miniſters of thoſe commonwealths. The nature of their governments and the humour of thoſe ages made elaborate orations neceſſary. They harangued oftner than they debated: and the *ars dicendi* required more ſtudy and more exerciſe of mind and of body too, among them, than are neceſſary among us. But as much pains as they took in learning how to conduct the ſtream of eloquence, they took more to enlarge the fountain from which it flowed. Hear DEMOSTHENES, hear CICERO thunder againſt PHILIP, CATILINE, and ANTHONY. I chuſe the example of the firſt rather than that of PERICLES whom he imitated, or of PHOCION whom he oppoſed, or of any other conſiderable perſonage in *Greece*; and the example of CICERO rather than that of CRASSUS, or of HORTENSIUS, or of any other of the great men of *Rome*; becauſe the eloquence of theſe two has been ſo celebrated

that

that we are accuſtomed to look upon them almoſt as *meer orators*. They were orators indeed, and no man who has a ſoul can read their orations, after the revolution of ſo many ages, after the extinction of the governments, and of the people for whom they were compoſed, without feeling at this hour the paſſions they were deſigned to move, and the ſpirit they were deſigned to raiſe. But if we look into the hiſtory of theſe two men, and conſider the parts they acted, we ſhall ſee them in another light, and admire them in an higher ſphere of action. DEMOSTHENES had been neglected, in his education, by the ſame tutors who cheated him of his inheritance. CICERO was bred with greater advantage: and PLUTARCH, I think, ſays that when he firſt appeared the people uſed to call him, by way of deriſion, the *Greek*, and the ſcholar. But whatever advantage of this kind the latter might have over the former, and to which of them ſoever you aſcribe the ſuperior genius, the progreſs which both of them made in every part of *political knowledge*, by their induſtry and application, was marvellous. CICERO might be a better philoſopher, but DEMOSTHENES was no leſs a ſtateſman: and both of them performed

formed actions and acquired fame, above the reach of eloquence alone. DEMOSTHENES uſed to compare eloquence to a weapon, aptly enough; for eloquence, like every other weapon, is of little uſe to the owner, unleſs he have the force and the ſkill to uſe it. This force and this ſkill DEMOSTHENES had in an eminent degree. Obſerve them in one inſtance among many. It was of mighty importance to PHILIP to prevent the acceſſion of *Thebes* to the grand alliance that DEMOSTHENES, at the head of the *Athenian* commonwealth, formed againſt the growing power of the *Macedonians*. PHILIP had emiſſaries and his ambaſſadors on the ſpot to oppoſe to thoſe of *Athens*, and we may be aſſured that he neglected none of thoſe arts upon this occaſion that he employed ſo ſucceſsfully on others. The ſtruggle was great, but DEMOSTHENES prevailed, and the *Thebans* engaged in the war againſt PHILIP. Was it by his eloquence alone that he prevailed in a divided ſtate, over all the ſubtilty of intrigue, all the dexterity of negotiation, all the ſeduction, all the corruption, and all the terror that the ableſt and moſt powerful prince could employ? Was DEMOSTHENES wholly taken up with compoſing orations, and haranguing the people, in this

this remarkable criſis? He harangued them no doubt at *Thebes*, as well as at *Athens*, and in the reſt of *Greece*, where all the great reſolutions of making alliances, waging war, or concluding peace, were determined in democratical aſſemblies. But yet haranguing was no doubt the leaſt part of his buſineſs, and eloquence was neither the ſole, nor the principal talent, as the ſtyle of writers would induce us to believe, on which his ſucceſs depended. He muſt have been maſter of other arts, ſubſervi-ently to which his eloquence was employed, and muſt have had a thorough knowledge of his own ſtate, and of the other ſtates of *Greece*, of their diſpoſitions, and of their intereſts relatively to one another, and relatively to their neighbours, to the *Perſians* particularly, with whom he held a correſpondence not much to his honour: I ſay, he muſt have been maſter of many other arts, and have poſſeſſed an immenſe fund of knowledge, to make his eloquence in every caſe ſucceſsful, and even pertinent or ſeaſonable in ſome, as well as to direct it, and to furniſh it with matter whenever he thought proper to employ this weapon.

Let

Let us conſider TULLY on the greateſt theatre of the known world, and in the moſt difficult circumſtances. We are better acquainted with him than we are with DEMOSTHENES; for we ſee him nearer, as it were, and in more different lights. How perfect a knowledge had he acquired of the *Roman* conſtitution of government, eccleſiaſtical and civil; of the original and progreſs, of the general reaſons and particular occaſions of the laws and cuſtoms of his country; of the great rules of equity and the low practice of Courts; of the duty of every magiſtracy and office in the ſtate, from the dictator down to the lictor; and of all the ſteps by which *Rome* had riſen from her infancy, to liberty, to power, and grandeur, and dominion, as well as of all thoſe by which ſhe began to decline, a little before his age, to that ſervitude which he died for oppoſing, but lived to ſee eſtabliſhed, and in which not her liberty alone, but her power, and grandeur, and dominion were loſt? How well was he acquainted with the *Roman* colonies and provinces, with the allies and enemies of the empire, with the rights and privileges of the former, the diſpoſitions and conditions of the latter, with

with the intereſts of them all relatively to *Rome*, and with the intereſts of *Rome* relatively to them? How preſent to his mind were the anecdotes of former times concerning the *Roman* and other ſtates, and how curious was he to obſerve the minuteſt circumſtances that paſſed in his own? His works will anſwer ſufficiently the queſtions I aſk, and eſtabliſh in the mind of every man who reads them the idea I would give of his capacity and knowledge, as well as that which is ſo univerſally taken of his eloqunce. To a man fraught with all this ſtock of knowledge, and induſtrious to improve it daily, nothing could happen that was entirely new, nothing for which he was quite unprepared, ſcarce any effect whereof he had not conſidered the cauſe, ſcarce any cauſe wherein his ſagacity could not diſcern the latent effect. His eloquence in private cauſes gave him firſt credit at *Rome*, but it was this knowledge, this experience, and the continued habits of buſineſs, that ſupported his reputation, enabled him to do ſo much ſervice to his country, and gave force and authority to his eloquence. To little purpoſe would he have attacked CATILINE with all the vehemence that indignation and even fear added

added to eloquence, if he had truſted to this weapon alone. This weapon alone would have ſecured neither him nor the ſenate from the poniard of that aſſaſſin. He would have had no occaſion to boaſt, that he had driven this infamous citizen out of the walls of *Rome*, *abiit*, *exceſſit*, *evaſit*, *erupit*, if he had not made it before-hand impoſſible for him to continue any longer in them. As little occaſion would he have had to aſſume the honour of defeating without any tumult, or any diſorder, the deſigns of thoſe who conſpired to murder the *Roman* people, to deſtroy the *Roman* empire, and to extinguiſh the *Roman* name; if he had not united by ſkill and management, in the common cauſe of their country, orders of men the moſt averſe to each other; if he had not watched all the machinations of the conſpirators in ſilence, and prepared a ſtrength ſufficient to reſiſt them at *Rome*, and in the provinces, before he opened this ſcene of villany to the ſenate and the people: in a word, if he had not made much more uſe of political prudence, that is, of the knowledge of mankind, and of the arts of government, which ſtudy and experience give, than of all the powers of his eloquence.

Such was DEMOSTHENES, ſuch was CICERO, ſuch were all the great men whoſe memories are preſerved in hiſtory, and ſuch muſt every man be, or endeavour to be, if he has either ſenſe or ſentiment, who preſumes to meddle in affairs of government, of a free government I mean, and hopes to maintain a diſtinguiſhed character in popular aſſemblies, whatever part he takes, whether that of ſupporting, or that of oppoſing. I put the two caſes purpoſely, my Lord, becauſe I have obſerved, and your Lordſhip will have frequent occaſions of obſerving, many perſons who ſeem to think that oppoſition to an adminiſtration requires fewer preparatives, and leſs conſtant application than the conduct of it. Now, my Lord, I take this to be a groſs error, and I am ſure it has been a fatal one. It is one of thoſe errors, and there are many ſuch, which men impute to judgment, and which proceed from the defect of judgment, as this does from lightneſs, irreſolution, lazineſs, and a falſe notion of oppoſition; unleſs the perſons, who ſeem to think, do not really think in this manner, but ſerving the public purely for intereſt, and not for fame, nor for duty, decline taking the ſame pains when they oppoſe

oppoſe without perſonal and immediate reward, as they are willing to take when they are paid for ſerving. Look about you, and you will ſee men eager to ſpeak, and keen to act, when particular occaſions preſs them, or particular motives excite them, but quite unprepared for either: and hence all that ſuperficiality in ſpeaking, for want of information, hence all that confuſion or inactivity, for want of concert, and all that diſappointment for want of preliminary meaſures. They who affect to head an oppoſition, or to make any conſiderable figure in it, muſt be equal at leaſt to thoſe whom they oppoſe; I do not ſay in parts only, but in application and induſtry, and the fruits of both, information, knowledge, and a certain conſtant preparedneſs for all the events that may ariſe. Every adminiſtration is a ſyſtem of conduct: oppoſition therefore, ſhould be a ſyſtem of conduct likewiſe; an oppoſite, but not a dependent ſyſtem. I ſhall explain myſelf better by an example. When two armies take the field, the generals on both ſides have their different plans for the campaign, either of defence or of offence; and as the former does not ſuſpend his meaſures till he is attacked, but takes them

beforehand on every probable contingency, ſo the latter does not ſuſpend his, till the opportunity of attacking preſents itſelf, but is alert and conſtantly ready to ſeize it whenever it happens; and in the mean time is buſy to improve all the advantages of ſkill, of force, or of any other kind that he has, or that he can acquire, independently of the plan and of the motions of his enemy.

In a word, my Lord, this is my notion, and I ſubmit it to you. According to the preſent form of our conſtitution, every member of either houſe of parliament is a member of a national ſtanding council, born, or appointed by the people, to promote good, and to oppoſe bad government; and, if not veſted with the power of a miniſter of ſtate, yet veſted with the ſuperior power of controuling thoſe who are appointed ſuch by the crown. It follows from hence, that they who engage in oppoſition are under as great obligations, to prepare themſelves to controul, as they who ſerve the crown are under, to prepare themſelves to carry on the adminiſtration: and that a party formed for this purpoſe, do not act like good citizens nor honeſt men, unleſs they *propoſe true*, as well as *oppoſe falſe* meaſures

ſures of government. Sure I am they do not act like wiſe men unleſs they act ſyſtematically, and unleſs they contraſt, on every occaſion, that ſcheme of policy which the public intereſt requires to be followed, with that which is ſuited to no intereſt but the private intereſt of the prince or his miniſters. Cunning men (ſeveral ſuch there are among you) will diſlike this conſequence, and object, that ſuch a conduct would ſupport, under the appearance of oppoſing, a weak and even a wicked adminiſtration; and that to proceed in this manner would be to give good counſel to a bad miniſter, and to extricate him out of diſtreſſes that ought to be improved to his ruin. But cunning pays no regard to virtue, and is but the low mimic of wiſdom. It were eaſy to demonſtrate what I have aſſerted concerning the duty of an oppoſing party: and I preſume there is no need of labouring to prove, that a party who oppoſed, ſyſtematically, a wiſe to a filly, an honeſt to an iniquitous, ſcheme of government, would acquire greater reputation and ſtrength, and arrive more ſurely at their end, than a party who oppoſed occaſionally, as it were. without any common ſyſtem, without any general con-

cert, with little uniformity, little preparation, little perſeverance, and as little knowledge or political capacity. But it is time to leave this invidious ſubject, and to haſten to the concluſion of my letter before it grows into a book.

I am, my LORD, &c.

LETTER

# LETTER II.

## The IDEA of

## A PATRIOT KING.

# The IDEA of A PATRIOT KING.

## INTRODUCTION.

*Dec.* 1. 1738.

REviſing ſome letters I writ to my Lord * * *, I found in one of them a great deal ſaid concerning the *duties* which men owe to their *country*, thoſe men particularly who live under a *free conſtitution* of government; with a ſtrong application of theſe general doctrines to the *preſent ſtate* of *Great Britain*, and to the *characters* of the preſent actors on this ſtage.

I ſaw no reaſon to alter, none even to ſoften, any thing that is there advanced.

On the contrary, it came into my mind to carry theſe conſiderations further, and to delineate, for I pretend not to make a perfect draught, the *duties of a king to his country*; of thoſe kings particularly who are appointed by the people, for I know of none who are anointed by God, to rule in *limited monarchies*. After which, I propoſed to apply the general doctrines in this caſe, as ſtrongly and as directly as in the other, to the *preſent ſtate* of *Great Britain*.

I am not one of thoſe oriental ſlaves, who deem it unlawful preſumption to look their kings in the face; neither am I ſwayed by my Lord Bacon's authority to think this cuſtom good and reaſonable in it's *meaning*, tho' it ſavours of barbariſm in it's *inſtitution*: *Ritu quidem barbarus, ſed ſignificatione bonus*. Much otherwiſe: It ſeems to me that no ſecrets are ſo important to be known, no hearts deſerve to be pryed into with more curioſity and attention, than thoſe of princes. But many things have concurred, beſides age and temper, to ſet me at a great diſtance from the preſent court. Far from prying into the hearts, I ſcarce know the faces, of our royal family. I ſhall therefore decline all

all application to their characters, and all mention of any influence which their characters may have on their own fortune, or on that of this nation.

The principles I have reaſoned upon in my letter to my Lord ***, and thoſe I ſhall reaſon upon here, are the ſame. They are laid in the ſame ſyſtem of human nature. They are drawn from that ſource from whence all the duties of public and private morality muſt be derived, or they will be often falſly, and always precarioufly eſtabliſhed. Up to this ſource there are few men who take the pains to go: and, open as it lies, there are not many who can find their way to it. By ſuch as you, I ſhall be underſtood, and approved; and far from fearing the cenſure or the ridicule, I ſhould reproach myſelf with the applauſe, of men who meaſure their intereſt by their paſſions, and their duty by the examples of a corrupt age; that is, by the examples they afford to one another. Such I think are the greateſt part of the preſent generation; not of the vulgar alone, but of thoſe who ſtand foremoſt, and are raiſed higheſt in our nation. Such we may juſtly apprehend too that the next will be, ſince they

who are to compoſe it will ſet out into the world under a direction that muſt incline them ſtrongly to the ſame courſe of ſelf-intereſt, profligacy, and corruption.

The iniquity of all the principal men in any community, of kings and miniſters eſpecially, does not conſiſt alone in the crimes they commit, and in the immediate conſequences of theſe crimes: and therefore their guilt is not to be meaſured by theſe alone. Such men ſin againſt poſterity, as well as againſt their own age: and when the conſequences of their crimes are over, the conſequences of their example remain. I think, and every wiſe and honeſt man in generations yet unborn will think, if the hiſtory of ——'s adminiſtration deſcends to blacken our annals, that the greateſt iniquity of the miniſter, on whom the whole iniquity ought to be charged, ſince he has been ſo long in poſſeſſion of the whole power, is the conſtant endeavour he has employed to corrupt the *morals* of *men*. I ſay thus generally the *morals*, becauſe he who abandons or betrays his country, will abandon or betray his friend; and becauſe he who is prevailed on to act in parliament, without any regard to truth or juſtice, will eaſily

eaſily prevail on himſelf to act in the ſame manner every where elſe. A wiſer and honeſter adminiſtration may relieve our trade from that oppreſſion, and the public from that load of debt under which it muſt be ſuppoſed that he has induſtriouſly kept it; becauſe we are able to prove, by fair calculations, that he might have provided effectually for the payment of it, ſince he came to the head of the treaſury. A wiſer and honeſter adminiſtration may draw us back to our former credit and influence abroad, from that ſtate of contempt into which we are ſunk among all our neighbours. But will the *minds* of *men*, which this miniſter has narrowed to perſonal regards alone, will their *views*, which he has confined to the preſent moment, as if nations were mortal like the men who compoſe them, and *Britain* was to periſh with her degenerate children; will theſe, I ſay, be ſo *eaſily* or ſo *ſoon* enlarged? Will their *ſentiments*, which are debaſed from the love of liberty, from zeal for the honour and proſperity of their country, and from a deſire of honeſt fame, to an abſolute unconcernedneſs for all theſe, to an abject ſubmiſſion, and to a rapacious eagerneſs after wealth that may ſate their avarice,

and

and exceed the profuſion of their luxury; will theſe, I ſay again, be ſo *eaſily*, or ſo *ſoon elevated?* In a word, will the *Britiſh ſpirit*, that *ſpirit* which has preſerved liberty hitherto in one corner of the world at leaſt, be ſo *eaſily* or ſo *ſoon reinfuſed* into the *Britiſh* nation? I think not. We have been long coming to this point of depravation: and the progreſs from confirmed habits of evil is much more ſlow than the progreſs to them. Virtue is not placed on a rugged mountain of difficult and dangerous acceſs, as they who would excuſe the indolence of their temper, or the perverſeneſs of their will, deſire to have it believed; but ſhe is ſeated however on an *eminence*. We may go up to her with eaſe, but we muſt go up *gradually*, according to the natural progreſſion of *reaſon*, who is to lead the way, and to guide our ſteps. On the other hand, if we fall from thence, we are ſure to be hurried down the hill with a blind impetuoſity, according to the natural violence of thoſe *appetites* and *paſſions* that cauſed our fall at firſt, and urge it on the faſter, the further they are removed from the controul that before reſtrained them.

To

To perform, therefore, ſo great a work, as to reinfuſe the *ſpirit* of *liberty*, to reform the *morals*, and to raiſe the *ſentiments* of a people, much time is required: and a work which requires ſo much time may too probably be never compleated; conſidering how unſteadily and unſyſtematically even the beſt of men are apt often to proceed; and how this reformation is to be carried forward in oppoſition to *public faſhion*, and *private inclination*, to the *authority* of the men *in* power, and to the *ſecret bent* of many of thoſe who are *out* of power. Let us not flatter ourſelves; I did ſo too long. It is more to be wiſhed than to be hoped, that the contagion ſhould ſpread no further than that leprous race, who carry on their ſkins, expoſed to public ſight, the ſcabs and blotches of their Diſtemper. The *miniſter* preaches corruption aloud and conſtantly, like an impudent miſſionary of vice: and ſome there are who not only inſinuate, but teach the ſame occaſionally. I ſay ſome; becauſe I am as far from thinking, that all thoſe who join with him, as that any of thoſe who oppoſe him, wait only to be more authorized, that they may propagate it with greater

ſucceſs,

ſucceſs, and apply it to their own uſe, in their turn.

It ſeems to me, upon the whole matter, that to ſave or redeem a nation under ſuch circumſtances from perdition, nothing leſs is neceſſary than ſome great, ſome extraordinary conjuncture of ill fortune, or of good, which may *purge*, yet *ſo as by fire*. Diſtreſs from abroad, bankruptcy at home, and other circumſtances of like nature and tendency, may beget univerſal Confuſion. Out of confuſion order may ariſe: but it may be the order of a wicked tyranny, inſtead of the order of a juſt monarchy. Either may happen: and ſuch an alternative, at the diſpoſition of fortune, is ſufficient to make a ſtoic tremble! We may be ſaved indeed by means of a very different kind; but theſe means will not offer themſelves, this way of ſalvation will not be opened to us without the concurrence, and the influence of a PATRIOT KING, the moſt uncommon of all phænomena in the phyſical and moral world.

Nothing can ſo ſurely and ſo effectually reſtore the virtue and public ſpirit, eſſential to the preſervation of liberty, and national

national proſperity, as the reign of ſuch a prince.

We are willing to indulge this pleaſing expectation, and there is nothing we deſire more ardently than to be able to hold of a *Britiſh* prince, without flattery, the ſame language that was held of a *Roman* emperor, with a great deal,

*Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale fatentes.*

But let us not neglect, on our part, ſuch means as are in our power, to keep the cauſe of truth, of reaſon, of virtue, and of liberty, alive. If the bleſſing be withheld from us, let us deſerve at leaſt that it ſhould be granted to us. If heaven in mercy beſtows it on us, let us prepare to receive it, to improve it, and to co-operate with it.

I ſpeak as if I could take my ſhare in theſe glorious efforts. Neither ſhall I recal my words. Stripped of the rights of a *Britiſh* ſubject, of all except the meaneſt of them, that of inheriting, I remember that I am a *Briton* ſtill. I apply to myſelf what I have read in SENECA, *Officia ſi civis amiſerit, hominis exerceat.* I have renounced

renounced the world, not in ſhew, but in reality, and more by my way of thinking than by my way of living, as retired as that may ſeem. But I have not renounced my country, nor my friends; and by my friends I mean all thoſe, and thoſe alone, who are ſuch to their country, by whatever name they have been, or may be ſtill diſtinguiſhed: and tho' in that number there ſhould be men, of whoſe paſt ingratitude, injuſtice, or malice, I might complain on my own account with the greateſt reaſon. Theſe I will never renounce. In their proſperity, they ſhall never hear of me; in their diſtreſs, always. In that retreat, wherein the remainder of my Days ſhall be ſpent, I may be of ſome uſe to them; ſince even from thence I may adviſe, exhort, and warn them. *Nec enim is ſolus reipub: prodeſt, qui candidatos extrahit, & tuetur reos, & de pace belloq; cenſet; ſed' qui juventutem exhortatur: qui, in tanta bonorum præceptorum inopia, virtute inſtruit animos; qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque curſu ruentes, prenſat ac retrahit, & ſi nihil aliud, certe moratur; in privato publicum negotium agit.*

The

# The IDEA of

# A PATRIOT KING.

MY intention is not to introduce what I have to ſay concerning the *duties of kings*, by any nice inquiry into the *original* of their inſtitution. What is to be known of it will appear plainly enough, to ſuch as are able and can ſpare time to trace it, in the broken traditions which are come down to us of a few nations. But thoſe, who are not able to trace it there, may trace ſomething better and more worthy to be known, in their own thoughts: I mean what this inſtitution *ought* to have been, whenever it began, according to the rule of *reaſon*, founded in the common *rights*, and *intereſts*, of *mankind*. On this head it is quite neceſſary to make ſome reflections, that will, like angular ſtones laid on a rock, ſupport the little fabric, the model however of a great building, that I propoſe to raiſe.

So.

So plain a matter could never have been rendered intricate and voluminous, had it not been for lawleſs Ambition, extravagant vanity, and the deteſtable ſpirit of tyranny; abetted by the private intereſts of artful men, by adulation and ſuperſtition, two vices to which that ſtaring timid creature man is exceſſively prone; if authority had not impoſed on ſuch as did not pretend to reaſon; and if ſuch as did attempt to reaſon had not been caught in the common ſnares of ſophiſm, and bewildered in the labyrinths of diſputation. In this caſe, therefore, as in all thoſe of great concernment, the ſhorteſt and the ſureſt method of arriving at real knowledge is to *unlearn* the leſſons we have been taught, to *remount* to *firſt principles*, and take no body's word about *them*; for it is about *them* that almoſt all the juggling and legerdemain, employed by men whoſe trade it is to deceive, are ſet to work.

Now he who does ſo, in this caſe, will diſcover ſoon, that the notions concerning the *divine inſtitution* and *right* of kings, as well as the *abſolute power* belonging to their Office, have no foundation in fact or reaſon, but have riſen from an *old alliance* between *eccleſiaſtical* and *civil*

*civil policy*. The characters of king and prieſt have been ſometimes blended together; and when they have been divided, as kings have found the great effects wrought in government by the empire which prieſts obtain over the conſciences of mankind, ſo prieſts have been taught by experience, that the beſt method to preſerve their own rank, dignity, wealth, and power, all raiſed upon a ſuppoſed *divine right*, is to communicate the ſame pretenſion to kings, and by a fallacy common to both, impoſe their uſurpations on a ſilly world. This they have done: and in the *ſtate* as in the *church*, theſe pretenſions to a *divine right* have been generally carried higheſt by thoſe, who have had the leaſt pretenſion to the *divine favour*.

It is worth while to obſerve, on what principle ſome men were advanced to a great pre-eminence over others, in the early ages of thoſe nations that are a little known to us: I ſpeak not of ſuch as raiſed themſelves by *conqueſt*, but of ſuch as were raiſed by *common conſent*. Now you will find in all theſe proceedings an entire uniformity of principle. The authors of ſuch inventions as were of general uſe to the well-being of mankind, were

were not only reverenced and obeyed during their lives, but worſhipped after their deaths: they became principal Gods, *Dii majorum gentium*. The founders of commonwealths, the law-givers, and the heroes of particular ſtates, became Gods of a ſecond claſs, *Dii minorum gentium*. All pre-eminence was given in heaven, as well as on earth, in proportion to the benefits that men received. *Majeſty* was the firſt, and *divinity* the ſecond reward. Both were earned by ſervices done to mankind, whom it was eaſy to lead in thoſe days of ſimplicity and ſuperſtition, from admiration and gratitude, to adoration and expectation.

When advantage had been taken by ſome particular men of theſe diſpoſitions in the generality, and religion and government were become two trades or myſteries, new means of attaining to this pre-eminence were ſoon deviſed, and new and even contrary motives worked the ſame effect. Merit had given rank; but rank was ſoon kept, and, which is more prepoſterous, obtained too, without merit. Men were then made *kings* for reaſons as little relative to *good government*, as the neighing of the horſe of the ſon of HYSTASPES.

But

But the moſt prevalent, and the general motive was *proximity of blood*, to the *laſt*, not to the *beſt* king. *Nobility* in *China mount upwards*, and he who has it conferred upon him, enobles his *anceſtors*, not his *poſterity*. A wiſe inſtitution! and eſpecially among a people in whoſe minds a great veneration for their forefathers has been always carefully maintained. But in *China*, as well as in moſt other Countries, *royalty* has *deſcended*, and kingdoms have been reckoned the patrimonies of particular families.

I have read in one of the hiſtorians of the latter *Roman* empire, hiſtorians, by the way, that I will not adviſe others to miſpend their time in reading, that SAPORES the famous king of *Perſia*, againſt whom JULIAN made the expedition wherein he loſt his life, was crowned in his mother's womb. His father left her with child, the magi declared that the child would be a male; whereupon the royal enſigns were brought forth, they were placed on her majeſty's Belly, and the princes and the ſatrapes proſtrate recognized the embryo-monarch. But to take a more known example out of multitudes that preſent themſelves, DOMITIAN the worſt,

worſt, and TRAJAN the beſt of princes, were promoted to the empire by the *ſame title*. DOMITIAN was the ſon of FLAVIUS, and the brother, tho' poſſibly the poiſoner too, of TITUS VESPASIAN: TRAJAN was the adopted ſon of NERVA. Hereditary right ſerved the purpoſe of one, as well as of the other: and if TRAJAN was tranſlated to a place among the gods, this was no greater a diſtinction than ſome of the worſt of his predeceſſors and his ſucceſſors obtained, for reaſons generally as good as that which SENECA puts into the mouth of DIESPITER in the *apokolokyntoſis* of CLAUDIUS, *Cum ſit e republica eſſe aliquem qui cum Romulo poſſit ferventia rapa vorare.* To ſay the truth, it would have been a wiſer meaſure to have made theſe royal perſons gods at once: as *gods* they would have done neither good nor hurt; but as emperors, in their way to divinity, they acted like *devils*.

If my readers are ready by this Time to think me antimonarchial, and in particular an enemy to the ſucceſſion of kings by hereditary right, I hope to be ſoon reſtored to their good opinion. I eſteem monarchy above any other form of government, and hereditary

hereditary monarchy above elective. I reverence kings, their office, their rights, their perſons; and it will never be owing to the *principles* I am going to eſtabliſh, becauſe the character and government of a *patriot king* can be eſtabliſhed on no other, if their *office* and their *right* are not always held *divine*, and their *perſons* always *ſacred*.

Now we are ſubject, by the conſtitution of human nature, and therefore by the will of the Author of this and every other nature, to two laws. One given immediately to all men by God, the ſame to all, and obligatory alike on all. The other given to man by man; and therefore not the ſame to all, nor obligatory alike on all: founded indeed on the ſame principles, but varied by different applications of them to times, to characters, and to a number which may be reckoned infinite, of other circumſtances. By the firſt you ſee, that I mean the univerſal law of reaſon; and by the ſecond the particular law, or conſtitution of laws, by which every diſtinct community has choſen to be governed.

The obligation of ſubmiſſion to both, is diſcoverable by ſo clear and ſo ſimple an uſe of our intellectual faculties, that it may be ſaid properly enough to be *revealed to us by God*; and tho' *both* theſe laws cannot be ſaid properly to be given by Him, yet our obligation to ſubmit to the *civil* law is a principal paragraph in the *natural* law, which he has moſt manifeſtly given us. In truth we can no more doubt of the obligations of both theſe laws, than of the exiſtence of the lawgiver. As ſupreme lord over all his works, his *general* providence regards immediately the *great commonwealth* of mankind; but then, as ſupreme Lord likewiſe, his authority gives a ſanction to the *particular bodies* of law which are made under it. The law of *nature* is the law of *all* his ſubjects: the conſtitutions of *particular* governments are like the *by-laws* of cities, or the appropriated cuſtoms of provinces. It follows, therefore, that he who breaks the *laws of his country* reſiſts the *ordinance of God*, that is, the law of his nature. God has inſtituted neither monarchy, nor ariſtocracy, nor democracy, nor mixed government: but tho' God has inſtituted no particular form of government among men, yet by the general

general laws of his kingdom, he exacts our obedience to the laws of thoſe communities to which each of us is attached by birth, or to which we may be attached by a ſubſequent and lawful engagement.

From ſuch plain, unrefined, and therefore I ſuppoſe true reaſoning, the *juſt authority* of *kings*, and the *due obedience* of *ſubjects*, may be deduced with the utmoſt certainty. And ſurely it is far better for kings themſelves to have their authority thus founded on principles inconteſtible, and on fair deductions from them, than on the chimeras of madmen, or, what has been more common, the ſophiſms of knaves. A *human right*, that cannot be controverted, is preferable ſurely to a *pretended divine right*, which every man muſt believe implicitly, as few will do, or not believe at all.

But the principles we have laid down do not ſtop here. A divine right in kings is to be deduced evidently from them. A divine right to govern *well*, and conformably to the conſtitution at the head of which they are placed. A divine right to govern *ill*, is an abſurdity:

to aſſert it is blaſphemy. A people may chooſe, or hereditary ſucceſſion may raiſe, a *bad* prince to the throne; but a *good* king alone can derive his right to govern from *God*. The reaſon is plain: good government alone can be in the divine intention. God has made us to deſire happineſs; he has made our happineſs dependent on ſociety; and the happineſs of ſociety dependent on good or bad government. His intention therefore was, that government ſhould be *good*.

This is eſſential to his wiſdom; for wiſdom conſiſts ſurely in proportioning means to ends: therefore it cannot be ſaid without abſurd impiety, that he confers a right to oppoſe his intention.

The office of kings is then of *right divine*, and their perſons are to be reputed *ſacred*. As *men*, they have no ſuch right, no ſuch ſacredneſs belonging to them: as *kings* they have both, unleſs they forfeit them. Reverence for government obliges to reverence governors, who, for the ſake of it, are raiſed above the level of other men: but reverence for governors, independently of government, any further than reverence would be

be due to their virtues if they were private men, is preposterous, and repugnant to common ſenſe. The ſpring from which this legal reverence, for ſo I may call it, ariſes, is *national*, not *perſonal*. As well might we ſay that a ſhip is built, and loaded, and manned, for the ſake of any particular pilot, inſtead of acknowledging that the pilot is made for the ſake of the ſhip, her lading, and her crew, who are always the *owners* in the political veſſel, as to ſay that kingdoms were inſtituted for kings, not kings for kingdoms. In ſhort, and to carry our alluſion higher, majeſty is not an inherent, but a reflected light.

All this is as true of *elective*, as it is of *hereditary* monarchs; tho' the ſcriblers for tyranny, under the name of monarchy, would have us believe that there is ſomething more auguſt, and more ſacred in one than the other. They are ſacred *alike*, and this attribute is to be aſcribed, or not aſcribed to them, as they anſwer, or do not anſwer, the *Ends* of their inſtitution. But there is another compariſon to be made, in which a great and moſt important diſſimulitude will be found between hereditary and elective

monarchy. Nothing can be more abſurd, in pure *ſpeculation*, than an hereditary right in any mortal to govern other men: and yet, in *practice*, nothing can be more abſurd than to have a king to chooſe at every vacancy of a throne. We draw at a *lottery* indeed in one caſe, where there are many chances to loſe, and few to gain. But have we much more advantage of this kind in the other? I think not. Upon theſe, and upon moſt occaſions, the multitude would do at leaſt as well to truſt to chance as choice, and to their fortune as to their judgment. But in another reſpect the advantage is entirely on the ſide of hereditary ſucceſſion: for in elective monarchies, theſe elections, whether well or ill made, are often attended with ſuch *national calamities*, that even the beſt reigns cannot make amends for them; whereas in hereditary monarchy, whether a good or a bad prince ſucceeds, theſe calamities are avoided. There is one ſource of evil the leſs open: and one ſource of evil the leſs in human affairs, where there are ſo many, is ſufficient to decide. We may lament the imperfections of our human ſtate, which is ſuch, that in caſes of the utmoſt importance to the order and good government of ſociety,

ciety, and by conſequence to the happineſs of our kind, we are reduced, by the very conſtitution of our nature, to have *no part* to take that our reaſon can *approve abſolutely*. But tho' we lament it, we muſt ſubmit to it. We muſt tell our ſelves once for all, that *perfect* ſchemes are not adapted to our imperfect ſtate; that *Stoical morals* and *Platonic politics* are nothing better than amuſements for thoſe who have had little experience in the affairs of the world, and who have much leiſure, *verbo otioſorum ſenum ad imperitos juvenes*; which was the cenſure, and a juſt one too, that DIONYSIUS paſt on ſome of the doctrines of the father of the academy. In truth, all that human prudence can do, is to furniſh expedients, and to compound as it were with general vice and folly; employing reaſon to act even againſt her own principles, and teaching us, if I may ſay ſo, *inſanire tum ratione*, which appears on many occaſions not to be the paradox it has been thought.

To conclude this head therefore, as I think a *limited monarchy* the beſt of governments, ſo I think an *hereditary monarchy* the beſt of monarchies. I ſaid a

*limited monarchy*; for an *unlimited monarchy*, wherein arbitrary will, which is in truth no rule, is however the ſole rule, or ſtands inſtead of all rule of government, is ſo great an abſurdity, both in reaſon informed or uninformed by experience, that it ſeems a government fitter for ſavages than for civilized people.

But I think it proper to explain a little more what I mean, when I ſay a *limited* monarchy, that I may leave nothing untouched which ought to be taken into conſideration by us, when we attempt to fix our ideas of a PATRIOT KING.

Among many reaſons which determine me to prefer *monarchy* to every form of government, this is a principal one. When monarchy is the eſſential form, it may be more eaſily and more uſefully *tempered* with *ariſtocracy* or *democracy*, or both, than either of them, when they are the eſſential forms, can be *tempered* with *monarchy*. It ſeems to me, that the introduction of a real permanent monarchical power, or any thing more than the pageantry of it, into either of theſe, muſt deſtroy them and extinguiſh them, as a great

great light extinguiſhes a leſs Whereas it may eaſily be ſhewn. and the true form of our government will demonſtate, without ſeeking any other example, that very conſiderable *ariſtocratical* and *democratical powers* may be grafted on a *monarchical ſtock*, without diminiſhing the luſtre, or reſtraining the power and authority of the prince, enough to alter in any degree the eſſential form.

A great difference is made in nature, and therefore the diſtinction ſhould be always preſerved in our notions, between two things that we are apt to confound in ſpeculation, as they have been confounded in practice, *legiſlative* and *monarchical power*. There muſt be an abſolute, unlimited, and uncontroulable power lodged *ſomewhere* in every government; but to conſtitute monarchy, or the government of a ſingle perſon, it is not neceſſary that this power ſhould be lodged in the monarch *alone*. It is no more neceſſary that he ſhould excluſively and independently eſtabliſh the rule of his government, than it is, that he ſhould govern without any rule at all: and this ſurely will be thought reaſonable by no man.

I would not ſay God governs by a rule that we know, or may know as well as he, and upon our knowledge of which he appeals to men for the juſtice of his proceedings towards them; which a famous divine has impiouſly advanced, in a pretended demonſtration of his being and attributes. God forbid! But this I may ſay, that God does always that which is fitteſt to be done, and that this fitneſs, whereof neither that preſumptuous dogmatiſt was, nor any created being is, a competent judge, reſults from the various *natures*, and more various *relations* of things; ſo that, as creator of all ſyſtems by which theſe natures and relations are conſtituted, he preſcribed to himſelf the *rule*, which he follows as governor of every ſyſtem of being. In ſhort, with reverence be it ſpoken, God is a monarch, yet not an arbitrary but a limited monarch, limited by the *rule* which *infinite wiſdom* preſcribes to *infinite power*. I know well enough the impropriety of theſe expreſſions; but when our ideas are inadequate, our expreſſions muſt needs be improper. Such conceptions however as we are able to form of theſe attributes, and of the exerciſe of them in the government of the univerſe, may ſerve to

ſhew

ſhew what I have produced them to ſhew. If governing without *any rule*, and by *arbitrary will*, be not eſſential to our idea of the monarchy of the *Supreme Being*, it is plainly ridiculous to ſuppoſe them neceſſarily included in the idea of a *human monarchy:* and tho' God in his eternal ideas, for we are able to conceive no other manner of knowing, has preſcribed to himſelf, that rule by which he governs the univerſe he *created*; it will be juſt as ridiculous to affirm, that the idea of human monarchy cannot be preſerved, if kings are obliged to govern according to a rule eſtabliſhed by the wiſdom of a ſtate, that was a ſtate before they were kings, and by the conſent of a people that they did not moſt certainly *create*; eſpecially when the whole executive power is excluſively in their hands, and the legiſlative power cannot be exerciſed without their concurrence.

There are *limitations* indeed that would deſtroy the *eſſential form* of monarchy: or, in other words, a monarchical conſtitution may be changed, under pretence of limiting the monarch. This happened among us in the laſt century, when the vileſt uſurpation, and the moſt infamous tyranny was eſtabliſhed over our nation,

by ſome of the worſt and ſome of the meaneſt Men in it, I will not ſay, that the *eſſential form* of monarchy ſhould be preſerved, tho' the preſervation of it were to cauſe the loſs of *liberty*. *Salus reip. ſuprema lex eſto*, is a fundamental law: and ſure I am the *ſafety* of a commonwealth is ill provided for, if the *liberty* be given up. But this I preſume to ſay, and can demonſtrate, that *all* the limitations neceſſary to preſerve liberty, as long as the *ſpirit* of it ſubſiſts, and longer than that, no limitation of monarchy, nor any other form of government, can preſerve it, are *compatible* with monarchy. I think on theſe ſubjects, neither as the *Tories*, nor as the *Whigs* have thought: at leaſt I endeavour to avoid the exceſſes of both. I neither *dreſs up* kings like ſo many *burleſque Jupiters*, weighing the fortunes of mankind in the ſcales of fate, and darting thunderbolts at the heads of rebellious giants: nor do I ſtrip them *naked*, as it were, and leave them at moſt a few *tatter'd rags* to clothe their *majeſty*, but ſuch as can ſerve really as little for uſe as for ornament. My aim is to fix this principle, that *limitations* on a crown ought to be carried *as far* as it is neceſſary to ſecure the liberties of a people; and that

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all ſuch *limitations* may ſubſiſt, without weakening or endangering monarchy.

I ſhall be told perhaps, for I have heard it is ſaid by many, that this point is imaginary, and that the limitations ſufficient to procure good government, and to ſecure liberty under a *bad* prince, cannot be made, unleſs they are ſuch as will deprive the ſubjects of many benefits in the reign of a *good* prince, *clog* his adminiſtration, maintain an unjuſt jealouſy between him and his people, and occaſion a defect of power neceſſary to preſerve the public tranquillity, and to promote the national proſperity. If this was true, here would be a much more melancholy inſtance of the imperfections of our nature, and of the inefficacy of our reaſon to ſupply this imperfection, than the former. In the former, reaſon prompted by experience avoids a certain evil effectually, and is able to provide, in ſome meaſure, againſt the contingent evils that may ariſe from the expedient itſelf. But in the latter, if what is there advanced was true, theſe proviſions againſt contingent evils would, in ſome caſes, be the occaſions of much certain evil, and of poſitive good in none: under a good prince they would

would render the adminſtration defective; and under a bad one there would be no government at all. But the truth is widely different from this repreſentation. The limitations neceſſary to preſerve liberty under monarchy will *reſtrain* effectually a *bad* prince, without being ever *felt* as *ſhackles* by a good one. Our conſtitution is brought, or almoſt brought, to ſuch a point, a point of perfection I think it, that no *king* who is not, in the true meaning of the word, a *patriot*, can govern *Britain* with *eaſe*, *ſecurity*, *honour*, *dignity*, or indeed with *ſufficient power* and *ſtrength*. But yet a king, who is a patriot, may govern with all the former; and beſides them, with power as extended as the moſt abſolute monarch can boaſt, and a power too far more agreeable in the enjoyment, as well as more effectual in the operation.

To attain theſe great and noble ends, the patriotiſm muſt be real, and not in *ſhew* alone. It is ſomething to deſire to appear a patriot: and the deſire of having fame is a ſtep towards having it, becauſe it is a motive the more to deſerve it. If it be true as TACITUS ſays, *Contemptu*

*temptu famæ contemni virtutem*, that a contempt of a good name, or an indifference about it, begets or accompanies always a contempt of virtue, the contrary will be true; and they are certainly both true. But this motive alone is not ſufficient. To conſtitute a *patriot*, whether *king* or *ſubject*, there muſt be ſomething more ſubſtantial than a deſire of *fame*, in the compoſition: and if there be not, this deſire of fame will never riſe above that ſentiment which may be compared to the coquetry of women; a fondneſs of tranſient applauſe, which is courted by *vanity*, given by *flattery*, and ſpends itſelf in *ſhew*, like the qualities which acquire it. *Patriotiſm* muſt be founded in *great principles*, and ſupported by *great virtues*. The chief of theſe principles I have endeavoured to trace; and I will not ſcruple to aſſert, that a man can be a *good king* upon *no other*. He may, without them and by complexion, be unambitious, generous, good-natured; but without them the exerciſe even of theſe virtues will be often ill *directed*: and with principles of another ſort, he will be drawn eaſily, notwithſtanding theſe virtues, from all the purpoſes of his inſtitution.

I mention

I mention thoſe oppoſite principles the rather, becauſe, inſtead of wondering that ſo many kings, unfit and unworthy to be truſted with the government of mankind, appear in the world, I have been tempted to wonder that there are any tolerable: when I have conſidered the flattery that environs them moſt commonly from the cradle, and the tendency of all thoſe falſe notions that are inſtilled into them by precept, and by example, by the habits of courts, and by the intereſted ſelfiſh views of courtiers. They are bred to eſteem themſelves of a *diſtinct* and *ſuperior ſpecies* among *men*, as men are among *animals*.

Lewis the fourteenth was a ſtrong inſtance of the effect of this *education*, which trains up kings to be tyrants, without knowing that they are ſo. That oppreſſion under which he kept his people, during the whole courſe of a long reign, might proceed in ſome degree, from the natural haughtineſs of his temper; but it proceeded in a greater degree from the principles and habits of his education. By this he had been brought to look on his kingdom as a patrimony that deſcended to him from his anceſtors, and that was

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to be conſidered in no other light: ſo that when a very conſiderable man had diſcourſed to him at large of the miſerable condition to which his people was reduced, and had frequently uſed this word, *l'etat*; tho' the king approved the ſubſtance of all he had ſaid, yet he was ſhocked at the frequent repetition of this word, and complained of it as of a kind of indecency to himſelf. This will not appear ſo ſtrange to our ſecond, as it may very juſtly to our firſt reflections; for what wonder is it, that princes are eaſily betrayed into an error that takes its riſe in the general imperfection of our nature, in our pride, our vanity, and our preſumption? the baſtard children, but the children ſtill, of ſelf-love; a ſpurious brood, but often a favourite brood, that governs the whole family. As men are apt to make themſelves the meaſure of all being, ſo they make themſelves the final cauſe of all creation. Thus the reputed orthodox philoſophers in all ages have taught that the world was made for man, the earth for him to inhabit, and all the luminous bodies in the immenſe expanſe around us, for him to gaze at. Kings do no more, no not ſo much, when they imagine themſelves the final cauſe

for

for which ſocieties were formed, and governments inſtituted.

This capital error, in which almoſt every prince is confirmed by his *education*, has ſo great extent and ſo general influence, that a right to do every iniquitous thing in government may be derived from it. But as if this was not enough, the characters of princes are ſpoiled many more ways by their *education*. I ſhall not deſcend into a detail of ſuch particulars, nor preſume ſo much as to hint what regulations might be made about the *education of princes*, nor what part our *parliaments* might take occaſionally in this momentous affair, leſt I ſhould appear too refining or too preſumptuous in my ſpeculations. But I may aſſert in general, that the indifference of mankind upon this head, eſpecially in a government conſtituted like ours, is monſtrous.

I may alſo take notice of another cauſe of the miſtakes of princes, I mean the general conduct of thoſe who are brought near to their perſons. Such men, let me ſay, have a particular duty ariſing from this very ſituation; a duty common to them all, becauſe it ariſes not from their ſtations

ſtations which are different, but from their ſituation, which is the ſame. To enumerate the various applications of this duty would be too minute and tedious: but this may ſuffice, that all ſuch men ſhould bear conſtantly in mind, that the maſter they ſerve is to be the *king* of *their country*; that their attachment to him, therefore, is not to be like that of other ſervants to other *maſters*, for *his* ſake alone, or for *his* ſake and *their own*, but for the ſake of *their country* likewiſe.

CRATERUS *loves the king*, but HEPHESTION *loves* ALEXANDER, was a ſaying of the latter that has been often quoted, but not cenſured as it ought to be. ALEXANDER gave the preference to the attachment of HEPHESTION; but this preference was due undoubtedly to that of CRATERUS. Attachment to a private perſon muſt comprehend a great concern for his character and his intereſts: but attachment to one who is, or may be a king, much more; becauſe the character of the latter is more important to himſelf and others; and becauſe his intereſts are vaſtly more complicated with thoſe of his Country, and in ſome ſort with thoſe of mankind. ALEXANDER himſelf

ſelf ſeemed, upon one occaſion, to make the diſtinction that ſhould be always made between our attachments to a prince, and to any private Perſon. It was then PARMENIO adviſed him to accept the terms of peace which DARIUS offered: they were great, he thought them ſo; but he thought, no matter for my purpoſe whether juſtly or not, that it would be unbecoming him to accept them; therefore he rejected them, but acknowledged, that "he would "have done as he was adviſed to do, if "he had been PARMENIO."

As to perſons who are not about a prince in the ſituation here ſpoken of, they can do little more than proportion their applauſe, and the Demonſtrations of their confidence and affection, to the benefits they actually receive from the prince on the Throne, or to the juſt expectations that a ſucceſſor gives them. It is of the latter I propoſe to ſpeak here particularly. If he gives them thoſe of a *good reign*, we may aſſure ourſelves that they will carry, and in this caſe they ought to carry, that applauſe, and thoſe demonſtrations of their confidence and affection, as high as ſuch a prince himſelf can deſire. Thus the prince and the people take, in effect a ſort of engagement with one another;

ther; the prince to govern well, and the people to honour and obey him. If he gives them expectations of *a bad reign*, they have this obligation to him at leaſt, that he puts them early on their guard. And an obligation, and an advantage it will be, if they prepare for his acceſſion as for a great and inevitable evil; and if they guard on every occaſion againſt the ill uſe they foreſee that he will make of money and power. Above all, they ſhould not ſuffer themſelves to be caught in the common ſnare, which is laid under ſpecious pretences of "*gaining* ſuch a prince, "and of *keeping* him by public compli- "ances out of *bad hands*." That argument has been preſſed more than once, has prevailed, and has been fruitful of moſt pernicious conſequences. None indeed can be more abſurd: it is not unlike the reaſoning of thoſe ſavages who worſhip the devil, not becauſe they love him or honour him, or expect any good from him, but that he may do them no hurt. Nay, it is more abſurd; for the ſavages ſuppoſe, that the devil has *independently of them* the power to hurt them: whereas the others put more power into the hands of a prince, becauſe he has already ſome power to hurt them; and truſt to the juſtice and gratitude

tude of one who wants ſenſe, virtue, or both, rather than increaſe and fortify the barriers againſt his folly and his vices.

But the truth is, that men who reaſon and act in this manner either mean, or elſe are led by ſuch as mean, nothing more than to make a *private court* at the *public expence*; who chuſe to be the inſtruments of a bad king rather than to be out of power; and who are often ſo wicked, that they would *prefer* ſuch a ſervice to that of the beſt of kings. In fine, theſe reaſons, and every other reaſon for providing againſt a *bad reign* in proſpect, acquire a new force when one weak or wicked prince is, in the order of ſucceſſion, to follow another of the ſame character. Such proviſions indeed are *hardeſt* to be obtained when they are the *moſt neceſſary*; that is, when the ſpirit of liberty begins to flag in a free people, and when they become diſpoſed by habits that have grown inſenſibly upon them, to a baſe ſubmiſſion. But they are *neceſſary too*, even when they are *eaſieſt* to be obtained; that is, when the ſpirit of liberty is in full ſtrength, and a diſpoſition to oppoſe all inſtances of male-adminiſtration, and to reſiſt all attempts on liberty, is univerſal. In both caſes, the endeavours of every man who loves his

his country will be employed with inceſſant care and conſtancy to obtain them; that good government and liberty may be the better preſerved and ſecured: but in the latter caſe, for this further reaſon alſo, that the preſervation and ſecurity of theſe may be provided for, not only better, but *more conſiſtently* with *public tranquillity*, by *conſtitutional* methods, and a *legal* courſe of oppoſition to the exceſſes of regal or miniſterial power. What I touch upon here might be made extremely plain; and I think the obſervation would appear to be of no ſmall importance: but I ſhould be carried too far from my ſubject, and my ſubject will afford me matter of more agreeable ſpeculation.

It is true, that a prince who gives juſt reaſons to expect that his reign will be that of a PATRIOT KING, may not always meet, and from all perſons, ſuch returns as ſuch expectations deſerve: but they muſt not hinder either the prince from continuing to give them, or the people from continuing to acknowledge them. United, none can hurt them: and if no artifice interrupts, no power can defeat the effects of their perſeverance. It will blaſt many a wicked pro-

ject,

jeſt, keep virtue in countenance, and vice to ſome degree at leaſt in awe. Nay, if it ſhould fail to have theſe effects, if we ſhould even ſuppoſe a good prince to ſuffer with the people, and in ſome meaſure for them, yet many advantages would accrue to him: for inſtance, the cauſe of the people he is to govern, and his own cauſe would be made the ſame by their common enemies. He would feel grievances himſelf as a ſubject, before he had the power of impoſing them as a king. He would be formed in that ſchool out of which the greateſt and the beſt of monarchs have come, the ſchool of affliction: and all the vices, which had prevailed before his reign, would ſerve as ſo many foils to the glories of it. But I haſten to ſpeak of the greateſt of all theſe advantages, and of that which a PATRIOT KING will eſteem to be ſuch; whoſe ways of thinking and acting to ſo glorious a purpoſe as the re-eſtabliſhment of a free conſtitution, when it has been ſhook by the iniquity of former adminiſtrations, I ſhall endeavour to explain.

What I have here ſaid will paſs among ſome for the reveries of a diſtempered brain, at beſt for the vain ſpeculations of an idle man who has loſt ſight of the world,

world, or who had never ſagacity enough to diſcern in government the practicable from the impracticable. Will it not be ſaid, that this is adviſing a king to rouze a ſpirit which may turn againſt himſelf; to reject the ſole expedient of governing a limited monarchy with ſucceſs, to labour to confine, inſtead of labouring to extend his power; to patch up an old conſtitution, which his people are diſpoſed to lay aſide, inſtead of forming a new one more agreeable to them, and more advantageous to him; to refuſe in ſhort, to be an *abſolute monarch*, when every circumſtance invites him to it? All theſe particulars, in every one of which the queſtion is begged, will be thus repreſented, and will be then ridiculed as paradoxes fit to be ranked among the *mirabilia & inopinata* of the ſtoics, and ſuch as no man in his ſenſes can maintain in earneſt. Theſe judgments and theſe reaſonings may be expected in an age as futile and as corrupt as ours: in an age wherein ſo many betray the cauſe of liberty, and act not only without regard, but in direct oppoſition to the moſt important intereſts of their country; not only occaſionally, by ſurprize, by weakneſs, by ſtrong temptation, or ſly ſeduction, but conſtantly, ſteadily, by deliberate choice,

and in purſuance of principles they avow and propagate: in an age when ſo many others ſhrink from the ſervice of their country or promote it cooly or uncertainly, in ſubordination to their own intereſt and humour, or to thoſe of a party: in an age, when to aſſert the truth is called ſpreading of deluſion, and to aſſert the cauſe of liberty and good government, is termed ſowing of ſedition. But I have declared already my unconcernedneſs at the cenſure or ridicule of ſuch men as theſe; for whoſe *ſuppoſed abilities* I have much well-grounded contempt, and againſt whoſe *real immorality* I have as juſt indignation.

Let us come therefore to the bar of reaſon and experience, where we ſhall find thoſe paradoxes admitted as plain and almoſt ſelf-evident propoſitions, and thoſe reveries and plain ſpeculations as important truths, confirmed by experience in all ages and all countries.

MACHIAVEL is an author who ſhould have great authority with the perſons likely to oppoſe me. He propoſes to princes the amplification of their power, the extent of their dominion, and the ſubjection of their people, as the ſole objects of their policy.

policy. He deviſes and recommends all means that tend to theſe purpoſes, without the conſideration of any duty owing to god or man, or any regard to the morality or immorality of actions. Yet even he declares the affectation of virtue to be uſeful to princes: he is ſo far on my ſide in the preſent queſtion. The only difference between us is, I would have the virtue real: he requires no more than the appearance of it.

In the tenth chapter of the firſt book of *Diſcourſes*, he appears convinced, ſuch is the force of truth, but how conſiſtently with himſelf let others determine, that the ſupreme glory of a prince accrues to him who eſtabliſhes good government and a *free conſtitution*; and that a prince, ambitious of fame, muſt wiſh to come into poſſeſſion of a diſordered and corrupted ſtate, not to finiſh the wicked work that others have begun, and to compleat the ruin, but to ſtop the progreſs of the firſt, and to prevent the laſt. He thinks this not only the true way to *fame*, but to *ſecurity* and *quiet*; as the contrary leads, for here is no third way, and a prince muſt make his option between theſe two, not only to infamy, but to danger and to perpetual diſquietude. He repreſents thoſe who might eſtabliſh a com-

monwealth or a legal monarchy, and who chuſe to improve the opportunity of eſtabliſhing tyranny, that is, monarchy without any rule of law, as men who are deceived by falſe notions of good, and falſe appearances of glory, and who are in effect blind to their true intereſt in every reſpect: *Ne ſi auvegono pro queſto partito quanta fama, quanta gloria, quanto honore, ſircuta, quiete, con ſatisfatione d'animo e' ſuggono, & in quanta infamia, vituperio, biaſimo, pericolo & inquietudine incorrono.* He touches another advantage which patriot princes reap: and in that he contradicts flatly the main point on which his half-taught ſcholars inſiſt. He denies, that ſuch princes *diminiſh* their power by *circumſcribing* it; and affirms, with truth on his ſide, that TIMOLEON, and others of the ſame character whom he had cited, poſſeſſed as great authority in their country, with every other advantage beſides, as DIONYSIUS or PHALARIS had acquired, with the loſs of all thoſe advantages. Thus far MACHIAVEL reaſons juſtly; but he takes in only a *part* of his ſubject, and confines himſelf to thoſe motives that ſhould determine a wiſe prince to maintain liberty, becauſe it is his *intereſt* to do ſo. He riſes no higher than the conſideration of mere intereſt, of fame, of ſecurity,

ſecurity, of quiet, and of power, all perſonal to the prince: and by ſuch motives alone even his favourite BORGIA might have been determined to affect the virtues of a patriot prince: more than which this great doctor in political knowledge would not have required of him. But he is far from going up to that motive which ſhould above all determine a good prince to hold this conduct, becauſe it is his *duty to do ſo*; a duty that he owes to God by one law, and to his people by another. Now it is with this that I ſhall begin what I intend to offer concerning the ſyſtem of principles and conduct by which a patriot king will govern himſelf and his people. I ſhall not only begin higher, but deſcend into more detail, and keep ſtill in my eye the application of the whole to the conſtitution of *Great Britain*, even to the preſent ſtate of our nation, and temper of our people.

I think enough has been already ſaid, to eſtabliſh the *firſt and true principles* of *monarchical* and indeed of *every other* kind of *government*: and I will ſay with confidence, that no principles but theſe, and ſuch as theſe can be advanced, which deſerve to be treated ſeriouſly, tho' Mr. LOCK condeſcended to examine thoſe of FILMER,

more out of regard to the prejudices of the time, than to the importance of the work. Upon ſuch foundations we muſt conclude, that ſince men were directed by nature to form *ſocieties*, becauſe they cannot by their nature ſubſiſt without them, nor in a ſtate of *individuality*; and ſince they were directed in like manner to eſtabliſh *governments*, becauſe ſocieties cannot be maintained without them, nor ſubſiſt in a ſtate of *anarchy*; the ultimate end of all governments, is the *good* of the *people*, *for whoſe ſake* they were made, and *without whoſe conſent* they could not have been made. In forming ſocieties, and ſubmitting to government, men give up part of that *liberty* to which they are all born, and all alike. But why? Is government incompatible with a full enjoyment of *liberty?* By no means. But becauſe popular liberty without government will degenerate into *licence*, as government without ſufficient liberty will degenerate into *tyranny*, they are mutually neceſſary to each other, good government to ſupport legal liberty, and legal liberty to preſerve good government.

I ſpeak here not of people, if any ſuch there are, who have been ſavage or ſtupid enough to ſubmit to tyranny by original

ginal contract; nor of thoſe nations on whom tyranny has ſtolen as it were imperceptibly, or been impoſed by violence, and ſettled by preſcription. I ſhall exerciſe no political caſuiſtry about the rights of *ſuch kings*, and the obligation of *ſuch people*. Men are to take their lots, perhaps, in governments as in climates, to fence againſt the inconveniencies of both, and to bear what they cannot alter. But I ſpeak of people who have been wiſe and happy enough to eſtabliſh, and to preſerve *free conſtitutions* of government, as the people of *this iſland* have done. To theſe therefore I ſay, that their kings are under the moſt ſacred obligations that *human* law can create, and *divine law* authorize, to defend and maintain, in the firſt place, and preferably to every other conſideration, the *freedom* of ſuch conſtitutions.

The *good of the people* is the ultimate and true *end* of government. Governours are therefore appointed for *this end*, and the civil conſtitution which appoints them, and inveſts them with their power, is determined to do ſo by that *law of nature* and *reaſon*, which has determined the *end* of government, and which admits this *form* of government as the proper

mean of arriving at it. Now the greateſt good of a people is their liberty: and in the caſe here referred to, the people has judged it ſo, and provided for it accordingly. *Liberty* is to the collective body, what *health* is to every individual body. Without *health* no pleaſure can be taſted by man: without *liberty* no happineſs can be enjoyed by *ſociety*. The obligation, therefore, to defend and maintain the freedom of ſuch conſtitutions, will appear moſt ſacred to a patriot king.

Kings who have weak underſtandings, bad hearts, and ſtrong prejudices, and all theſe, as it often happens, inflamed by their paſſions, and rendered incurable by their ſelf-conceit and preſumption; ſuch kings are apt to imagine, and they conduct themſelves ſo as to make many of their ſubjects imagine, that the king and the people in free governments are *rival powers*, who ſtand in *competition* with one another, who have *different intereſts*, and muſt of courſe have different *views*: that the *rights* and *privileges* of the people are ſo many *ſpoils* taken from the *right* and *prerogative* of the crown; and that the rules and laws, made for the exerciſe and ſecurity of the former, are ſo many *diminutions*

*diminutions* of their dignity, and *reſtraints* on their power.

A patriot king will ſee all this in a far different and much truer light. The conſtitution will be conſidered by him as *one law*, conſiſting of *two tables*, containing the rule of his government, and the meaſure of his ſubjects obedience; or as *one ſyſtem*, compoſed of *different parts* and *powers*, but all duly proportioned to one another, and conſpiring by their harmony to the perfection of the whole. He will make one, and *but one* diſtinction between his rights, and thoſe of his people: he will look on his to be a *truſt*, and theirs a *property*. He will diſcern, that he can have a right to no more than is truſted to him by the conſtitution: and that his people, who had an original right to the *whole* by the law of nature, can have the ſole indefeazable right to *any part*; and really have ſuch a right to *that part* which they have reſerved to themſelves. In fine, the *conſtitution* will be reverenced by him as the *law of God* and of *man*; the *force* of which binds the king *as much* as the meaneſt ſubject, and the *reaſon* of which binds him *much more*.

Thus he will think, and on theſe principles he will act, whether he come to the throne by immediate or remote election. I ſay *remote*; for in hereditary monarchies, where *men* are not elected, *families* are: and therefore ſome authors would have it believed, that when a family has been once admitted, and an hereditary right to the crown recognized in it, that right cannot be forfeited, nor that throne become vacant, as long as any heir of the family remains. How much more agreeably to truth and to common ſenſe would theſe authors have written, if they had maintained, that every prince who comes to a crown in the courſe of ſucceſſion, were he the *laſt* of five hundred, comes to it under the *ſame* conditions under which the *firſt* took it, whether expreſſed or implyed; as well as under thoſe if any ſuch there be, which have been ſince made by legal authority: and that royal blood can give no right, nor length of ſucceſſion any preſcription, againſt the conſtitution of a government? The *firſt* and the *laſt* hold by the *ſame tenure*.

I mention this the rather, becauſe I have an imperfect remembrance, that ſome ſcribler was employed, or employed himſelf,

himſelf, to aſſert the *hereditary right* of the preſent royal family. A taſk ſo unneceſſary to any good purpoſe, that I believe a ſuſpicion aroſe of its having been deſigned for a bad one. A patriot king will never countenance ſuch impertinet fallacies, nor deign to lean on broken reeds. He knows that his right is founded on the *laws of God and man*, that none can ſhake it but himſelf, and that his own virtue is ſufficient to maintain it againſt all oppoſition.

I have dwelt the longer on the *firſt* and *general principles* of *monarchical government*, and have recurred the oftener to them; becauſe it ſeems to me that they are the *ſeeds* of *patriotiſm*, which muſt be ſowed as ſoon as poſſible in the mind of a prince, leſt their growth ſhould be checked by rank luxuriant weeds, which are apt to abound in ſuch ſoils, and under which no crop of kingly virtues can ever flouriſh. A prince, who does not know the *true principles*, cannot propoſe to himſelf the *true ends* of *government*: and he, who does not propoſe them, will never direct his conduct ſteadily to them. There is not a deeper, nor a finer obſervation in all my Lord BACON's works, than one

which I ſhall apply and paraphraſe on this occaſion. The moſt compendious, the moſt noble, and the moſt effectual remedy which can be oppoſed to the uncertain and irregular motions of the human mind, agitated by various paſſions, allured by various temptations, inclining ſometimes towards a ſtate of moral perfections, and oftener even in the beſt towards a ſtate of moral depravation, is this. We muſt chuſe betimes ſuch *virtuous objects* as are proportioned to the means we have of purſuing them, and as belong particularly to the *ſtations* we are in, and to the duties of thoſe ſtations. We muſt *determine* and *fix* our minds in ſuch manner upon them, that the purſuit of them may become the *buſineſs*, and the attainment of them the *end* of our whole lives. Thus we ſhall imitate the great operations of nature, and not the feeble, ſlow, and imperfect operations of art. We muſt not proceed, in forming the moral character, as a ſtatuary proceeds in forming a ſtatue, who works ſometimes on the face, ſometimes on one part, and ſometimes on another: but we muſt proceed, and it is in our power to proceed, as nature does in forming a flower, an animal, or any other of her productions; *rudimenta*

*menta partium omnium ſimul parit & producit.* "She throws out altogether, and "at once, the whole ſyſtem of every be-"ing, and the rudiments of all the parts." The vegetable or the animal grows in bulk, and increaſes in ſtrength; but is the *ſame from the firſt*. Juſt ſo our patriot king muſt be a patriot from the firſt. He muſt be ſuch in reſolution, before he grows ſuch in practice. He muſt fix at once the *general principles and ends* of all his actions, and determine that his whole conduct ſhall be regulated by them, and directed to them. When he has done this, he will have turned, by one great effort, the bent of his mind ſo ſtrongly towards the perfection of a kingly character, that he will exerciſe with eaſe, and as it were by a natural determination, all the virtues of it; which will be ſuggeſted to him on every occaſion by the *principles* wherewith his mind is imbued, and by thoſe *ends* that are the conſtant objects of his attention.

Let us then ſee in what manner, and with what effect he will do this, upon the greateſt occaſion he can have of exerciſing theſe virtues, the *maintainance* of *liberty*, and the *re-eſtabliſhment* of a *free conſtitution*. The

The freedom of a conſtitution reſts on *two* points. The orders of it are one: ſo MACHIAVEL calls them, and I know not how to call them more ſignificantly. He means not only the forms and cuſtoms, but the different claſſes and aſſemblies of men, with different powers and privileges attributed to them, which are eſtabliſhed in the ſtate. The *ſpirit* and *character* of the *people* are the other. On the mutual conformity and harmony of theſe the preſervation of liberty depends. To take away, or eſſentially to alter the former, cannot be brought to paſs, whilſt the latter remains in original purity and vigour: nor can liberty be deſtroyed by this method, unleſs the attempt be made with a military force ſufficient to conquer the nation, which would not ſubmit in this caſe till it was conquered, nor with much ſecurity to the conqueror even then. But theſe *orders* of the ſtate may be eſſentially altered, and ſerve more effectually to the deſtruction of liberty than the taking of them away would ſerve, if the *ſpirit* and *character* of the people are loſt.

Now this method of deſtroying liberty is the moſt dangerous on ma-

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ny accounts, particularly on this; that even the reign of the weakeſt prince, and the policy of the weakeſt miniſtry, may effect the deſtruction, when circumſtances are favourable to this method. If a people is growing corrupt, there is no need of capacity to contrive, nor of inſinuation to gain, nor of plauſibility to ſeduce, nor of eloquence to perſuade, nor of authority to impoſe, nor of courage to attempt. The moſt incapable, awkward, ungracious, ſhocking, profligate, and timorous wretches, inveſted with power, and maſters of the purſe, will be ſufficient for the work, when the people are complices in it. Luxury is rapacious; let them feed it: the more it is fed, the more profuſe it will grow. What is the conſequence of profuſion, venality of want, and dependance of venality. By this progeſſion, the firſt men of a nation will become the penſioners of the leaſt; and he who has talents, the moſt implicit tool to him who has none. The diſtemper will ſoon deſcend, not indeed to make a depoſite *below*, and to remain there, but to pervade the *whole body*.

It may ſeem a ſingular, but it is perhaps a true propoſition, that ſuch a king and

and ſuch a miniſtry are more likely to *begin* to *purſue* with ſucceſs, this method of deſtroying a free conſtitution of government, than a king and a miniſtry that were held in great eſteem would be. This very *eſteem* might put many on their guard againſt the latter; but the former may draw from *contempt* the advantage of *not being feared*: and an advantage this is in the beginning of corruption. Men are willing to excuſe, not only to others, but to themſelves, the firſt ſteps they take in vice, and eſpecially in vice that affects the public, and whereof the public has a right to complain. Thoſe therefore who might withſtand corruption in one caſe, from a perſuaſion that the conſequence was too certain to leave them any excuſe, may yield to it when they can flatter themſelves, and endeavour to flatter others, that liberty cannot be deſtroyed, nor the conſtitution be demoliſhed by *ſuch hands* as hold the ſcepter, and guide the reins of the adminiſtration. But alas! the flattery is groſs, and the excuſe without colour. Theſe men may ruin their country, but they cannot impoſe on any, unleſs it be on themſelves. Nor will even this impoſition on themſelves be long neceſſary. Their conſciences will be ſoon ſeared, by

*habit*

*habit* and by *example:* and they, who wanted an *excuſe* to *begin*, will want *none* to *continue* and to *compleat* the tragedy of their country. Old men will outlive the ſhame of loſing liberty, and young men will ariſe who know not that it ever exiſted. A ſpirit of ſlavery will oppoſe and oppreſs the ſpirit of liberty, and ſeem at leaſt to be the genius of the nation. Such too it will become in time, when corruption has once grown to this height, unleſs the progreſs of it can be interrupted.

How ineſtimable a bleſſing therefore muſt the ſucceſſion of a patriot king be eſteemed in ſuch circumſtances as theſe, which would be a bleſſing, and a great one too, in another? He, and he alone, can ſave a country whoſe ruin is ſo far advanced. The utmoſt that private men can do, who remain untainted by the general contagion, is to keep the ſpirit of liberty alive in a few breaſts; to proteſt againſt what they cannot hinder, and to claim on every occaſſion what they cannot by their own ſtrength recover.

MACHIAVEL has treated, in the diſcourſes before cited, this queſtion, 'whether, when the *people* are *grown corrupt*, a *free government* can be maintained,

'tained, if they enjoy it; or eſtabliſhed, 'if they enjoy it not?' And upon the whole matter he concludes for the difficulty or rather the impoſſibility, of ſucceeding in either caſe. It will be worth while to obſerve his way of reaſoning. He aſſerts very truly, and proves by the example of the *Roman* commonwealth, that thoſe *orders* which are proper to maintain liberty, whilſt a people remain uncorrupt, become improper and hurtful to liberty when a people is grown corrupt. To remedy this abuſe, new laws alone will not be ſufficient. Theſe *orders* therefore muſt be *changed*, according to him, and the conſtitution muſt be adapted to the depraved manners of the people. He ſhews that ſuch a change in the orders, and conſtituent parts of the government, is impracticable, whether the attempt be made by gentle and ſlow, or by violent and precipitate meaſures: and from thence he concludes, that a *free commonwealth* can neither be *maintained* by a *corrupt people*, nor be *eſtabliſhed* among them. But he adds, that 'if this can poſſibly be done, 'it muſt be done by drawing the conſti-'tution to the *monarchical form* of go-'vernment,' *acchioce quelli huomini i quali dalle leggi non poſſono eſſere corretti, fuſſero*

*ſuſſero da una podeſtá, in qualche modo, frenati.* 'That a *corrupt people*, whom *law* 'cannot correct, may be reſtrained and 'corrected by a *kingly power*.' Here is the hinge on which the whole turns.

Another advantage that a *free monarchy* has over all other forms of free government, beſides the advantage of being more eaſily and more uſefully tempered with ariſtocratical and democratical powers, which is mentioned above, is this. Thoſe governments are made up of *different parts*, and are apt to be diſjointed by the ſhocks to which they are expoſed: but a free monarchical government is more compact, becauſe there is a *part the more* that *keeps*, like the *key-ſtone* of a vault, the whole building together. They cannot be *mended* in a ſtate of corruption, they muſt be in effect *conſtituted anew*, and in that attempt they may be diſſolved for ever: but this is not the caſe of a free monarchy. To preſerve liberty by *new* laws and *new* ſchemes of government, whilſt the corruption of a people *continues* and *grows*, is abſolutely impoſſible every where: but to reſtore and to preſerve it under *old* laws, and an *old* conſtitution, by reinfuſing into the minds of men

men the *ſpirit of this conſtitution*, is not only poſſible, but is in a particular manner, eaſy to a *king*. A corrupt commonwealth remains without remedy, tho' all the orders and forms of it ſubſiſt: a free monarchical government cannot remain abſolutely ſo, as long as the orders and forms of the conſtitution ſubſiſt. Theſe *alone* are indeed nothing more than the dead letter of freedom or maſks of liberty. In the firſt character they ſerve to no good purpoſe whatſoever: in the ſecond they ſerve to a bad one, becauſe tyranny, or government by will, becomes more ſevere, and more ſecure, under their diſguiſe, than it would if it was barefaced and avowed. But a king can, eaſily to himſelf, and without violence to his people, renew the ſpirit of liberty in their minds, quicken this dead letter, and pull off this maſk.

As ſoon as corruption ceaſes to be an expedient of government, and it will ceaſe to be ſuch as ſoon as a patriot king is raiſed to the throne, the *panacea* is applied: the ſpirit of the conſtitution revives of courſe; and as faſt as it revives, the orders and forms of the conſtitution are reſtored to their primitive integrity, and become what they were intended to be;

be; *real barriers* againſt arbitrary power, not *blinds* nor *masks* under which tyranny may lie concealed. Depravation of manners expoſed the conſtitution to ruin; reformation will ſecure it. Men decline eaſily from virtue; for there is a devil too in the political ſyſtem, a conſtant tempter at hand: a patriot king will want neither power nor inclination to caſt out this devil, to make the temptation ceaſe, and to deliver his ſubjects if not from the guilt, yet from the conſequence, of their fall. Under him, they will not only ceaſe to do evil, but learn to do well; for by rendering public virtue and real capacity the ſole means of acquiring any degree of power or profit in the ſtate, he will ſet the paſſions of their hearts on the ſide of liberty and good government. A patriot king is the moſt powerful of all reformers; for he is himſelf a ſort of ſtanding miracle, ſo rarely ſeen and ſo little underſtood, that the ſure effects of his appearance will be admiration and love in every honeſt breaſt, confuſion and terror to every guilty conſcience, but ſubmiſſion and reſignation in all. A new people will ſeem to riſe with a new king. Innumerable metamorphoſes, like thoſe which poets feign, will happen in very deed:

deed: and while men are conſcious that they are the ſame individuals, the difference of their ſentiments will almoſt perſuade them that they are changed into different beings.

But that we may not expect more from ſuch a king than even he can perform, it is neceſſary to premiſe another general obſervation, after which I ſhall deſcend into ſome that will be more particular.

Abſolute ſtability is not to be expected in any thing human; for that which exiſts immutably exiſts alone neceſſarily, and this attribute of the Supreme Being can neither belong to man, nor to the works of man. The beſt inſtituted governments, like the beſt conſtituted animal bodies, carry in them the ſeeds of their deſtruction: and tho' they grow and improve for a time, they will ſoon tend viſibly to their diſſolution. Every hour they live is an hour the leſs that they have to live. All that can be done therefore to prolong the duration of a good government, is to draw it back, on every favourable occaſion, to the *firſt good principles* on which it was founded. When theſe occaſions happen often, and are well improved, ſuch

ſuch governments are proſperous and durable. When they happen ſeldom, or are ill improved, theſe political bodies live in pain or in languor, and die ſoon.

A patriot king affords one of the occaſions I mention in a free monarchical ſtate, and the very beſt that can happen. It ſhould be improved, like ſnatches of fair weather at ſea, to repair the damages ſuſtained in the laſt ſtorm, and to prepare to reſiſt the next. For ſuch a king cannot ſecure to his people a ſucceſſion of princes like himſelf. He will do all he can towards it, by his example and by his inſtruction. But after all, the royal mantle will not convey the ſpirit of patriotiſm into another king, as the mantle of *Elijah* did the gift of prophecy into another prophet. The utmoſt he can do, and that which deſerves the utmoſt gratitude from his ſubjects, is to reſtore good government, to revive the ſpirit of it, and to maintain and confirm both, during the whole courſe of his reign. The reſt his people muſt do for themſelves. If they do not, they will have none but themſelves to blame: if they do, they will have the principal obligation to him. In all events they will have been free-

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men one reign the longer by his means, and perhaps more; ſince he will leave them much better prepared and diſpoſed to defend their liberties, than he found them.

This general obſervation being made, let us now deſcend, in ſome detail, to the particular *ſteps* and *meaſures* that ſuch a king muſt purſue, to merit a much nobler title than all thoſe which many princes of the weſt, as well as the eaſt, are ſo proud to accumulate.

Firſt then, he muſt begin to govern as ſoon as he begins to reign. For the very firſt ſtep he makes in government will give the firſt impreſſion, and as it were the preſage of his reign; and may be of great importance in many other reſpect beſides that of opinion and reputation. His firſt care will be, no doubt, to *purge his court*, and to call into the adminiſtration ſuch men, as he can aſſure himſelf will *ſerve* on the *ſame principles* on which he intends to *govern*.

As to the firſt point; if the precedent reign has been bad, we know how he will find the court compoſed. The men in

in power will be ſome of thoſe adventurers, buſy and bold, who thruſt and crowd themſelves early into the intrigue of party and the management of affairs of ſtate, often without true ability, always without true ambition, or even the appearances of virtue: who mean nothing more than what is called making a fortune, the acquiſition of wealth to ſatisfy avarice, and of titles and ribbands to ſatisfy vanity. Such as theſe are ſure to be employed by a weak, or a wicked king: they impoſe on the firſt, and are choſen by the laſt. Nor is it marvellous that they are ſo, ſince every other want is ſupplied in them by the want of good principles and a good conſcience; and ſince theſe defects become miniſterial perfections, in a reign when meaſures are purſued and deſigns carried on that every honeſt man will diſapprove. All the proſtitutes who ſet themſelves to ſale, all the locuſts who devour the land, with crowds of ſpies, paraſites and ſycophants, will ſurround the throne under the patronage of ſuch miniſters; and whole ſwarms of little noiſome, nameleſs inſects will hum and buzz in every corner of the court. Such miniſters will be caſt off, and ſuch abettors of a miniſtry will be chaſ-

ed away together, and at once, by a patriot king.

Some of them perhaps will be abandoned by him; not to party-fury, but to national juſtice; not to ſate private reſentments, and to ſerve particular intereſts, but to make ſatisfaction for wrongs done to their country, and to ſtand as examples of terror to future adminiſtrations. Clemency makes, no doubt, an amiable part of the character I attempt to draw; but clemency to be a virtue, muſt have its bounds like other virtues, and ſurely theſe bounds are extended enough by a maxim I have read ſomewhere, that frailties and even vices may be paſſed over, but not enormous crimes: *multa donanda ingeniis puto; ſed donanda vitia, non portenta.*

Among the bad company with which ſuch a court will abound, may be reckoned a ſort of men too low to be much regarded, and too high to be quite neglected; the lumber of every adminiſtration, the furniture of every court. Theſe gilt carved things are ſeldom anſwerable for more than the men on a cheſs-board, who, are moved about at will, and on whom the conduct

conduct of the game is not to be charged. Some of theſe every prince muſt have about him. The pageantry of a court requires that he ſhould, and this pageantry, like many other deſpicable things, ought not to be laid aſide. But as much ſameneſs as there may appear in the characters of this ſort of men, there is one diſtinction that will be made, whenever a good prince ſucceeds to the throne after an iniquitous adminiſtration: the diſtinction I mean is, between thoſe who have affected to dip themſelves deeply in precedent iniquities, and thoſe who have had the virtue to keep aloof from them, or the good luck not to be called to any ſhare in them. And thus much for the firſt point, that of purging his court.

As to the ſecond, that of calling to his adminiſtration ſuch men as he can aſſure himſelf will *ſerve* on the *ſame principles* on which he intends to *govern*, there is no need to enlarge much upon it. A good prince will no more chuſe ill men, than a wiſe prince will chuſe Fools. Deception in one caſe is indeed more eaſy than in the other; becauſe a knave may be an artful hypocrite, whereas a ſilly fellow can never impoſe himſelf for a

man of ſenſe. And leaſt of all, in a country like ours, can either of theſe deceptions happen, if any degree of the diſcernment of ſpirits be employed to chuſe. The reaſon is, becauſe every man here, who ſtands forward enough in rank and reputation to be called to the councils of his king, muſt have given proofs beforehand of his patriotiſm as well as of his capacity, if he has either, ſufficient to determine his general character.

There is, however, one diſtinction to be made as to the capacity of miniſters, on which I will inſiſt a little: becauſe I think it very important at all times, particularly ſo at this time; and becauſe it eſcapes obſervation moſt commonly. The diſtinction I mean is that between a cunning man and a wiſe man: and this diſtinction is built on a manifeſt difference in nature, how imperceptible ſoever it may become to weak eyes, or to eyes that look at their object thro' the falſe medium of cuſtom and habit. My lord *Bacon* ſays, that cunning is *left-handed* or *crooked wiſdom*. I would rather ſay that it is a part, but the loweſt part of wiſdom; employed alone by ſome, becauſe they have not the other parts to employ: and by ſome, becauſe it is as much as they want,

want, within thoſe bounds of action which they preſcribe to themſelves, and ſufficient to the ends that they propoſe. The difference ſeems to conſiſt in degree and application, rather than in kind, Wiſdom is neither left-handed, nor crooked: but the heads of ſome men contain little, and the hearts of others employ it wrong. To uſe my lord *Bacon*'s own compariſon, the cunning man knows how to pack the cards, the wiſe man how to play the game better: but it would be of no uſe to the firſt to pack the cards, if his knowledge ſtopt here, and he had no ſkill in the game; nor to the ſecond to play the game better, if he did not know how to pack the cards, that he might unpack them by new ſhuffling. Inferior wiſdom or cunning may get the better of folly; but ſuperior wiſdom will get the better of cunning. Wiſdom and cunning have often the ſame objects; but a wiſe man will have more and greater in his view. The leaſt will not fill his ſoul, nor ever become the principal there; but will be purſued in ſubſerviency, in ſubordination at leaſt, to the other. Wiſdom and cunning may employ ſometimes the ſame means too: but the wiſe man ſtoops to thoſe means, and the other cannot riſe above them. Simulation

and diſſimulation for inſtance are the chief arts of cunning: the firſt will be eſteemed always by a wiſe man unworthy of him, and will be therefore avoided by him, in every poſſible caſe; for, to reſume my lord *Bacon*'s compariſon, ſimulation is put on that we may look into the cards of another, whereas diſſimulation intends nothing more than to hide our own. Simulation is a ſtiletto, not only an offenſive, but an unlawful weapon; and the uſe of it may be rarely, very rarely, excuſed, but never juſtified. Diſſimulation is a ſhield, as ſecrecy is armour: and it is no more poſſible to preſerve ſecrecy in the adminiſtration of publick affairs without ſome degree of diſſimulation, than it is to ſucceed in it without ſecrecy. Thoſe two arts of cunning are like the alloy mingled with pure ore. A little is neceſſary, and will not debaſe the coin below it's proper ſtandard; but if more than that little be employed, the coin loſes it's currency, and the coiner his credit.

We may obſerve much the ſame difference between wiſdom and cunning, both as to the objects they propoſe, and to the means they employ, as we obſerve between the viſual powers of different men. One ſees diſtinctly the objects that are near to him,

him, their immediate relations, and their direct tendencies; and a ſight like this ſerves well enough the purpoſe of thoſe who concern themſelves no further. The cunning miniſter is one of thoſe: he neither ſees nor is concerned to ſee any further, than his perſonal intereſts, and the ſupport of his adminiſtration require. If ſuch a man overcomes any actual difficulty, avoids an immediate diſtreſs, or, without doing either of theſe effectually, gains a little time, by all the low artifice which cunning is ready to ſuggeſt and baſeneſs of mind to employ; he triumphs, and is flattered by his mercenary train on the great event, which amounts often to no more than this, that he got into diſtreſs by one ſeries of faults, and out of it by another. The wiſe miniſter ſees, and is concerned to ſee further, becauſe government has a further concern: he ſees the objects that are diſtant as well as thoſe that are near, and all their remote relations, and even their indirect tendencies. He thinks of fame as well as of applauſe, and prefers that, which to be enjoyed muſt be given, to that which may be bought. He conſiders his adminiſtration as a ſingle day in the great year of government; but as a day that is affected by thoſe which went before, and that muſt affect thoſe which are to follow. He combines

therefore and compares all theſe objects, relations, and tendencies, and the judgment he makes on an entire, not a partial ſurvey of them, is the rule of his conduct. That ſcheme of the reaſon of ſtate which lies open before a wiſe miniſter contains all the great principles of government, and all the great intereſts of his country: ſo that as he prepares ſome events, he prepares againſt others, whether they be likely to happen during his adminiſtration, or in ſome future time.

Many reflections might be added to theſe, and many examples be brought to illuſtrate them. Some I could draw from the men I have ſeen at the head of buſineſs, and make very ſtrong contraſts of men of great wiſdom with thoſe of meer cunning. But I conclude this head, that I may proceed to another of no leſs importance.

To eſpouſe no party, but to govern like the common father of his people, is ſo eſſential to the character of a patriot king, that he who does otherwiſe, forfeits the title. It is the peculiar privilege and glory of this character, that princes who maintain it, and they alone, are ſo far from

from the neceſſity, that they are not expoſed to the temptation, of *governing by a party*: which muſt always end in the government of a *faction*; the faction of the *prince* if he has ability, the faction of his *miniſters* if he has not, and either one way or other in the oppreſſion of the people. For *faction* is to *party* what the *ſuperlative* is to the *poſitive*: *party* is a political evil, and *faction* is the *worſt* of all *parties*. The true image of a free people, governed by a patriot king, is that of a patriarchal family, where the head and all the members are united by one common intereſt, and animated by one common ſpirit; and where, if any are perverſe enough to have another, they will be ſoon borne down by the ſuperiority of thoſe who have the ſame; and far from making a *diviſion*, they will but confirm the union of the little ſtate. That to approach as near as poſſible to theſe ideas of perfect government, and ſocial happineſs under it, is deſirable in every ſtate, no man will be abſurd enough to deny. The ſole queſtion is therefore, how near to them it is poſſible to attain? For, if this attempt be not abſolutely impracticable, all the views of a patriot king will be directed to make it ſucceed. In-

ſtead of abetting the diviſions of his people he will endeavour to unite them, and to be himſelf the center of their union: inſtead of putting himſelf at the head of *one party* in order to govern *his people*, he will put himſelf at the head of *his people* in order to govern, or more properly to ſubdue *all parties*. Now, to arrive at this deſirable union, and to maintain it, will be found more difficult in ſome caſes than in others, but abſolutely impoſſible in none, to a wiſe and good prince.

If his people are *united* in their ſubmiſſion to him, and in their attachment to the eſtabliſhed government, he muſt not only *eſpouſe* but *create* a party, in order to govern by *one*: and what ſhould tempt him to purſue ſo wild a meaſure? A prince who aims at more power than the conſtitution gives him, may be ſo tempted; becauſe he may hope to obtain in the diſorders of the ſtate what cannot be obtained in quiet times; and becauſe contending parties will give what a nation will not. Parties, even before they degenerate into abſolute factions, are ſtill numbers of men aſſociated together for certain purpoſes, and certain intereſts, which

which are not, or which are not allowed to be thoſe of the community by others. A more private or perſonal intereſt comes but too ſoon, and too often, to be ſuperadded, and to grow predominant in them: and when it does ſo, whatever occaſions or principles began to form them, the ſame logic prevails in them that prevails in every church. The intereſt of the ſtate is ſuppoſed to be that of the party, as the intereſt of religion is ſuppoſed to be that of the church: and, with this pretence or prepoſſeſſion, the intereſt of the ſtate becomes like that of religion, a remote conſideration, is never purſued for it's own ſake, and is often ſacrificed to the other. A king, therefore, who has ill deſigns to carry on, muſt endeavour to divide an united people; and, by blending or ſeeming to blend his intereſts with that of a party, he may ſucceed perhaps; and his party and he may ſhare the ſpoils of a ruined nation: but ſuch a party is then become a faction, ſuch a king is a tyrant, and ſuch a government is a conſpiracy. A patriot king muſt renounce his character to have ſuch deſigns, or act againſt his own deſigns to purſue ſuch methods. Both are too abſurd to be ſuppoſed. It remains therefore, that as all the good

ends of government are moſt attainable in an united ſtate, and as the diviſions of a people can ſerve to bad purpoſes alone, the king we ſuppoſe here will deem the union of his ſubjects his greateſt advantage, and will think himſelf happy to find that eſtabliſhed, which he would have employed the whole labour of his life to bring about. This ſeems ſo plain, that I am ready to make excuſes for having inſiſted at all upon it.

Let us turn ourſelves to another ſuppoſition, to that of a *divided ſtate*. This will fall in oftener with the ordinary courſe of things in free governments, and eſpecially after iniquitous and weak adminiſtrations. Such a ſtate may be better or worſe, and the great and good purpoſes of a patriot king more or leſs attainable in it, according to the different nature of thoſe *diviſions*, and therefore we will conſider this ſtate in different lights.

A people may be *united* in ſubmiſſion to the prince, and to the eſtabliſhment, and yet be *divided* about *general principles*, or *particular meaſures* of government. In the firſt caſe, they will do by their

their conſtitution what has been frequently done by the Scripture, ſtrain it to their own notions and prejudices; and if they cannot ſtrain it, alter it as much as is neceſſary to render it conformable to them. In the ſecond, they will ſupport or oppoſe particular acts of adminiſtrations, and defend, or attack the perſons employed in them: and both theſe ways a conflict of parties may ariſe, but no great difficulty to a prince who determines to purſue the union of his ſubjects, and the proſperity of his kingdoms, independently of all parties.

When parties are divided by different notions and principles concerning ſome particular eccleſiaſtical or civil inſtitutions, the conſtitution, which ſhould be *their* rule, muſt be that of the prince. He may, and he ought to ſhew his diſlike or his favour, as he judges the conſtitution may be hurt or improved, by one ſide or the other. The hurt he is never to ſuffer, not for his own ſake; and therefore ſurely not for the ſake of any whimſical, factious, or ambitious ſett of men. The improvement he muſt always deſire, but as every new modification in a ſcheme of government and of national policy, is of great importance,

importance, and requires more and deeper conſideration than the warmth and hurry and raſhneſs of party-conduct admit, the duty of a prince ſeems to require that he ſhould render by his influence the proceedings more *orderly* and more *deliberate*, even when he approves the end to which they are directed. All this may be done by him without fomenting diviſion; and far from forming, or eſpouſing a party, he will defeat party in defence of the conſtitution, on ſome occaſions; and lead men from acting with a party-ſpirit, to act with a national ſpirit, on others.

When the diviſion is about *particular meaſures* of government, and the conduct of the adminiſtration is alone concerned, a patriot king will ſtand in want of party as little as in any other caſe. Under his reign, the opportunities of forming an oppoſition of this ſort will be rare, and the pretences generally weak. Nay the motives to it will loſe much of their force, when a government is ſtrong in reputation, and men are kept in good humour by feeling the rod of a party on no occaſion, tho' they feel the weight of the ſcepter on ſome. Such opportunities however

ever may happen, and there may be reaſon as well as pretences ſometimes for oppoſition even in ſuch a reign, at leaſt we will ſuppoſe ſo, that we may include in this argument every contingent caſe. Grievances then are complained of, miſtakes and abuſes in government are pointed out, and miniſters are profecuted by their enemies. Shall the prince on the throne form a party by intrigue, and by ſecret and corrupt influence, to oppoſe the proſecution? When the prince and the miniſters are *participes criminis*, when every thing is to be defended, leſt ſomething ſhould come out, that may unravel the ſilly wicked ſcheme, and diſcloſe to public ſight the whole turpitude of the adminiſtration; there is no help, this muſt be done, and ſuch a party muſt be formed, becauſe ſuch a party alone will ſubmit to a drudgery of this kind. But a prince, who is not in theſe circumſtances, will not have recourſe to theſe means. He has others more open, more noble, and more effectual in his power: he knows that the views of his government are right, and that the tenor of his adminiſtration is good; but he knows that neither he nor his miniſters are infallible, nor impeccable. There may be abuſes in his government,

ment, miſtakes in his adminiſtration, and guilt in his miniſters, which he has not obſerved: and he will be far from imputing the complaints, that give him occaſion to obſerve them, to a ſpirit of party; much leſs will he treat thoſe who carry on ſuch proſecutions in a legal manner as incendiaries, and as enemies to his government. On the contrary, he will diſtinguiſh the voice of his people from the clamour of a faction, and will hearken to it. He will redreſs grievances, correct errors, and reform or puniſh miniſters. This he will do as a good prince: and as a wiſe one, he will do it in ſuch a manner that his dignity ſhall be maintained, and that his authority ſhall increaſe with his reputation by it.

Should the efforts of a meer faction be bent to calumniate his government, and to diſtreſs the adminiſtration on groundleſs pretences, and for inſufficient reaſons; he will not neglect, but he will not apprehend niether, the ſhort-lived and contemptible ſcheme. He will indeed have no reaſon to do ſo; for let the fautors of male-adminiſtration, whenever an oppoſition is made to it, affect to inſinuate as much as they pleaſe, that their maſters

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are in no other circumſtances than thoſe to which the very beſt miniſters ſtand expoſed, objects of general envy and of particular malice, it will remain eternally true, that groundleſs oppoſition, in a well-regulated monarchy, can never be ſtrong and durable. To be convinced of the truth of this propoſition, one needs only to reflect how many well-grounded attacks have been defeated, and how few have ſucceeded, againſt the moſt wicked and the weakeſt adminiſtrations. Every king of *Britain* has means enough in his power to defeat and to calm oppoſition. But a patriot king, above all others, may ſafely reſt his cauſe on the innocency of his adminiſtration, on the conſtitutional ſtrength of the crown, and on the concurrence of his people, to whom he dares appeal, and by whom he will be ſupported.

To conclude all I will ſay on the diviſions of this kind, let me add, that the caſe of a groundleſs oppoſition can hardly happen in a bad reign, becauſe in ſuch a reign juſt occaſions of oppoſition muſt of courſe be frequently given (as we have allowed that they may be given ſometimes, tho' very rarely, in a good reign) but that whether

whether it be well or ill grounded, whether it be that of the nation, or that of a faction, the conduct of the prince with reſpect to it will be the ſame; and one way or other this conduct muſt have a very fatal event. Such a prince will not mend the adminiſtration, as long as he can reſiſt the juſteſt and moſt popular oppoſition: and therefore this oppoſition will laſt and grow, as long as a free conſtitution is in force, and the ſpirit of liberty is preſerved; for ſo long even a change of his miniſters, without a change of his meaſures, will not be ſufficient. The former without the latter is a meer banter, and would be deemed and taken for ſuch, by every man who did not oppoſe on a factious principle; that I mean of getting into power at any rate, and uſing it as ill, perhaps worſe than the men he helped to turn out of it. Now if ſuch men as theſe abound, and they will abound in the decline of a free government, a bad prince, whether he changes, or does not change his miniſters, may hope to govern by the ſpirit and art of a faction, againſt the ſpirit and ſtrength of the nation. His character may be too low, and that of his miniſter too odious, to form originally even a faction that ſhall be able to defend them.

them. But they may apply to their purpoſes a party that was formed on far different occaſions, and bring numbers to fight for a cauſe in which many of them would not have liſted. The names, and with the names the animoſity of parties, may be kept up, when the cauſes that formed them ſubſiſt no longer.

When a party is thus revived or continued in the ſpirit of a faction, the corrupt and the infatuated members of it will act without any regard to right or wrong: and they who have aſſerted liberty in one reign, or oppoſed invaſions of one kind, will give it up in another reign, and abet invaſions of another kind; though they ſtill diſtinguiſh themſelves by the ſame appellation, ſtill ſpread the ſame banner, and ſtill deafen their adverſaries and one another with the ſame cry. If the national cauſe prevails againſt all the wicked arts of corruption and diviſion, that an obſtinate prince and flagitious miniſtry can employ; yet will the ſtruggle be long, and the difficulties, the diſtreſſes, and the danger great, both to the king and to the people. The beſt he can hope for, in ſuch a caſe, will be to eſcape with a diminution of his reputation, authority, and

and power. He may be expoſed to ſomething worſe; and his obſtinacy may force things to ſuch extremities, as they who oppoſe him will lament, and as the preſervation of liberty and good government can alone juſtify. If the wicked arts I ſpeak of prevail, faction will be propagated through the whole nation, an ill or well-grounded oppoſition will be the queſtion no longer, and the conteſt among parties will be who ſhall govern, not how they ſhall be governed. In ſhort, univerſal confuſion will follow, and a complete victory on any ſide will enſlave all ſides.

I have not overcharged the draught. Such conſequences muſt follow ſuch a conduct; and therefore let me aſk how much more ſafe, more eaſy, more pleaſant, more honourable is it, for a prince to correct, if he has not prevented male-adminiſtration? that he may be able to reſt his cauſe, as I ſaid before, on the ſtrength of the crown and the concurrence of his people, whenever any faction preſumes to riſe in oppoſition to him.

This a patriot king will do. He may favour one party and diſcourage another, upon occaſions wherein the ſtate of his king-

kingdom makes ſuch a temporary meaſure neceſſary. But he will eſpouſe none, much leſs will he proſcribe any. He will liſt no party, much leſs will he do the meaneſt and moſt imprudent thing a king can do, liſt himſelf in any. It will be his aim to purſue true principles of government independently of all: and by a ſteddy adherence to this meaſure, his reign will become an undeniable and glorious proof, that a wiſe and good prince may unite his ſubjects, and be himſelf the center of their union, notwithſtanding any of theſe diviſions that have been hitherto mentioned.

Let us now view the divided ſtate of a nation in another light. In this, the diviſions will appear more odious, more dangerous; leſs dependent on the influence, and leſs ſubject to the authority of the crown. Such will be the ſtate, whenever a people is *divided* about *ſubmiſſion to their prince*, and a party is formed of ſpirit and ſtrength ſufficient to oppoſe, even in arms, the eſtabliſhed government. But in this caſe, deſperate as it may ſeem, a patriot king will not deſpair of reconciling, and re-uniting his ſubjects to himſelf, and to one another. He may be obliged perhaps,

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as *Henry* the Fourth of *France* was, to conquer his own; but then like that great prince, if he is the conqueror, he will be the father too of his people. He muſt purſue in arms thoſe who preſume to take arms againſt him; but he will purſue them like rebellious children whom he ſeeks to reclaim, and not like irreconcileable enemies whom he endeavours to exterminate. Another prince may blow up the flame of civil war by unprovoked ſeverity, render thoſe zealous againſt him who were at worſt indifferent, and determine the diſaffection of others to open rebellion. When he has prevailed againſt the faction he helped to form, as he could not have prevailed if the bent of the nation had been againſt him, he may be willing to aſcirbe his ſucceſs to a *party*, that he may have that pretence to govern by a party: and far from reconciling the minds that have been alienated from him, and re-uniting his ſubjects in a willing unforced ſubmiſſion to him, he may be content to maintain himſelf on that throne, where the laws of God and man have placed him, by the melancholy expedient that uſurpers and tyrants, who have no other in their power, employ; the expedient of force. But a patriot king will act with

with another ſpirit, and entertain nobler and wiſer views from firſt to laſt, and thro' the whole courſe of ſuch a conjuncture. Nothing leſs than the hearts of his people will content ſuch a prince, nor will he think his throne eſtabliſhed till it is eſtabliſhed there. That he may have time and opportunity to gain them, therefore, he will prevent the flame from breaking out, if by art and management he can do it. If he cannot, he will endeavour to keep it from ſpreading: and if the phrenzy of rebellion diſappoints him in both theſe attempts, he will remember peace, like the heroic king I juſt now quoted, in the midſt of war. Like him he will forego advantages of puſhing the latter, rather than loſe an opportunity of promoting the former: like him, in the heat of battle he will ſpare, and in the triumph of victory condeſcend: like him, he will beat down the violence of this flame, by his valour, and extinguiſh even the embers of it, by his lenity.

It may happen, that a prince, capable of holding ſuch a conduct as this, may not have the opportunity. He may ſucceed to the throne after a contrary conduct has been held; and when, among other diviſions

ſions which male-adminiſtration and the tyranny of faction have increaſed and confirmed, there is one againſt the eſtabliſhed government ſtill in being, though not ſtill in arms. The uſe is obvious, which a faction in power might make of ſuch a circumſtance under a weak prince, by ranking in that diviſion all thoſe who oppoſed the adminiſtration, or at leaſt by holding out equal danger to him from two quarters, from their enemies who meant him no harm, and from his enemies who could do him none. But ſo groſs an artifice will not impoſe on a prince of another character; he will ſoon diſcern the diſtinctions it becomes him to make. He will ſee, in this inſtance, how faction breeds, nouriſhes, and perpetuates faction: he will obſerve how far that of the court contributed to form the other, and contributes ſtill to keep it in countenance and credit, among thoſe who conſider more what ſuch men are againſt, than what they are for. He will obſerve, how much that of the diſaffected gives pretence to the other who keeps a monopoly of power and wealth, one of which oppreſſes, and the other beggars, the reſt of the nation: his penetration will ſoon diſcover, that theſe factions break in but little on the body of his people,

ple, and that it depends on him alone to take from them even the ſtrength they have; becauſe that of the former is acquired entirely by his authority and purſe, and that of the latter principally by the abuſe which the former makes of both. Upon the whole, the meaſures he has to purſue towards the great object of a patriot king, the union of his people, will appear to him extremely eaſy. How ſhould they be otherwiſe? One of the factions muſt be diſſolved the moment that the favour of the prince is withdrawn, and the other is diſarmed as ſoon as it is marked out. It will have no ſhelter, and it muſt therefore be ſo marked out, under a good and wiſe adminiſtration; for whether the members of it avow their principles by refuſing thoſe teſts of fidelity which the law requires, or perjure themſelves by taking them, they will be known alike. One difference, and but one will be made between them in the general ſenſe of mankind, a difference ariſing from the greater degree of infamy that will belong juſtly to the latter. The firſt may paſs for fools: the latter muſt paſs without excuſe for knaves.

The terms I uſe ſound harſhly, but the cenſure is juſt, and it will appear to be ſo in the higheſt degree, and upon the higheſt reaſon, if we ſtop to make a reflection or two that deſerve very well to be made, on the conduct of our Jacobites; for I deſire no ſtronger inſtance on which to eſtabliſh the cenſure, and to juſtify the terms I have uſed. Now all theſe, whether they ſwear, or whether they do not, are liable to one particular objection, that did not lye againſt thoſe who were in former days enemies to the king on the throne. In the days of *York* and *Lancaſter*, for inſtance, a man might be againſt the prince on the throne without being againſt the conſtitution of his country. The *conſtitution* conveyed the crown by *hereditary right* in the ſame family: and he who was a *Yorkiſt*, and he who was a *Lancaſtrian*, might, and I doubt not did, pretend in every conteſt to have this right on his ſide. The ſame *conſtitution* was acknowledged by both, and therefore ſo much indulgence was ſhewn by law to both, at leaſt in the time of *Henry* the Seventh, that ſubmiſſion to a *King de facto* could not be imputed as a crime to either. Thus again, to deſcend lower in hiſtory; when the exclusion

excluſion of the duke of *York* was preſſed in the reign of *Charles* the Second, the right of that Prince to the Crown was not diſputed. His *divine right* indeed, ſuch a divine right as his grandfather and father had aſſerted before him, was not much regarded; but his right by the conſtitution, his *legal right*, was ſufficiently owned by thoſe who inſiſted on a law as neceſſary to barr it. But every Jacobite at this time goes beyond all theſe examples, and is a rebel to the *conſtitution* under which he is born, as well as to the *prince* on the throne. The law of his country has ſettled the right of ſucceſſion in a *new family*. He reſiſts this law, and aſſerts on his own private authority, not only a right in contradiction to it, but a right extinguiſhed by it. This abſurdity is ſo great, that it cannot be defended except by advancing a greater; and therefore it is urged, that no power on earth could alter the conſtitution in this reſpect, nor extinguiſh a right to the crown inherent in the *Stuart* family, and derived from a ſuperior, that is from a divine authority. This kind of plea, for refuſing ſubmiſſion to the laws of the land, if it was admitted, would ſerve any purpoſe as well as that for which it is

brought. Our fanatics urged it formerly, and I do not ſee why a conſcientious fifth monarchy-man had not as much right to urge it formerly, as a Jacobite has now. But if conſcience, that is private opinion, may excuſe the fifth monarchy-man and the Jacobite, who act conformably to it, from all imputations except thoſe of madneſs and folly; how ſhall the latter be excuſed when he forſwears the principles he retains, acknowledges the right he renounces, takes oaths with an intent to violate them, and calls God to witneſs to a premeditated lie? Some caſuiſtry has been employed to excuſe theſe men to themſelves and to others. But ſuch caſuiſtry, and in truth every other, deſtroys, by diſtinctions and exceptions, all morality, and effaces the eſſential difference between right and wrong, good and evil. This the ſchoolmen in general have done on many occaſions; the ſons of *Loyola* in particular: and I wiſh with all my heart that nothing of the ſame kind could be objected to any other divines. Some political reaſoning has been employed, as well as the caſuiſtry here ſpoken of, and to the ſame purpoſe. It has been ſaid, that the conduct of thoſe who are enemies to the eſtabliſhment, to which they ſubmit

ſubmit and ſwear, is juſtified by the principles of the Revolution. But nothing can be more falſe and frivolous. By the principles of the Revolution, a ſubject may reſiſt, no doubt, the prince who endeavours to ruin and enſlave his people, and may puſh this reſiſtance to the dethronement and excluſion of him and his race: but will it follow, that, becauſe we may juſtly take arms againſt a prince whoſe right to govern we once acknowledged, and who by ſubſequent acts has forfeited that right, we may ſwear to a right we do not acknowledge, and reſiſt a prince whoſe conduct has not forfeited the right we ſwore to, nor given any juſt diſpenſation from our oaths?

But I ſhall lengthen this digreſſion no further: it is on a ſubject I have treated in public writings, the refutation of which never came to my hands, and, I think, never will. I return to the ſubject of my preſent diſcourſe. And I ſay, that ſuch factions as theſe can never create any obſtruction to a prince, who purſues the union of his ſubjects, nor diſturb the peace of his government. The men who compoſe them muſt be deſperate, and impotent; the moſt deſpicable of all charac-

ters when they go together. Every honeſt and ſenſible man will diſtinguiſh himſelf out of their number: and they will remain, as they deſerve to be, hewers of wood, and drawers of water, to the reſt of their fellow ſubjects.

They will remain ſuch, if they are abandoned to themſelves, and to that habitual infatuation which they have not ſenſe and ſpirit enough to break. But if a prince, out of goodneſs or policy, ſhould think it worth his while to take them from under this influence, and to break theſe habits; even this diviſion, the moſt abſurd of all others, will not be found incurable. A man who has not ſeen the inſide of parties, nor had opportunities to examine nearly their ſecret motives, can hardly conceive how little a ſhare, principle of any ſort, though principle of ſome ſort or other be always pretended, has in the determination of their conduct. Reaſon has ſmall effect on numbers: a turn of imagination, often as violent and as ſudden as a guſt of wind, determines their conduct; and paſſion is taken by others, and by themſelves too, when it grows into habit eſpecially, for principle. What gave ſtrength and ſpirit

rit to a Jacobite party after the late king's acceſſion? The true anſwer is, a ſudden turn of the imaginations of a whole party, to reſentment and rage, that were turned a little before to quiet ſubmiſſion, and patient expectation. Principle had as little ſhare in making the turn, as reaſon had in conducting it. Men who had ſenſe, and temper too before that moment, thought of nothing after it but of ſetting up a tory king againſt a whig king: and when ſome of them were aſked, if they were ſure a popiſh king would make a good tory king? or whether they were determined to ſacrifice their religion and liberty to him? The anſwer was, no; that they would take arms againſt him if he made attempts on either; that this might be the caſe perhaps in ſix months after his reſtoration, but that in the mean time they would endeavour his reſtoration. This is no exaggerated fact: and I leave you to judge to what ſuch ſentiments and conduct muſt be aſcribed, to principle or paſſion, to reaſon or madneſs? What gives obſtinacy without ſtrength, and ſullenneſs without ſpirit, to the Jacobite-tories at this time? Another turn of imagination, or rather the ſame ſhewing itſelf in another form.

A factious habit, and a factious notion, converted into a notion of policy and honour. They are taught to believe, that by clinging together they are a conſiderable weight, which may be thrown in to turn the ſcale in any great event; and that in the mean time to be a ſteddy ſuffering party, is an honour they may flatter themſelves with very juſtly. Thus they continue ſteddy to engagements which moſt of them wiſh in their hearts they had never taken; and ſuffer for principles, in ſupport of which not one of them would venture further than talking the treaſon that claret inſpires.

It reſults therefore from all that has been ſaid, and from the reflections which theſe hints may ſuggeſt, that in whatever light we view the *divided ſtate* of a people, there is none in which theſe diviſions will appear incurable, nor an union of the members of a great community with one another, and with their head, unattainable. It may happen in this caſe, as it does in many others, that things uncommon may paſs for improbable or impoſſible: and as nothing can be more uncommon than a patriot king, there will be no room to wonder if the natural and certain

certain effects of his conduct ſhould appear improbable or impoſſible to many. But there is ſtill ſomething more in this caſe. Tho' the union we ſpeak of be ſo much for the intereſt of every king and every people, that their glory and their proſperity muſt increaſe, or diminiſh, in proportion as they approach nearer to it, or are further removed from it; yet is there another intereſt, by which princes and people both are often impoſed upon ſo far as to miſtake it for their own. The intereſt I mean is that of *private ambition*. It would be eaſy to ſhew in many inſtances, and particularly in this, of uniting inſtead of dividing, and of governing by a national concurrence inſtead of governing by the management of parties and factions in the ſtate, how widely different, nay how repugnant the intereſts of *private ambition* and thoſe of *real patriotiſm* are. Men therefore who are warmed by the firſt, and have no ſenſe of the laſt, will declare for *diviſion*, as they do for *corruption*, in oppoſition to *union* and to *integrity* of government. They will not indeed declare directly that the two former are in the abſtract preferable, but they will affirm with great airs of ſufficiency that both are incurable; and con-

clude from hence, that in practice it is neceſſary to comply with both. This ſubterfuge once open, there is no falſe and immoral meaſure, in political management, which may not be avowed and recommended. But the very men who hope to eſcape by opening it, ſhut it up again, and ſecure their own condemnation, when they labour to *confirm* diviſions, and to *propagate* corruption, and thereby to *create* the very *neceſſity* that they plead in their excuſe. Neceſſity of this kind there is in reality none; for it ſeems full as abſurd to ſay, that popular diviſions muſt be cultivated, becauſe popular union cannot be procured, as it would be to ſay that poiſon muſt be poured into a wound, becauſe it cannot be healed. The practice of morality in private life will never arrive at ideal perfection: muſt we give up ourſelves therefore to all manner of immorality? And muſt thoſe who are charged with our inſtruction endeavour to make us the moſt profligate of men, becauſe they cannot make us ſaints?

Experience of the depravity of human nature made men deſirous to unite in ſociety and under government, that they might defend themſelves the better againſt

gainſt injuries: but the ſame depravity ſoon inſpired to ſome the deſign of employing ſocieties to invade and ſpoil ſocieties; and to diſturb the peace of the great common-wealth of mankind, with more force and effect in ſuch collective bodies, than they could do individually. Juſt ſo it happens in the domeſtic oeconomy of particular ſtates: and their peace is diſturbed by the ſame paſſions. Some of their members content themſelves with the common benefits of ſociety, and employ all their induſtry to promote the public good: but ſome propoſe to themſelves a ſeparate intereſt, and, that they may purſue it the more effectually, they aſſociate with others. Thus *factions* are in them, what *nations* are in the world. They invade and rob one another: and while each purſues a ſeparate intereſt, the common intereſt is ſacrificed by them all; that of mankind in one caſe, that of ſome particular community in the other. This has been and muſt always be in ſome meaſure the courſe of human affairs, eſpecially in free countries, where the paſſions of men are leſs reſtrained by authority: and I am not wild enough to ſuppoſe that a patriot

king can change human nature. But I am reaſonable enough to ſuppoſe, that without altering human nature he may give a check to this courſe of human affairs, in his own kingdom at leaſt; that he may defeat the deſigns, and break the ſpirit of faction, inſtead of partaking in one, and aſſuming the other; and that if he cannot render the union of his ſubjects univerſal, he may render it ſo general, as to anſwer all the ends of good government, private ſecurity, public tranquillity, wealth, power, and fame.

If theſe ends were ever anſwered, they were ſo, ſurely, in this country, in the days of our ELIZABETH. She found her kingdom full of factions, and factions of another conſequence and danger than theſe of our days, whom ſhe would have diſperſed with a puff of her breath. She could not re-unite them, it is true: the papiſt continued a papiſt, the puritan a puritan; one furious, the other ſullen. But ſhe united the great body of the people in her and their *common intereſt*, ſhe inflamed them with *one national ſpirit*, and thus armed, ſhe maintained tranquillity at home, and carried ſuccour to her friends

friends and terror to her enemies abroad. There were cabals at her court, and intrigues among her miniſters. It is ſaid too that ſhe did not diſlike that there ſhould be ſuch. But theſe were kept within her court. They could not creep abroad, to ſow diviſion among her people: and her greateſt favourite the earl of ESSEX paid the price of attempting it with his head. Let our great doctors in politics, who preach ſo learnedly on the trite text *divide & impera*, compare the conduct of ELIZABETH in this reſpect with that of her ſucceſſor, who endeavoured to govern his kingdom by the notions of a *faction* that he raiſed, and to manage his *parliament* by *undertakers*: and they muſt be very obſtinate indeed, if they refuſe to acknowledge, that a wiſe and good prince can unite a divided people, tho' a weak and wicked prince cannot; and that the conſequences of national union, are glory and happineſs to the prince and to the people, whilſt thoſe of diſ-union bring ſhame and miſery on both, and entail them too on poſterity.

I have dwelt long on the laſt head, not only becauſe it is of great importance in itſelf, and at all times, but becauſe it is rendered

rendered more ſo than ever at this time, by the unexampled avowal of contrary principles. Hitherto it has been thought the higheſt pitch of profligacy to own, inſtead of concealing crimes, and to take pride in them, inſtead of being aſhamed of them. But in our age men have ſoared to a pitch ſtill higher. The firſt is common, it is the practice of numbers, and by their numbers they keep one another in countenance. But the choice ſpirits of theſe days, the men of mode in politics, are far from ſtopping where criminals of all kinds have ſtopt when they have gone even to this point; for generally the moſt hardened of the inhabitants of *Newgate* do not go ſo far. The men I ſpeak of contend, that it is not enough to be vicious by *practice* and *habit*, but that it is neceſſary to be ſo by *principle*. They make themſelves miſſionaries of faction as well as of corruption: they recommend both, they deride all ſuch as imagine it poſſible or fit, to retain truth, integrity, and a diſintereſted regard to the public in public life, and pronounce every man a fool who is not ready to act like a knave. I hope that enough has been ſaid, tho' much more might have been ſaid, to expoſe the wickedneſs

of

of theſe men, and the abſurdity of their ſchemes; and to ſhew that a patriot king may walk more eaſily and ſucceſsfully in other paths of government, *per tutum planumque iter religionis, juſtitiæ, honeſtatis, virtutumque moralium.* Let me proceed, therefore, to mention two other heads of the conduct that ſuch a king will hold, and it ſhall be my endeavour not to fall into the ſame prolixity.

A king who eſteems it his duty to ſupport, or to reſtore, if that be needful, the free conſtitution of a limited monarchy; who forms and maintains a wiſe and good adminiſtration; who ſubdues faction, and promotes the union of his people; and who makes their greateſt good the conſtant object of his government, may be ſaid, no doubt, to be in the true intereſt of his kingdom. All the particular caſes that can ariſe are included in theſe general characteriſtics of a wiſe and good reign. And yet it ſeems proper to mention, under a diſtinct head, ſome particular inſtances that have not been touched, wherein this wiſdom and goodneſs will exert themſelves.

Now

Now tho' the true intereſt of ſeveral ſtates may be the ſame in many reſpects, yet is there always ſome difference to be perceived by a diſcerning eye, both in theſe intereſts, and in the manner of purſuing them; a difference that ariſes from the ſituation of countries, from the character of people, from the nature of government, and even from that of climate and ſoil; from circumſtances that are like theſe permanent, and from others that may be deemed more accidental. To illuſtrate all this by examples, would be eaſy, but long. I ſhall content myſelf therefore to mention, in ſome inſtances only, the difference that ariſes, from the cauſes referred to, between the true intereſt of our country, and that of ſome or all our neighbours on the continent; and leave you to extend and apply in your thoughts the compariſon I ſhall hint at, rather than enlarge upon.

The ſituation of *Great Britain*, the character of her people, and the nature of her government fit her for trade and commerce. Her climate and her ſoil make them neceſſary to her well being. By trade and commerce we grew a rich and

and powerful nation, and by their decay we are growing poor and impotent. As trade and commerce enrich, ſo they fortify our country. The ſea is our barrier, ſhips are our fortreſſes, and the mariners, that trade and commerce alone can furniſh, are the garriſons to defend them. *France* lies under great diſadvantages in trade and commerce by the nature of her government. Her advantages in ſituation are as great at leaſt as ours. Thoſe that ariſe from the temper and character of her people are a little different perhaps, and yet upon the whole equivalent. Thoſe of her climate and her ſoil are ſuperior to ours, and indeed to thoſe of any *European* nation. The United Provinces have the ſame advantages that we have in the nature of their government, more perhaps in the temper and character of their people, leſs to be ſure in their ſituation, climate, and ſoil. But without deſcending into a longer detail of the advantages and diſadvantages attending each of theſe nations in trade and commerce, it is ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe to obſerve, that *Great Britain* ſtands in a certain middle between the other two, with regard to *wealth* and *power* ariſing from theſe ſprings.

ſgrings. A leſs, and a leſs conſtant, application to the improvement of theſe may ſerve the ends of *France*; a greater is neceſſary in this country; and a greater ſtill in *Holland*. The *French* may improve their natural wealth and power by the improvement of trade and commerce. We can have no wealth, no power by conſequence, as *Europe* is now conſtituted, without the improvement of them, nor in any degree but proportionably to this improvement. The *Dutch* cannot ſubſiſt without them. They bring wealth to other nations, and are neceſſary to the well being of them; but they ſupply the *Dutch* with food and raiment, and are neceſſary even to their being.

The reſult of what has been ſaid is, *in general*, that the wealth and power of all nations depending ſo much on their trade and commerce, and every nation being, like the three I have mentioned, in ſuch different circumſtances of advantage or diſadvantage in the purſuit of this common intereſt; a good government, and therefore the government of a patriot king, will be directed conſtantly to make the moſt of every advantage that nature has given, or art can procure towards the im-

improvement of trade and commerce. And this is one of the principal criterions, by which we are to judge whether governors are in the true intereſt of the people, or not.

It reſults, *in particular*, that *Great Britain* might improve her wealth and power in a proportion ſuperior to that of any nation who can be deemed her rival, if the advantages ſhe has were as wiſely cultivated, as they will be in the reign of a patriot king. To be convinced more thoroughly of this truth a very ſhort proceſs of reaſoning will ſuffice. Let any man, who has knowledge enough for it, firſt compare the natural ſtate of *Great Britain*, and of the United Provinces, and then their artificial ſtate together; that is, let him conſider minutely the advantages we have by the ſituation, extent, and nature of our iſland, over the inhabitants of a few ſalt marſhes gained on the ſea, and hardly defended from it: and after that, let him conſider how nearly theſe provinces have raiſed themſelves to an equality of wealth and power with the kingdom of *Great Britain*. From whence ariſes this difference of improvement? It ariſes plainly from hence: the *Dutch* have

have been, from the foundation of their common-wealth, a nation of *patriots* and *merchants*. The ſpirit of that people has not been diverted from theſe two objects, the defence of their liberty, and the improvement of their trade and commerce; which have been carried on by them with uninterrupted and unſlackened application, induſtry, order, and œconomy. In *Great Britain* the caſe has not been the ſame, in either reſpect; but here we confine ourſelves to ſpeak of the laſt alone.

Trade and commerce, ſuch as they were in thoſe days, had been ſometimes, and in ſome inſtances, before the reign of Queen ELIZABETH, encouraged and improved: but the great encouragements were given, the great extenſions and improvements were made, by that glorious princeſs. To her we owe that ſpirit of domeſtic and foreign trade which is not quite extinguiſhed. It was ſhe who gave that rapid motion to our whole mercantile ſyſtem which is not entirely ceaſed. They both flagged under her ſucceſſor; were not revived under his ſon; were checked, diverted, clogged, and interrupted, during our civil wars: and began to exert new vigour after the reſtoration in a long courſe of peace; but met with

with new difficulties too from the confirmed rivalry of the *Dutch*, and the growing rivalry of the *French*. To one of theſe the puſillanimous character of JAMES the firſt gave many ſcandalous occaſions: and the other was favoured by the conduct of CHARLES the ſecond, who never was in the true intereſt of the people he governed. From the revolution to the death of queen ANNE, however trade and commerce might be aided and encouraged in other reſpects, they were neceſſarily ſubjected to depredations abroad, and over-loaded by taxes at home, during the courſe of two great wars. From the acceſſion of the late king to this hour, in the midſt of a full peace, the debts of the nation continue much the ſame, the taxes have been encreaſed, and for eighteen years of this time we have tamely ſuffered continual depredations from the moſt contemptible maritime power in *Europe*, that of *Spain*.

A patriot king will neither neglect, nor ſacrifice his country's intereſt. No other intereſt, neither a foreign nor a domeſtic, neither a public nor a private, will influence his conduct in government. He will not multiply taxes wantonly, nor

nor keep up thoſe unneceſſarily which neceſſity has laid, that he may keep up legions of tax-gatherers. He will not continue national debts by all ſorts of political and other profuſion; nor, more wickedly ſtill, by a ſettled purpoſe of oppreſſing and impoveriſhing the people, that he may with greater eaſe corrupt ſome, and govern the whole, according to the dictates of his paſſions and arbitrary will. To give eaſe and encouragement to manufactory at home, to aſſiſt and protect trade abroad, to improve and keep in heart the national colonies, like ſo many farms of the mother-country, will be principal and conſtant parts of the attention of ſuch a prince. The wealth of the nation he will moſt juſtly eſteem to be his wealth, the power his power, the ſecurity and the honour, his ſecurity and honour: and, by the very means by which he promotes the two firſt, he will wiſely preſerve the two laſt; for by theſe means, and by theſe alone, can the great advantage of the *ſituation* of this kingdom be taken and improved.

*Great Britain* is an iſland: and whilſt nations on the continent are at immenſe charge in maintaining their barriers, and perpetually

perpetually on their guard, and frequently embroiled to extend or ſtrengthen them, *Great Britain* may, if her governours pleaſe, accumulate wealth in maintaining hers; make herſelf ſecure from invaſions, and be ready to invade others when her own immediate intereſt or the general intereſt of *Europe* require it. Of all which Queen ELIZABETH's reign is a memorable example, and undeniable proof. I ſaid the *general intereſt* of *Europe*, becauſe it ſeems to me that this alone ſhould call our councils off from an almoſt entire application to their domeſtic and proper buſineſs. Other nations muſt watch over every motion of their neighbours; penetrate, if they can, every deſign; foreſee every minute event, and take part by ſome engagement or other in almoſt every conjuncture that ariſes. But as we cannot be eaſily nor ſuddenly attacked, and as we ought not to aim at any acquiſition of territory on the continent, it may be our intereſt to watch the ſecret workings of the ſeveral councils abroad; to adviſe, and warn; to abet, and oppoſe: but it never can be our true intereſt eaſily and officiouſly to enter into action, much leſs into engagements that imply action and expence. Other nations,

tions, like the *Velites* or light-armed troops, ſtand foremoſt in the field, and ſkirmiſh perpetually. When a great war begins, we ought to look on the powers of the continent, to whom we incline, like the two firſt lines, the *Principes* and *Haſtati* of a *Roman* army; and on ourſelves, like the *Triarii*, that are not to charge with theſe legions on every occaſion, but to be ready for the conflict whenever the fortune of the day, be it ſooner or later, calls us to it, and the ſum of things, or the *general intereſt*, makes it neceſſary.

This is that *poſt* of *advantage* and *honour*, which our ſingular ſituation among the powers of *Europe* determines us, or ſhould determine us, to take, in all diſputes that happen on the Continent. If we neglect it, and diſſipate our ſtrength on occaſions that touch us remotely or indirectly; we are governed by men who do not know the true intereſt of this iſland, or who have ſome other intereſt more at heart. If we adhere to it, ſo at leaſt as to deviate little and ſeldom from it, as we ſhall do whenever we are wiſely and honeſtly governed, then will this nation make her proper figure, and a great one

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it will be. By a continual attention to improve her natural, that is her maritime ſtrength, by collecting all her forces within herſelf, and reſerving them to be laid out on great occaſions, ſuch as regard her immediate intereſts and her honour, or ſuch as are truly important to the general ſyſtem of power in *Europe*; ſhe may be the *arbitrator* of *differences*, the *guardian* of *liberty*, and the *preſerver* of that *Balance*, which has been ſo much talked of, and is ſo little underſtood.

" Are we never to be ſoldiers? you will ſay. Yes, conſtantly, in ſuch proportion as is neceſſary for the defence of good government. To eſtabliſh ſuch a military force as none but bad governours can want, is to eſtabliſh tyrannical power in the king or in the miniſters; and may be wanted by the latter, when the former would be ſecure without his army, if he broke his miniſter. Occaſionally too we muſt be ſoldiers, and for offence as well as defence; but in proportion to the nature of the conjuncture, conſidered always relatively to the difference here inſiſted upon, between our ſituation, our intereſt, and the nature of our ſtrength, compared with thoſe of the other pow-

ers of *Europe*; and not in proportion to the deſires, or even to the wants, of the nations with whom we are confederated. Like other amphibious animals, we muſt come occaſionally on ſhore: but the water is more properly our element, and in it, like them, as we find our greateſt ſecurity, ſo we exert our greateſt force.

What I touch upon here, very ſhortly, deſerves to be conſidered, and reconſidered, by every man who has, or may have any ſhare in the government of *Great Britain*. For we have not only departed too much from our true national intereſt in this reſpect; but we have done ſo with the general applauſe even of well-meaning men, who did not diſcern that we waſted our ſelves by an improper application of our ſtrength in conjunctures, when we might have ſerved the common cauſe far more uſefully, nay with entire effect, by a proper application of our natural ſtrength. There was ſomething more than this. Armies grew ſo much into faſhion in time of war, among men who meant well to their country, that they who mean ill to it have kept, and keep them ſtill up in the profoundeſt peace: and the number

number of our ſoldiers, in this iſland alone, is almoſt double to that of our ſeamen. That they are kept up againſt foreign enemies, cannot be ſaid with any colour. If they are kept for ſhew, they are ridiculous. If they are kept for any other purpoſe whatever, they are too dangerous to be ſuffered. A patriot king, ſeconded by miniſters attached to the true intereſt of their country, would ſoon reform this abuſe, and ſave a great part of this expence; or apply it in a manner preferable even to the ſaving it, to the maintainance of a body of marine foot, and to the charge of a regiſter of thirty or forty thouſand ſeamen. But no thoughts like theſe, no great deſigns for the honour and intereſt of the kingdom, will be entertained, till men who have this honour and intereſt at heart ariſe to power.

I come now to the laſt head, under which I ſhall conſider the character and conduct of a patriot king: and let it not be thought to be of the leaſt importance, tho' it may ſeem at the firſt mention to concern appearances rather than realities, and to be nothing more than a circumſtance contained in or implied by the great parts of the character and conduct

of ſuch a king. It is of his perſonal behaviour, of his manner of living with other men, and, in a word, of his private as well as public life that I mean to ſpeak. It is of that decency and grace, that *bienſéance* of the *French*, that decorum of the *Latins*, that εὐπρέπεια of the *Greeks*, which can never be reflected on any character that is not laid in virtue: but for want of which, a character that is ſo laid will loſe at all times part of the luſtre belonging to it, and may be ſometimes not a little miſ-underſtood and under-valued. *Beauty* is not ſeparable from *health*, nor this *luſtre*, ſaid the ſtoics, from *virtue*: but as a man may be *healthful* without being *handſome*, ſo he may be *virtuous* without being *amiable*.

There are certain finiſhing ſtrokes, a laſt hand as we commonly ſay, to be given to all the works of art. When that is not given, we may ſee the excellency of a general deſign, and the beauty of ſome particular parts. A judge of the art may ſee further; he may allow for what is wanting, and diſcern the full merit of a compleat work in one that is imperfect. But vulgar eyes will not be ſo ſtruck. The work will appear to them defec-

defective, becauſe unfiniſhed: ſo that without knowing preciſely what they diſlike, they may admire, but they will not be pleaſed. Thus in moral characters, tho' every part be virtuous and great, or tho' the few and ſmall defects in it be concealed under the blaze of thoſe ſhining qualities that compenſate for them; yet is not this enough even in private life: it is leſs ſo in public life, and ſtill leſs ſo, in that of a prince.

There is a certain *ſpecies liberalis*, more eaſily underſtood than explained, and felt than defined, that muſt be acquired and rendered habitual to him. A certain propriety of words and actions, that reſults from their conformity to nature and character, muſt always accompany him, and create an air and manner, that run uniformly thro' the whole tenour of his conduct and behaviour: which air and manner are ſo far from any kind or degree of affectation, that they cannot be attained except by him who is void of all affectation. We may illuſtrate this to ourſelves, and make it more ſenſible, by reflecting on the conduct of good dramatic or epic writers. They draw the characters which they bring on the ſcene from

nature, they ſuſtain them thro' the whole piece, and make their actors neither ſay nor do any thing that is not exactly proper to the character each of them repreſents. *Oderint dum metuant*, came properly out of the mouth of a *tyrant*; but EURIPIDES would never have put that execrable ſentence into the mouth of MINOS or ÆACUS.

A man of ſenſe and virtue both will not fall into any great impropriety of character, or indecency of conduct. But he may ſlide or be ſurprized into ſmall ones, from a thouſand reaſons, and in a thouſand manners, which I ſhall not ſtay to enumerate. Againſt theſe, therefore, even men, who are incapable of falling into the others, muſt be ſtill on their guard, and no men ſo much as princes. When their minds are filled and their hearts warmed with *true notions* of government, when they *know their duty*, and *love their people*, they will not fail in the *great* parts they are to act, in the council, in the field, and in all the arduous affairs that belong to their kingly office: at leaſt they will not *begin* to fail, by failing in *them*. But as they are men, ſuſceptible of the ſame impreſſions, liable

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to the ſame errors, and expoſed to the ſame paſſions, ſo they are likewiſe expoſed to more and ſtronger temptations, than others. Beſides, the elevation in which they are placed, as it gives them great advantages, gives them great diſadvantages too, that often countervail the former. Thus for inſtance, a little *merit* in a prince is ſeen and felt by numbers; it is multiplied as it were, and in proportion to this effect his reputation is raiſed by it. But then a little *failing* is ſeen and felt by numbers too; it is multiplied in the ſame manner, and his reputation ſinks in the ſame proportion.

I ſpoke above of defects that may be concealed under the blaze of great and ſhining qualities. This may be the caſe; it has been that of ſome princes. There goes a tradition, that HENRY the Fourth of *France* aſked a *Spaniſh* ambaſſador, what miſtreſſes the king of *Spain* had? The ambaſſador replied (like a formal pedant) that his maſter was a prince who feared God, and had no miſtreſs but the queen. HENRY the Fourth felt the reflexion, and aſked him in return with ſome contempt, "Whether his maſter

" had not virtues enough to cover one " vice?"

The faults or defects that may be thus covered or compenſanted, are, I think, thoſe of the man, rather than thoſe of the king; ſuch as ariſe from conſtitution, and the *natural* rather than the *moral* character; ſuch as may be deemed accidental ſtarts of paſſion, or accidental remiſsneſs in ſome unguarded hours; ſurprizes, if I may ſay ſo, of the man on the king. When theſe happen ſeldom, and paſs ſoon, they may be hid, like ſpots in the ſun, but they are ſpots ſtill. He, who has the means of ſeeing them, will ſee them: and he, who has not, may feel the effects of them without knowing preciſely the cauſe. When they continue (for here is the danger, becauſe, if they *continue*, they will *increaſe*) they are ſpots no longer: they ſpread a general ſhade, and obſcure the light in which they were drowned before. The virtues of the king are loſt in the vices of the man.

ALEXANDER had violent paſſions, and thoſe for wine and women were predominant, after his ambition. They were

*ſpots*

*ſpots* in his character before they prevailed by the force of habit: as ſoon as they began to do ſo, the king and the hero appeared leſs, the rake and bully more. *Perſepolis* was burnt at the inſtigation of THAIS, and CLYTUS was killed in a drunken brawl. He repented indeed of theſe two horrible actions, and was again the king and hero upon many occaſions; but he had not been enough on his guard, when the ſtrongeſt incitements to vanity and to ſenſual pleaſures offered themſelves at every moment to him: and when he ſtood in all his eaſy hours ſurrounded by women and eunuchs, by the pandars, paraſites, and buffoons of a voluptuous court, they who could not approach the king, approached the man, and by ſeducing the man, they betrayed the king. His faults became habits. The *Macedonians*, who did not or would not ſee the one, ſaw the other; and he fell a ſacrifice to their reſentments, to their fears, and to thoſe factions that will ariſe under an odious government, as well as under one that grows into contempt.

Other characters might be brought to contraſte with this. The firſt SCIPIO AFRICANUS for example, or the eldeſt *Cato*;

(and there will be no objection to a compariſon of ſuch citizens of *Rome* as theſe were, with kings of the firſt magnitude. Now the reputation of the firſt *Scipio* was not ſo clear and uncontroverted in *private* as in *public* life; nor was he allowed by all, to be a man of ſuch ſevere virtue, as he affected, and as that age required. *Nævius* was thought to mean him in ſome verſes *Gellius* has preſerved, and *Valerius Antias* made no ſcruple to aſſert, that, far from reſtoring the fair *Spaniard* to her family, he debauched and kept her. Notwithſtanding this, what authority did he not maintain? In what eſteem and veneration did he not live and die? With what panegyrics has not the whole torrent of writers rolled down his reputation even to theſe days? This could not have happened, if the vice imputed to him had ſhewn itſelf in any ſcandalous appearances, to eclipſe the luſtre of the general, the conſul, or the citizen. The ſame reflexion might be extended to *Cato*, who loved wine as well as *Scipio* loved women. Men did not judge in the days of the elder *Cato* perhaps, as *Seneca* was ready to do in thoſe of the younger, that drunkenneſs could be no crime if *Cato* drank; but *Cato*'s paſſion, as well as that

of

of *Scipio*, was ſubdued and kept under by his public character. His virtue warmed inſtead of cooling, by this indulgence to his genius or natural temper; and one may gather from what *Tully* puts into his mouth in the treatiſe concerning old age, that even his love of wine was rendered ſubſervient, inſtead of doing hurt, to the meaſures he purſued in his public character.

Give me leave to inſiſt a little on the two firſt *Cæſars*, and on *Mark Antony*. I quote none of them as good men, but I may quote them all as great men, and therefore properly in this place; ſince a patriot king muſt avoid the defects that diminiſh a great character, as well as thoſe that corrupt a good one. Old *Curio* called *Julius Cæſar* the huſband of every wife, and the wife of every huſband, referring to his known adulteries, and to the compliances that he was ſuſpected of in his youth for NICOMEDES. Even his own ſoldiers in the licence of a triumph ſung lampoons on him for his profuſion as well as lewdneſs. The youth of AUGUSTUS was defamed as much as that of JULIUS CÆSAR, and both as much as that of ANTHONY. When *Rome* was ran-

ſacked by the pandars of AUGUSTUS, and matrons and virgins were ſtripped and ſearched like ſlaves in a market, to chooſe the fitteſt to ſatisfy his luſt, did ANTHONY do more? When JULIUS ſet no bounds to his debauches in *Egypt*, except thoſe that ſatiety impoſed, *poſtquam epulis bacchoque modum laſſata voluptas impoſuit*, when he trifled away his time with CLEOPATRA in the very criſis of the civil war, and till his troops refuſed to follow him any further in his effeminate progreſs up the *Nile* — did ANTHONY do more? No, all three had vices which would have been ſo little borne in any former age of *Rome*, that no man could have raiſed himſelf under the weight of them to popularity and to power. But we muſt not wonder that the people, who bore the *tyrants*, bore the *libertines*; nor that indulgence was ſhewn to the vices of the great, in a city where univerſal corruption and profligacy of manners were eſtabliſhed: and yet even in this city, and among theſe degenerate *Romans*, certain it is that different appearances, with the ſame vices, helped to maintain the CÆSARS, and ruined ANTHONY. I might produce many anecdotes to ſhew how the two former ſaved appearances whilſt their vices were the moſt

moſt flagrant, and made ſo much amends for the appearances they had not ſaved, by thoſe of a contrary kind, that a great part at leaſt of all which was ſaid to defame them, might paſs, and did paſs, for the calumny of party.

But ANTHONY threw off all decorum from the firſt, and continued to do ſo to the laſt. Not only *vice*, but *indecency* became habitual to him. He ceaſed to be a general, a conſul, a triumvir, a citizen of *Rome*. He became an *Egyptian* king, ſunk into luxurious effeminacy, and proved he was unfit to govern men, by ſuffering himſelf to be governed by a woman. His *vices* hurt him, but his *habits* ruined him. If a political modeſty at leaſt had made him diſguiſe the firſt, they would have hurt him leſs, and he might have eſcaped the laſt: but he was ſo little ſenſible of this, that in a fragment of one of his letters to *Auguſtus* which *Suetonius* has preſerved, he endeavours to juſtify himſelf by pleading this very *habit*. "What matter is it whom "we lie with? (ſays he) this letter may "find you perhaps with *Tertulla*, or "*Terentilla*, or others that he names. I "lie

" lie with *Cleopatra*, and have I not done
" ſo *theſe nine years?*"

Theſe great examples, which I have produced, not to encourage vice, but to ſhew more ſtrongly the advantages of decency in private behaviour, may appear in ſome ſort figures bigger than the life. Few virtues and few vices grow up, in theſe parts of the world, and in theſe latter ages, to the *ſize* of thoſe I have mentioned, and none have ſuch *ſcenes* wherein to exert themſelves. But the truths I am deſirous to inculcate will be as juſtly delivered in this manner, and perhaps more ſtrongly felt. Failings or vices that flow from the ſame ſource of human nature, that run the ſame courſe thro' the conduct of princes, and have the ſame effects on their characters, and conſequently on their government and their fortune, have all the proportion neceſſary to my application of them. It matters little, whether a prince who abandons that common decorum which reſults from nature, and which reaſon preſcribes, abandons the particular decorums of this country or that, of this age or that, which reſult from mode, and which cuſtom exacts. It matters little for inſtance, whether

ther a prince gives himſelf up to the more groſs luxury of the Weſt, or to the more refined luxury of the Eaſt; whether he become the ſlave of a domeſtic harlot, or of a foreign queen; in ſhort, whether he forget himſelf in the arms of one whore, or of twenty; and whether he imitate *Antony*, or a king of *Achin*, who is reported to have paſſed his whole time in a ſeraglio, eating, drinking, chewing betel, playing with women, and talking of cock-fighting.

To ſum up the whole and draw to a concluſion: this *decency*, this *grace*, this *propriety* of *manners* to *character*, is ſo eſſential to princes in particular, that whenever it is neglected, their virtues loſe a great degree of luſtre, and their defects acquire much aggravation. Nay more, by neglecting this decency and this grace, and for want of a ſufficient regard to appearances, even their virtues may betray them into failings, their failings into vices, and their vices into habits unworthy of princes and unworthy of men.

The *conſtitution* of *governments*, and the different *tempers* and characters of *people*,

*people*, may be thought juſtly to deſerve ſome conſideration, in determining the behaviour of princes in private life as well as in public; and to put a difference, for inſtance, between the decorum of a king of *France*, and that of a king of *Great Britain*.

Lewis the Fourteenth was king in an abſolute monarchy, and reigned over a people whoſe genius makes it as fit perhaps to impoſe on them by admiration and awe, as to gain and hold them by affection. Accordingly he kept great ſtate; was haughty, was reſerved; and all he ſaid or did appeared to be forethought and planned. His regard to appearances was ſuch, that when his miſtreſs was the wife of another man, and he had children by her every year, he endeavoured to cover her conſtant reſidence at court by a place ſhe filled about the queen: and he dined and ſupped and cohabited with the latter in every apparent reſpect as if he had had no miſtreſs at all. Thus he raiſed a great reputation; he was revered by his ſubjects, and admired by his neighbours: and this was due principally to the art with which he managed appearances, ſo as to ſet off his virtues,

tues, to diſguiſe his failings and his vices, and by his example and authority to keep a veil drawn over the futility and debauch of his court.

His ſucceſſor, not to the throne, but to the ſovereign power, was a mere rake, with ſome wit, and no morals; nay, with ſo little regard to them, that he made them a ſubject of ridicule in diſcourſe, and appeared in his whole conduct more profligate, if that could be, than he was in principle. The difference between theſe characters ſoon appeared in abominable effects; ſuch as cruelty apart, might recal the memory of *Nero*, or in the other ſex, that of *Meſſalina*, and ſuch as I leave the chroniclers of ſcandal to relate.

Our ELIZABETH was queen in a limited monarchy, and reigned over a people at all times more eaſily led than driven; and at that time capable of being attached to their prince and their country, by a more generous principle than any of thoſe which prevail in our days, by *affection*. There was a ſtrong *prerogative* then in being, and the crown was in poſſeſſion of greater legal power. Popularity was however

however then (as it is now, and as it muſt be always in mixed government) the ſole true foundation of that ſufficient authority and influence, which other conſtitutions give the prince *gratis*, and *independently* of the people, but which a king of this nation muſt *acquire*. The wiſe queen ſaw it, and ſhe ſaw too how much popularity depends on thoſe appearances, that depend on the decorum, the decency, the grace, and the propriety of behaviour of which we are ſpeaking. A warm concern for the intereſt and honour of the nation, a tenderneſs for her people, and a confidence in their affections, were appearances that run thro' her whole public conduct, and gave life and colour to it. She did great things, and ſhe knew how to ſet them off according to their full value, by her manner of doing them. In her *private behaviour* ſhe ſhewed great affability, ſhe deſcended even to familiarity; but her familiarity was ſuch as could not be imputed to her *weakneſs*, and was therefore moſt juſtly aſcribed to her *goodneſs*. Tho' a woman, ſhe hid all that was womaniſh about her; and if a few equivocal marks of coquetry appeared on ſome occaſions,

occaſions, they paſſed like flaſhes of lightning, vaniſhed as ſoon as they were diſcerned, and imprinted no blot on her character. She had private *friendſhips*, ſhe had *favourites:* but ſhe never ſuffered her *friends* to forget ſhe was their queen; and when her *favourites* did, ſhe made them feel that ſhe was ſo.

Her ſucceſſor had no virtues to ſet off, but he had failings and vices to conceal. He could not conceal the latter; and, void of the former, he could not compenſate for them. His failings and his vices therefore ſtanding in full view, he paſſed for a weak prince and an ill man; and fell into all the contempt wherein his memory remains to this day. The methods he took, to preſerve himſelf from it, ſerved but to confirm him in it. No man can keep the decorum of manners in life, who is not free from every kind of *affectation*, as it has been ſaid already: but he who affects what he has no pretenſions to, or what is improper to his character and rank in the world, is guilty of moſt conſummate folly: he becomes doubly ungracious, doubly indecent, and quite ridiculous. JAMES the firſt, not having one quality to conciliate the eſteem or affec-

tion

tion of his people to him, endeavoured to impoſe on their underſtandings; and to create a reſpect for himſelf, by ſpreading the moſt extravagant notions about *kings* in general, as if they were *middle beings* between God and other men; and by comparing the extent and unſearchable myſteries of their *power* and *prerogative* to thoſe of the divine providence. His *language* and his *behaviour* were commonly ſuited to ſuch fooliſh pretenſions; and thus by aſſuming a claim to ſuch reſpect and ſubmiſſion as were not due to him, he loſt a great part of what was due to him. In ſhort, he begun at the wrong end; for tho' the ſhining qualities of the king may cover ſome failings and ſome vices that do not grow up to ſtrong habits in the man, yet muſt the character of a *great* and *good king* be founded in that of a *great* and *good man*. A king who lives out of the ſight of his ſubjects, or is never ſeen by them except on his throne, can ſcarce be deſpiſed as a man, tho' he may be hated as a king. But the king who lives more in their ſight, and more under their obſervation, may be deſpiſed before he is hated, and even without being hated. This happened to king JAMES: a thouſand circumſtances brought it to paſs,

and

and none more than the *indecent weakneſſes* he had for his *minions*. He did not endeavour to cure this contempt and raiſe his character, only by affecting what he had no pretenſions to, as in the former caſe; but he endeavoured likewiſe moſt vainly to do it by affecting what was improper to his character and rank. He did not endeavour indeed to diſguiſe his natural *puſillanimity* and *timidity* under the maſk of a bully, whilſt he was impoſed upon and inſulted by all his neighbours, and above all by the *Spaniards*; but he retailed the ſcraps of *Buchanan*, affected to talk much, figured in church-controverſies, and put on all the pedantic appearances of a ſcholar, whilſt he neglected all thoſe of a great and good man, as well as king.

Let not princes flatter themſelves. They will be examined cloſely in *private* as well as in *public life:* and thoſe who cannot pierce further will judge of them by the appearances they give in both. To obtain true popularity, that which is founded in eſteem and affection, they muſt therefore maintain their characters in *both*; and to that end neglect appearances in neither, but obſerve the *decorum* neceſſary

ceſſary to preſerve the eſteem, whilſt they win the affections of mankind. *Kings*, they muſt never forget that they are *men*: *men*, they muſt never forget that they are *kings*. The ſentiments which one of theſe reflexions of courſe inſpires will give an humane and affable air to their whole behaviour, and make them taſte in that high elevation all the joys of ſocial life. The ſentiments that the other reflexion ſuggeſts will be found very compatible with the former; and they may never forget that they are kings, tho' they do not always carry the crown on their heads, nor the ſceptre in their hands. *Vanity* and *folly* muſt entrench themſelves in a conſtant affectation of ſtate to preſerve regal dignity: a *wiſe* prince will know how to preſerve it when he lays his majeſty aſide. He will *dare* to appear a private man, and in that character he will draw to himſelf a reſpect leſs oſtentatious, but more real and more pleaſing to him, than any which is paid to the monarch. By never *ſaying* what is unfit for him to ſay, he will never *hear* what is unfit for him to hear. By never *doing* what is unfit for him to do, he will never *ſee* what is unfit for him to ſee. Decency and propriety of manners are ſo far from

from leſſening the pleaſures of life; that they refine them, and give them an higher taſte: they are ſo far from reſtraining the free and eaſy commerce of ſocial life, that they baniſh the bane of it, licentiouſneſs of behaviour. *Ceremony* is the barrier againſt this abuſe of liberty in public; *politeneſs* and *decency* are ſo in private: and the prince, who practiſes and exacts them, will amuſe himſelf much better, and oblige thoſe who have the honour to be in his intimacy, and to ſhare his pleaſures with him, much more, than he could poſſibly do by the moſt *abſolute* and *unguarded familiarity*.

That which is here recommended to princes, that conſtant guard on their own behaviour even in private life, and that conſtant decorum which their example ought to exact from others, will not be found ſo difficult in practice as may be imagined; if they uſe a proper diſcernment in the *choice* of the *perſons* whom they admit to the neareſt degrees of intimacy with them. A prince ſhould chuſe his *companions* with as great care as his *miniſters*. If he truſts the *buſineſs* of his ſtate to theſe, he truſts his *character* to thoſe: and his character will depend on theirs

theirs much more than is commonly thought. General experience will lead men to judge that a ſimilitude of character determined the choice; even when chance, indulgence to aſſiduity, good nature, or want of reflection had their ſhare in the introduction of men unworthy of ſuch favour. But, in ſuch caſes, certain it is that they, who judged wrong at firſt concerning him, will judge right at laſt. He is not a trifler, for inſtance. Be it ſo: but if he takes trifling futile creatures, men of mean characters, or of no character, into his intimacy, he ſhews a diſpoſition to become ſuch, and will become ſuch, unleſs he breaks theſe habits early, and before puerile amuſements are grown up to be the buſineſs of his life. I mean that the minds of princes, like the minds of other men, will be *brought down* inſenſibly to the *tone* of the company they keep.

A worſe conſequence even than this may follow a want of diſcernment in princes how to chuſe their companions, and how to conduct themſelves in private life. Silly kings have reſigned themſelves to their *miniſters*, have ſuffered theſe to ſtand between them and their people, and

and have formed no judgments, nor taken any meaſures on their own knowledge, but all implicitly on the repreſentations made to them by their miniſters. Kings of ſuperior capacity have reſigned themſelves in the ſame manner to their *favourites*, male and female, have ſuffered theſe to ſtand between them and their moſt able and faithful counſellors: their judgments have been influenced, and their meaſures directed by inſinuations of women, or of men as little fitted as women, by nature and education, to be hearkened to, in the great affairs of government. Hiſtory is full of ſuch examples; all melancholy, many tragical! ſufficient, one would imagine, to deter princes, if attended to, from permitting the companions of their idle hours, or the inſtruments of their pleaſures, to exceed the bounds of thoſe provinces. Should a miniſter of ſtate pretend to vie with any of theſe, about the forms of a *drawing room*, the regulation of a *ruelle*, the decoration of a *ball*, or the dreſs of a *fine lady*, he would be thought ridiculous, and he would be truly ſo. But then are not any of theſe impertinent, when they preſume to meddle in things at leaſt as much *above* them, as thoſe that have been mentioned are *be-*

*low* the others? And are not princes who ſuffer them to do ſo, unaccountably weak?

What ſhall I ſay further on this head? Nothing more is neceſſary. Let me wind it up therefore by aſſerting this great truth, that reſults from what has been already ſaid: As he can never fill the character of a patriot king, tho' his perſonal great and good qualities be in every other reſpect equal to it, who lies open to the flattery of *courtiers*, to the ſeduction of *women*, and to the partialities and affections which are eaſily contracted by too great indulgence in private life; ſo the prince who is deſirous to eſtabliſh this character, muſt obſerve ſuch a decorum, and keep ſuch a guard on himſelf, as may prevent even the *ſuſpicion* of being liable to ſuch influences. For as the reality would ruin, the very ſuſpicion will leſſen him in the opinion of mankind: and the opinion of mankind, which is *fame* after death, is ſuperior *ſtrength* and *power* in life.

And now, if the principles and meaſures of conduct, laid down in this diſcourſe, as neceſſary to conſtitute that greateſt and moſt glorious of human beings,

ings, a patriot king, be ſufficient to this purpoſe; let us conſider too how *eaſy* it is, or ought to be, to eſtabliſh them in the minds of princes. They are founded on true propoſitions, all of which are obvious, nay, many of them ſelf-evident. They are confirmed by univerſal experience. In a word, no underſtanding can reſiſt them, and none but the weakeſt can fail, or be miſled, in the application of them. To a prince whoſe heart is corrupt, it is in vain to ſpeak, and for ſuch a prince I would not be thought to write. But if the heart of a prince be not corrupt, theſe truths will find an eaſy ingreſſion thro' the underſtanding to it. Let us conſider again, what the ſure, the neceſſary effects of ſuch principles and meaſures of conduct muſt be, to the prince, and to the people. On this ſubject let the imagination range thro' the whole glorious ſcene of a patriot reign: the beauty of the idea will inſpire thoſe tranſports, which PLATO imagined the viſion of virtue would inſpire, if virtue could be ſeen. What in truth can be ſo lovely? what ſo venerable, as to contemplate a king on whom the eyes of a whole people are fixed, filled with admiration, and glowing with affection? a king, in the temper

of whoſe government, like that of NERVA, things ſo ſeldom allied as empire and liberty are intimately mixed, co-exiſt together inſeparably, and conſtitute one real eſſence? What ſpectacle can be preſented to the view of the mind ſo rare, ſo nearly divine, as a king poſſeſſed of abſolute power, neither uſurped by fraud nor maintained by force, but the genuine effect of eſteem, of confidence, and affection; the free gift of *liberty*, who finds her greateſt ſecurity in this power, and would deſire no other if the prince on the throne could be, what his people wiſh him to be, immortal. Of ſuch a prince, and of ſuch a prince alone, it may be ſaid with ſtrict propriety and truth,

*Volentes*
*Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat*
*Olympi.*

Civil fury will have no place in this draught: or, if the monſter is ſeen, he muſt be ſeen as *Virgil* deſcribes him,

*Centum vinctus catenis*
*Poſt tergum nodis, fremit horridus ore*
*cruento.*

He

He muſt be ſeen ſubdued, bound, chained, and deprived entirely of power to do hurt. In his place, concord will appear, brooding peace and proſperity on the happy land; joy ſitting in every face, content in every heart; a people unoppreſſed, undiſturbed, unalarmed; buſy to improve their private property and the public ſtock; fleets covering the ocean; bringing home wealth by the returns of induſtry; carrying aſſiſtance or terror abroad by the direction of wiſdom; and aſſerting triumphantly the right and the honour of *Great Britain*, as far as waters roll and as winds can waft them.

Thoſe who live to ſee ſuch happy days, and to act in ſo glorious a ſcene, will perhaps call to mind with ſome tenderneſs of ſentiment, when he is no more, a *man*, who contributed his mite to carry on ſo good a work, and who deſired life for nothing ſo much, as to ſee a king of *Great Britain* the moſt popular man in his country, and a *patriot king* at the head of an united people.

# LETTER III.

## *Of the* State *of* PARTIES *at the Acceſſion of King* GEORGE I.

I Perceive by yours that my diſcourſe of the character and conduct of a patriot king, in that article which relates to *party*, has not entirely ſatisfied your expectations. You expected, from ſome things that I remember to have ſaid to you in converſation, and others that have fallen on that occaſion from my pen, a more particular application of thoſe general reaſonings to the preſent time, and to the ſtate of parties, from the late king's acceſſion to the throne. The ſubject is delicate enough, and yet I ſhall ſpeak upon it what *truth* exacts from me, with the utmoſt frankneſs: for I know all our parties

parties too well, to eſteem any; and I am too old, and too reſigned to my fate, to want, or to fear any.

Whatever anecdotes you have been told, for you are too young to have ſeen the paſſages of the times I am going to mention, and whatever prepoſſeſſions you have had, take theſe facts for undoubted truths: that there was no deſign on foot during the four laſt years of queen ANNE's reign to ſet aſide the ſucceſſion of the houſe of *Hanover*, and to place the crown on the head of the pretender to it; nor any party formed for this purpoſe at the time of the death of that princeſs, whoſe memory I honour, and therefore feel a juſt indignation at the irreverence with which we have ſeen it treated. If ſuch a deſign had been on foot during that time, there were moments when the execution of it would not have been difficult, or dangerous enough, to have ſtopped men of the moſt moderate reſolution. Neither could a deſign of that nature have been carried on ſo long, tho' it was not carried into execution, without leaving ſome traces, which would have appeared when ſuch ſtrict inquiſitions were made; when the papers of ſo many of the queen's ſervants were ſeized, and even her own pa-

pers, even thoſe ſhe had ſealed up to be burnt after her death, were expoſed to ſo much indecent inſpection. But laying aſide all arguments of the probable kind, I deny the fact abſolutely: and I have the better title to expect credit, becauſe it could not be true without my knowledge, or at leaſt ſuſpicion of it; and becauſe even they who believe it, for all who aſſerted it did not believe it, had no proof to produce, nor have to this hour, but vain ſurmiſes; nor any authority to reſt upon, but the clamour of party.

That there were particular men, who correſponded indirectly and directly too with the pretender, and with others for his ſervice; that theſe men profeſſed themſelves to be zealous in it, and made large promiſes, and raiſed ſome faint hopes, I cannot doubt; tho' this was unknown to me at that time, or at leaſt I knew it not with the ſame certainty and in the ſame detail that I have known it ſince. But if this was done by ſome who were in the queen's ſervice, it was done too by ſome who were out of it, and I think with little ſincerity by either.

It may well ſeem ſtrange to one who carries in his breaſt a heart like yours, that

that men of any rank, and eſpecially of the higheſt, ſhould hold a conduct ſo falſe, ſo dangerous, always of uncertain event, and often, as it was in the caſe here mentioned, upon remote contingencies, and ſuch as they themſelves think the leaſt probable. Even I think it ſtrange, who have been much longer mingled in a corrupt world, and who have ſeen many more examples of the folly, of the cunning, and the perfidy of mankind. A great regard to wealth, and a total contempt of virtue, are ſentiments very nearly allied: and they muſt poſſeſs the whole ſouls of men whom they can determine to ſuch infamous duplicity, to ſuch double treachery. In fact they do ſo. *One* is ſo afraid of loſing his fortune, that he lays in claims to ſecure it, perhaps to augment it, on all ſides, and to prevent even imaginary dangers. *Another* values ſo little the inward teſtimony of a good conſcience, or the future reproaches of thoſe he has deceived, that he ſcruples not to make engagements for a time to come that he has no deſign to keep; if they may ſerve as expedients to facilitate, in any ſmall degree, the ſucceſs of an immediate project. All this was done at the time, on the occaſion, and by the perſons I intend. But the ſcheme of defeating

the Proteſtant ſucceſſion was ſo far from being laid by the queen and her miniſters, and ſuch a reſolution was ſo far from being taken, that the very men I ſpeak of, when they were preſſed by the other ſide, that is from *Verſailles* and *St. Germains*, to be more particular, and to come into a cloſer concert, declined both, and gave the moſt evaſive anſwers.

A little before, or about the time of the queen's death, ſome other perſons, who figured afterwards in the rebellion, entered in good earneſt into thoſe engagements, as I believe; for I do not know exactly the date of them. But whenever they took them, they took them as *ſingle men*. They could anſwer for no *party* to back them. They might flatter themſelves with hopes and dreams, like POMPEY, if little men and little things may be compared with great, of legions ready to riſe at the ſtamp of their feet. But they had no aſſurance, no nor grounds to expect any troops, except thoſe of the highlands; whoſe diſpoſition in general was known to every man, but whoſe inſurrection without the concurrence of other inſurrections, and other troops, was deemed, even by thoſe that made them take arms afterwards, not a ſtrength but a weakneſs,

weakneſs, ruin to the poor people, and ruin to the cauſe. In a word, theſe men were ſo truly ſingle in their engagements, and their meaſures were ſo unripe for action when the reſolution of acting immediately was taken by them, that I am perſuaded they durſt not communicate their deſign to any one man of conſequence that ſerved at that time with them. What perſuades me of it is this: one man, whom they thought likely to incline to them on ſeveral accounts, they attempted indirectly and at a great diſtance: they came no nearer to the point with him, neither then, that is juſt before the queen's death, nor afterwards. They had indeed no encouragement to do it; for upon this hint and another circumſtance which fell in, both he and others took ſeveral occaſions to declare that tho' they would ſerve the queen faithfully and excluſively of all other regards or engagements to her laſt breath, yet after her deceaſe they would acknowledge the prince on whom the ſucceſſion devolved by law, and to which they had ſworn, and no other. This declaration would have been that of the far greateſt number of the ſame party, and would have been ſtuck to by them, if the paſſions and private intereſts of *another party* had not prevailed over the true intereſt of a new fa-

mily that was going to mount the throne. You may aſk me now, and the queſtion will not be at all improper, how it came to paſs, if the queen and her miniſters had no deſign to defeat this ſucceſſion, that ſo much ſuſpicion of it prevailed, that ſo great an alarm was taken, and ſo great a clamour raiſed? I might anſwer you very ſhortly and very truly, by the ſtrange conduct of a firſt miniſter, by the conteſts about the negociations of the peace, and by the arts of a party.

The minds of ſome miniſters are like the *ſanctum ſanctorum* of a temple I have read of ſomewhere: before it a great curtain was ſolemnly drawn; within it nothing was to be ſeen but a confuſed groupe of miſ-ſhapen, and imperfect forms, heads without bodies, bodies without heads, and the like. To develope the moſt complicated caſes, and to decide in the moſt doubtful, has been the talent of great miniſters: it is that of others to perplex the moſt ſimple, and to be puzzled by the plaineſt. No man was more deſirous of power than the miniſter here intended: and he had a competent ſhare of cunning to wriggle himſelf into it; but then his part was over, and no man was more at a loſs how to employ it. The ends he propoſed to himſelf, he ſaw for the moſt part

part darkly and indiſtinctly: and if he ſaw them a little better, he ſtill made uſe of means diſproportionate to them. That private correſpondence with the queen, which produced the change of the miniſtry in 1710, was begun with him whilſt he was ſecretary of ſtate, and was continued thro' him during the two years that intervened between his leaving the court, and his return to it. This gave him the ſole confidence of the queen, put him more abſolutely at the head of the party that came into power, and inveſted him with all the authority that a firſt miniſter could have in thoſe days, and before any man could preſume to rival in that rank, and in this kingdom, the rank of the ancient mayors of the palace in *France*. The tories, with whom and by whom he had riſen, expected much from him. Their expectations were ill-anſwered: and I think that ſuch management as he employed would not have hindered them long from breaking from him, if new things had not fallen in, to engage their whole attention, and to divert their paſſions.

The fooliſh proſecution of SACHEVEREL had carried party-rage to the heighth, and the late change of the miniſtry had confirmed

firmed it there. Theſe circumſtances, and many others relative to them, which I omit, would have made it impoſſible, if there had been honeſty and wiſdom enough to deſire it, to bring about a coalition of the bulk of the tories and whigs at the latter end of this reign: as it had been brought about a few years before under the adminiſtration of my lord MARLBOROUGH and my lord GODOLPHIN, who broke it ſoon and before it had time to cement, by making ſuch an uſe of it, as I am unable to account for even at this hour. The two parties were in truth become factions, in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word. I was of one, and I own the guilt; which no man of the other would have a good grace to deny. In this reſpect they were alike; but here was the difference: one was well united, well conducted, and determined to their future, as well as their preſent objects. Not one of theſe advantages attended the other. The miniſter had evidently no bottom to reſt his adminiſtration upon, but that of the party, at the head of which he came into power: if he had reſted it there, if he had gained their confidence, inſtead of creating even wantonly, if I may ſay ſo, a diſtruſt of himſelf in them, it is certain he might have determined

determined them to every national intereſt during the queen's time, and after her death. But this was above his conception as well as his talents. He meant to keep power as long as he could, by the little arts by which he had got into it: he thought that he ſhould be able to compound for himſelf in all events, and cared little what became of his party, his miſtreſs, or the nation. That this was the whole of his ſcheme appeared ſufficiently in the courſe of his adminiſtration; was then ſeen by ſome, and has been ſince acknowledged by all people. For this purpoſe he coaxed and perſecuted whigs, he flattered and diſappointed tories; and ſupported by a thouſand little tricks his tottering adminiſtration. To the tory party he held out the peace, as an æra when all they expected ſhould be done for them, and when they ſhould be placed in ſuch fulneſs of power and ſuch ſtrength of party, *that it would be more the intereſt of the ſucceſſor to be well with them, than theirs to be well with him.* Such expreſſions were often uſed, and others of like import: and I believe theſe oracular ſpeeches were interpreted, as oracles uſed to be, according as every man's inclinations led him.

The

The conteſts that ſoon followed, by the violent oppoſition to the negociations of peace, did the good hinted at above to the miniſter, and enabled him to amuſe and banter his party a little longer. But they did great, and in ſome reſpects irreparable, miſchief to *Great Britain*, and to all *Europe*. One part of the miſchief they did at home is proper to be mentioned here. They dipped the houſe of *Hanover* in our party-quarrels unſeaſonably, I preſume to think, and impopularly; for tho' the conteſt was maintained by two parties that pretended equally to have the national intereſt at heart, yet the national intereſt was ſo plainly on one ſide of the queſtion, and the other ſide was ſo plainly partial, at the expence of this intereſt, to the emperor, the princes of the empire, and the *Dutch* in particular; that a ſucceſſor to the crown, who was himſelf a prince of *Germany*, ſhould have preſerved in good policy, for this very reaſon, the appearance at leaſt of ſome neutrality. The means employed openly to break the queen's meaſures were indecent and unjuſtifiable: thoſe employed ſecretly, and meditated to be employed, were worſe. The miniſters of *Hanover*, whoſe conduct I may cenſure the more freely becauſe the late king did not approve

prove it all, took ſo remarkable a ſhare in the firſt, that they might be, and they were, ſuſpected of having ſome in the others. This had a very bad effect, which was improved by men in the two extremes. The whigs deſired nothing more than to have it thought that the ſucceſſor was theirs, if I may repeat an inſolent expreſſion which was uſed at that time: the notion did them honour, and tho' it could give no colour, it gave ſome ſtrength to their oppoſition. The Jacobites inſinuated induſtriouſly the ſame thing; and repreſented that the eſtabliſhment of the houſe of *Hanover* would be the eſtabliſhment of the whig party, and that the intereſts of *Great Britain* would be conſtantly ſacrificed to foreign intereſts, and her wealth drained to ſupport them under that family. I leave you to judge what ingreſſion ſuch exaggerations muſt find, on ſuch occaſion, and in ſuch a ferment. I do not think they determined men to Jacobitiſm. I know they did not; but I know that they diſ-inclined men from the ſucceſſion, and made many who reſolved to ſubmit to it, ſubmit to it rather as a neceſſary evil, than as an eligible good.

This was, to the beſt of my obſervation, and knowledge, the ſtate of one party.

An

An abſurd one it was, and the conſequences of it were foreſeen, foretold, and preſſed upon the miniſter at the time, but always without effect, and ſometimes without any anſwers. He had ſome private intrigue for himſelf at *Hanover*: ſo he had at *Bar*. He was the bubble of one in the end: the pretender was ſo of the other. But his whole management in the mean time was contrived to keep up a kind of general indetermination in the party about the ſucceſſion; which made a man of great temper once ſay to him with paſſion, that "he believed no other miniſter "at the head of a powerful party would "not be better at *Hanover*, if he did not "mean to be worſe there.

The ſtate of the other party was this. The whigs had appeared zealous for the proteſtant ſucceſſion from the time when king WILLIAM propoſed it, after the death of the duke of GLOUCESTER. The tories voted for it then, and the acts that were judged neceſſary to ſecure it, ſome of them at leaſt, were promoted by them. Yet were they not thought, nor did they affect as the others did, to be thought extremely fond of it. King WILLIAM did not come into this meaſure, till he found, upon trial, that there was no other ſafe and practicable:

cable: and the tories had an air of coming into it for no other reaſon. Beſides which, it is certain that there was at that time a much greater leaven of Jacobitiſm in the tory-lump, than at the time ſpoken of here.

Now thus far the whigs acted like a national party, who thought that their religion and liberty could be ſecured by no other expedient, and therefore adhered to this ſettlement of the crown with diſtinguiſhed zeal. But this national party degenerated ſoon into faction; that is, the national intereſt became ſoon a ſecondary and ſubſervient motive, and the cauſe of the ſucceſſion was ſupported more for the ſake of the party or faction, than for the ſake of the nation; and with views that went more directly to the eſtabliſhment of their own adminiſtration, than to a ſolid ſettlement of the preſent royal family. This appeared, evidently enough, to thoſe whom noiſe and ſhew could not impoſe upon, in the latter end of the queen's reign, and plain beyond diſpute to all mankind, after her deceaſe. The art of the whigs was to blend, as undiſtinguiſhably as they could, all their party-intereſts with thoſe of the ſucceſſion: and they made juſt the ſame factious uſe of the ſuppoſed danger of it, as the tories had endeavoured to make ſome time before

fore of the ſuppoſed danger of the church. As no man is reputed a friend to chriſtianity beyond the *Alpes* and the *Pyrenees*, who does not acknowledge the papal ſupremacy, ſo here no man was to be reputed a friend to the proteſtant ſucceſſion who was not ready to acknowledge their ſupremacy. The intereſt of the preſent royal family was to ſucceed without oppoſition and riſque, and to come to the throne in a calm. It was the intereſt of a faction that they ſhould come to it in a ſtorm. Accordingly the whigs were very near putting in execution ſome of the wildeſt projects of inſurrections and rebellion, under pretence of ſecuring what there was not ſufficient diſpoſition, nor any preparation at all made to obſtruct. Happily for the public theſe deſigns proved abortive. They were too well known to have ſucceeded, but they might have had, they would have had, moſt fatal conſequences. The ſtorm, that was not raiſed to diſturb and endanger the late king's acceſſion, was only deferred. To a party, who meant nothing leſs than engroſſing the whole power of the government and the whole wealth of the nation under the ſucceſſor, a ſtorm, in which every other man ſhould be driven from

from him, was too neceſſary, not to be conjured up at any rate; and it was ſo immediately after the late king's acceſſion. He came to the throne eaſily, and quietly, and took poſſeſſion of the kingdom with as little trouble, as he could have expected if he had been not only the queen's ſucceſſor, but her ſon. The whole nation ſubmitted chearfully to his government, and the queen's ſervants diſcharged the duty of their offices, whilſt he continued them in their offices, in ſuch a manner as to merit his approbation. This was ſignified to ſome of them, to the ſecretaries in particular, in the ſtrongeſt terms, and according to his majeſty's expreſs order, before the whole council of ſtate. He might I think, I thought then that he ought, and every man except the earl of *O——d*, who believed or had a mind to make others believe that his influence would be great in the new reign, expected that he would have given his principal confidence and the principal power of the adminiſtration to the whigs: but it was ſcarce poſſible to expect, that he would immediately let looſe the whole fury of party, ſuffer the queen's ſervants, who had ſurely been guilty of no crime againſt him nor the ſtate, to be ſo bitterly perſecuted;

cuted; and proſcribe in effect every man in the country who did not bear the name of whig. Princes have often forgot, on their acceſſion to a throne, even perſonal injuries received in party quarrels: and the ſaying of LEWIS the twelfth of *France*, in anſwer to thoſe who would have perſuaded him to ſhew ſeverity to LA TREMOUILLE, is very deſervedly famous, "God forbid, ſaid he, that LEWIS the "twelfth ſhould revenge the quarrels of "the duke of *Orleans*." Other princes, who have fought their way to the throne, have not only exerciſed clemency, but ſhewn favour to thoſe who had ſtood in arms againſt them: and here again I might quote the example of another king of *France*, that of HENRY the fourth. But to take an example in our own country, look back to the reſtoration, conſider all that paſſed from the year 1641 to the year 1660, and then compare the meaſures that King CHARLES the ſecond was adviſed to purſue for the eſtabliſhment of his government in the circumſtances of that time, with thoſe which the late king was adviſed, and prevailed on, againſt his opinion, inclination, and firſt reſolution, to purſue, in the circumſtances I have juſt mentioned. I leave the concluſion to the candour and good ſenſe of every impartial reader.

To

To theſe meaſures of unexpected violence alone it muſt be aſcribed, that the pretender had any party for him of ſtrength ſufficient to appear and act. Theſe meaſures alone produced the troubles that followed, and dyed the royal ermines of a prince, no way ſanguinary, in blood. I am far from excuſing one party, for ſuffering another to drive them into rebellion. I wiſh I could forget it myſelf. But there are two obſervations on that event, which I cannot refuſe myſelf to make. One is, that the very manner in which this rebellion was begun ſhews abundantly that it was a ſtart of paſſion, a ſudden phrenzy of men tranſported by their reſentment, and nothing leſs than the execution of a deſign long premeditated and prepared. The other is, that few examples are to be found in hiſtory, perhaps none, of what happened on this occaſion, when the ſame men, in the ſame country, and in the compaſs of the ſame year, were ready to riſe in arms againſt one prince without any national cauſe; and then provoked, by the violence of their councils, the oppoſite faction to riſe in actual rebellion againſt the ſucceſſor.

Theſe

Theſe are ſome of the effects of maintaining *diviſions* in a nation, and of *governing* by *faction*. I might deſcend into a detail of many fatal conſequences that have followed, from the firſt falſe ſtep which was taken, when the preſent ſettlement was ſo avowedly made on the *narrow bottom* of *party*. But I conſider that this diſcourſe is growing into length; that I have had and ſhall have occaſion to mention ſome of theſe conſequences elſewhere; and that your own reflexions on what has been ſaid, will more than ſupply what I omit to ſay in this place. Let me therefore conclude by repeating, That *diviſion* has cauſed all the miſchief we lament, that *union* can alone retrieve it, and that a great advance towards this union was the coalition of parties, ſo happily begun, ſo ſucceſsfully carried on, and of late ſo unaccountably neglected, to ſay no worſe. But let me add, that this union can never be compleat, till it become an union of the *head* with the *members*, as well as of the members with one another: and that ſuch an union can never be expected till *patriotiſm* fills the *throne*, and *faction* be baniſhed from the *adminiſtration*.

*The* E N D.